No room for complacency along LAC
THERE are a number of pressing issues warranting the attention of the new government. Among these, the requirements and concerns of the armed forces merit top priority as these directly affect national security. Enhanced financial outlay for capability development, implementing structural reorganisation at the macro level and a review of the recruitment systems need to be addressed in a committed and decisive manner.
While China will keep voicing platitudes about the need for friendly ties, the PLA will continue to look for positions of strength & advantage along the LAC.
Our major adversary on the northern borders is continuing with its duplicitous stance. China’s new Ambassador to India Xu Feihong (appointed after a gap of 18 months), after presenting his credentials on May 31, called for joint efforts to “enhance political mutual trust, manage differences properly, and advance mutual beneficial cooperation so as to bring China-India relations forward along the right track”. However, the situation on the borders, especially in eastern Ladakh, remains tense, with no significant forward movement even after 21 rounds of high-level military talks held so far. Along with the enhanced deployment of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops and significant construction of military infrastructure, recent satellite imagery has indicated the largest deployment of Chinese J-20 stealth fighter jets — its most advanced — at a dual-use military and civilian airport in Shigatse, the second largest city in the Tibet Autonomous Region which is less than 150 km from the Line of Actual Control, opposite Sikkim.
For India, the acquisition of major platforms like the third aircraft carrier, new-generation submarines and fighter jets is essential for building capabilities which enable credible deterrence against China. However, what is even more important is the present situation on the LAC, and this translates into current intent. While China will keep voicing platitudes about the need for friendly bilateral relations, the ground elements of the PLA will continue to look for positions of strength and advantage along the LAC. For the Indian Army, the focus will thus remain on enhancing intelligence and surveillance capabilities with an increasing number of military satellites and accelerating the process of acquiring state-of-the-art weapons and equipment. These include battlefield transparency systems, unmanned combat aerial vehicles and latest night vision capabilities, even imported ones as Atmanirbharta will take its time.
All this costs money and an enhancement of the ‘status quoist’ defence budget. On February 1, the Finance Minister presented the Interim Budget for 2024-25, which had an allocation of Rs 6,21,541 crore for the Ministry of Defence (MoD), a 4.72 per cent increase over the defence budget for 2023-24. However, compared to the revised allocation for last year, it was a marginal fall in real terms. As a percentage of government expenditure, this was just 13 per cent, continuing a multi-year trend of falling defence outlay, representing 1.89 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Interestingly, the bulk of the allotment for capital acquisitions, Rs 1.72 lakh crore — 27.67 per cent of the total defence budget — will be taken away by committed liabilities.
The finance ministry is getting ready to present the full Budget for 2024-25 next month. One key change would be in the accounting of the more-than-expected RBI dividend of Rs 2.11 trillion for the Central Government. As a result, some of the extra receipts would be used for pre-payment of debt and to further reduce the fiscal deficit. While the full Budget for the current financial year may not be much different from the interim one, a substantial increase in the total defence allocation would be prudent for enhancing national security.
An integrated and unified theatre command structure has been on the anvil for almost five years now. Despite the political executive being positively inclined and desirous of this, an inordinate delay has taken place. Prolonged confabulations due to inter-services turf wars and specious arguments for status quo have been the major stumbling blocks. There has been a concerted effort by the Department of Military Affairs, under the CDS, to give this restructuring a final shape, incorporating optimum utilisation of all elements, including cyberspace and space. While the CDS can and surely will be a facilitator for this change, it has to be strongly driven by the political leadership so that the armed forces evolve into a fully synergised joint organisation. It would make sense, therefore, for this subject to be on the government’s 100-day agenda.
The third issue of concern is the new recruitment system for the armed forces, the Agnipath scheme, which was unveiled in June 2022 and the process set in motion in January 2023. Recruits have been enrolled under the name of Agniveers, with only 25 per cent to be retained after four years and the remainder being released from service with benefits and generic promises of re-employment in other departments, including Central police organisations. This scheme was imposed on the armed forces in haste under some imagined benefits of a younger profile for the services. Almost two years down the line, the feedback from the unit-level organisations, the cutting edge of the Army, is anything but encouraging. It’s not a happy situation now, with Army recruitment a low-priority option for the mostly rural youth who have traditionally been the main source of our soldiery.
Some political parties had opposed the Agnipath scheme during the recent election campaign. Now, with a coalition in power, one of its constituents, the Janata Dal (United), has called for a review of this system of recruitment. It will indeed be ironic if a policy which did not find favour with the organisation on which it was imposed and which was stridently opposed by retired officers of the Army were to see a rollback not due to sane advice but the exigencies of coalition politics. Be that as it may, the recruitment system of the forces needs an urgent review, well before the first lot of Agniveers heads for retrenchment.
Expectations from new governments are always high, though the present dispensation is largely a continuation of the same leadership. It is to be hoped and expected that the urgent concerns of the armed forces will be prioritised.
