Nuclear brinkmanship keeping the world on edge
ON the eve
of Hiroshima Day (August 6), while the world can derive slender satisfaction from the fact that the nuclear taboo (non-use of nuclear weapons) has not been violated by the nuclear weapon-capable powers since 1945, one cannot be too certain that this sanctity will be respected in the run-up to the 80th anniversary of the atomic bombings next year.
This pessimism was reflected in January this year when the hands on the Doomsday Clock (maintained by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in Chicago) remained at 90 seconds to midnight — the “closest it has ever been to apocalypse”. This 90-second caution was announced last year in January and the reasons cited for this grave caution were the risk of nuclear escalation that arose from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as well as climate change, biological threats such as Covid-19 and risks associated with disinformation and disruptive technologies.
Every year, the bulletin determines how much notional time the world has to avert an apocalyptic catastrophe. Over the past 75 years, the hands of the clock have moved according to whether effective steps had been taken to redress threats that could end human civilisation on the planet. Both a nuclear war and unprecedented climate change are on top of the list of apocalyptic exigencies.
The clock’s original setting in 1947 was seven minutes (420 seconds) to midnight and the grim possibility of a nuclear war between the former superpowers (the US and the USSR) was a perennial anxiety during the Cold War decades. The so-called ‘safest’ setting of the clock was in 1991, when the clock hands showed 17 minutes (1,020 seconds) from midnight, and the most dire was 90 seconds, set in January 2023.
A brief review of the prevailing global turbulence that could escalate to nuclear sabre-rattling and related brinkmanship covers the war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas conflict; the latter has escalated to a potential Israel-Iran war after the recent assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was followed by Moscow drawing attention to its nuclear weapon capability on many occasions to ‘deter’ the US-led NATO from crossing the redlines identified by Russian President Vladimir Putin. Earlier this year, tactical nuclear weapons were brought into the picture; in May, a Russian Iskander missile was seen during drills to train the military for using tactical nuclear weapons at an undisclosed location in Russia.
Whether this brinkmanship to constrain the US and EU support to Kyiv is a bluff or otherwise remains moot but the UN clearly was very concerned. In June, UN Secretary General António Guterres cautioned: “Humanity is on a knife’s edge. The risk of a nuclear weapon being used has reached heights not seen since the Cold War. States are engaged in a qualitative arms race. We need disarmament now. All countries need to step up, but nuclear weapons states must lead the way."
In June, a global survey by SIPRI (the Stockholm-based security think tank) concluded that the nine nuclear-armed states — the US, Russia, the UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel — continued to modernise their nuclear arsenals and several had deployed new nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable weapon systems in 2023.
Nuclear-growling is in the simmer mode. In July-end, Russian President Putin warned that Moscow would station previously banned long-range missiles close to western countries if the US went ahead with its commitment to deploy several types of nuclear-capable missiles in Germany.
It is ironic that almost four decades after the former USSR and the US successfully concluded the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which required both parties to eliminate and permanently renounce use of all nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range from 500 km to 5,500 km, Moscow and Washington are getting back into the once-forbidden WMD (weapons of mass destruction) deployment mode in Europe. This is a cause for a deep concern.
If the world’s two major nuclear powers (the US and Russia have almost 90 per cent of the global nuclear arsenal) increase their reliance on the dreaded nuke for securing their core survival interests — as Putin has framed the threat for the US/NATO — other states will follow and this is what is animating the global nuclear domain.
Pakistan and North Korea have often rattled their nuclear sabre to ward off what they perceive as superior conventional military threats. The subtext here is of relevance to examine how the pristine deterrence of old is now being diluted. Both these nations have been accused by their adversaries of engaging in and abetting terrorism by using their nuclear weapons as a shield — this practice has been differently described as NWET (nuclear weapon-enabled terrorism) and TBNS (terrorism behind the nuclear shield) and merits attention.
The Kargil War remains a case study for the manner in which two nuclear weapon-capable nations — proximate neighbours and democracies to boot — were involved in a limited war but the WMD restraint was maintained. Will the current turmoil in West Asia — that involves Israel, an opaque nuclear power, and Iran that could transform itself into a nuclear weapon power — stay within the framework of mutual deterrence? Powerful non-state entities such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthi rebels have demonstrated considerable transborder lethality and the possibility of a ‘dirty bomb’ (radiological contamination) remains an abiding WMD challenge. Manipulation through AI and disinformation campaigns adds to the cocktail that is brewing, and the forecast is bleak.
The major powers are differently distracted: the US with its dramatic and ugly election that will determine the next White House incumbent, Russia mired in the Ukraine morass and China in the Taiwan dilemma.
Can India encourage like-minded medium powers to highlight the dangers of the darkening nuclear-brinkmanship cloud?