Necessary for security

THE TRIBUNE DEBATE BORDER FENCING

FENCES are not walls. They are latter-day creations in accordance with the Westphalian concept to manage legal, regulated movement between historically undemarcated territories that continue to be, in certain cases, contested.

The manner in which the Partition was carried out in 1947 left people on both sides of a united expanse with similarities in identities but political differences. Punjab and Bengal bore the brunt of the division.

India’s claim over entire Kashmir is iron-clad, fence or no fence. Pakistan’s illegal occupation of parts of Kashmir and the fence that demarcates the Line of Control (LoC) at present are matters that are inseparable from Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. The fencing of the entire LoC is, therefore, a national security imperative. Incursion into Kashmir is a planned affair. It takes place with lunar cycle regularity. The Indian security forces deployed in the Valley need the fence. It is there to both guard it and ensure that intruders are neutralised.

If a comparison is drawn with the fence in the North East, the most important aspect that must be addressed is illegal migration from Bangladesh to India. This is largely due to economic reasons. Of late, climate change in south Bangladesh, whereby the waters of the Bay of Bengal are flooding some regions, is also responsible for the illegal ingress.

The fence between India and Bangladesh continues to be a ragtag one because of riverine issues, but the migration has been controlled to a great extent.

The fact that Sheikh Hasina’s government has been able to improvise work visas with several countries for the growing Bangladeshi labour force has reduced illegal migration into India. It is in this context that the India-Myanmar fencing proposal must be examined.

There are many naysayers who are of the view that the fencing of the entire 1,643-km border is not a sound idea. These critics are raising matters ranging from the end of the Free Movement Regime (FMR), which permits denizens residing along the boundary on either side to travel 16 km into the other country without a visa for trade, to the human aspect pertaining to the demographic contiguity that characterises India and Myanmar along the border. But a dispassionate cost-benefit assessment would show that the pros outnumber the cons.

The current unrest in Manipur is a direct result of the porous India-Myanmar border. After the military takeover in February 2021, Valley-Based-Insurgent Groups (VBIGs) in Myanmar’s Sagaing division had arrived at an understanding with the Myanmarese army.

The VBIGs will no longer be touched, harassed or ousted from their safe havens in what has come to be known as the northern, central and southern clusters in Sagaing division. In return, the VBIGs would have to help the army quell the civil unrest that erupted after the coup d’etat.

The development led to an end to the modicum of military cooperation that had been witnessed in the years preceding the military takeover by way of Operations Sunrise-I and Sunrise-II, which demolished several India Insurgent Groups’ (IIGs) camps in and around Taga (a hunting ground for IIGs just west of the Chindwin river). Manipur has witnessed the entry of VBIG cadres to battle the Kukis and the security forces.

It is a matter of concern that the porous border facilitates illegal migration of people and the smuggling of drugs and arms.

Furthermore, certain groups from Myanmar, who have social affiliations with residents of Manipur, have entered the state and begun to occupy forest lands.

Several thousand anti-junta rebels have fled to India since the 2021 military coup in Myanmar. Of late, even the Myanmarese army personnel had begun to enter Mizoram in a bid to escape the pursuing People’s Defence Force (the National Unity Government’s armed wing) and various ethnic militias.

The government’s commitment to constructing impenetrable borders is laudable. The decision to build a fence along the India-Myanmar border will facilitate better surveillance and prevent illegal migration and entry of VBIGs from across Myanmar.

The fencing has nothing to do with the Neighbourhood First Policy. Even if the FMR has to be jettisoned, so be it. I cannot think of one reason why it was a great idea, even when it came into being in 2018. If the FMR was unveiled in order to keep border trade alive, there are several mechanisms to ensure its continuance, including the ‘border haat’ system that is in place on the India-Bangladesh border.

The Assam Rifles, which guards the border with tenacity and for which it is now being targeted in Manipur, would testify to the fact that although all borders are in the final analysis imaginary, walls make better neighbours. Even beasts mark their territory and would not countenance trespass. Along the India-Myanmar border, it has been trespass, transgression and temerity. If one is questioning the decision to fence the border by arguing that it would sound the death knell for people-to-people contact, it must be stated that the FMR has not achieved that purpose by any measure. If anything, it has only facilitated the unfettered movement of terrorists, drug smugglers and gun-runners.

Also, the contiguity that characterises, for instance, the Naga people (if the broad social formation can be termed ‘Naga people’) is not limited to the 16 km that the FMR has permitted, but it can actually go all the way to Taga, a place that is inhabited by Rangpang Nagas.

Harsh times call for tough calls. The situation in Manipur, Myanmar and Mizoram, intertwined as it is with a curious mix, calls for courageous decisions.

Manipur is not offering any easy solution. It is also known that much of the subterfuge in Manipur is a result of the sinister and motivated entry of the VBIGs into the state from Myanmar’s Sagaing division.

It must be understood that India’s national security is paramount. If the borderlands have to be fenced, so be it.