Military back in the thick of things in Pakistan
THE arrest of former Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan from the Islamabad High Court by the Rangers on the charge of corruption in connection with the Al-Qadir Trust case sparked massive protests and violence, leading to deaths, destruction of public property and attacks on military vehicles and installations. While the public outrage following the arrest of the popular leader was not unexpected, noteworthy were the attacks on the Lahore Corps Commander’s residence and the GHQ Rawalpindi, where Imran’s angry supporters not only managed to break in with ease but also did not face much resistance from the armed forces, which should have anticipated such a reaction from the masses.
Members of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) called the arrest an act of ‘state terrorism’ and expressed apprehension that Imran was being tortured in custody. The Pakistan army, reacting to the violence by PTI workers, called it a ‘black chapter’ in the country’s history.
Even as Pakistan’s Supreme Court on Thursday declared his arrest ‘illegal’ and ordered his immediate release, it is clear that the all-powerful military is no more willing to tolerate his blatant accusations questioning its credibility. Imran, just before his arrest, accused ‘Dirty Harry’ (Major Gen Faisal Naseer), a senior officer of the Inter-Services Intelligence, of conspiring to kill him.
Imran’s persistent demand for early general election (before October this year) has been unacceptable to the ruling elite. His abiding appeal among people has been indicative that in case the elections are free and fair this time, the probability of his victory is undeniably high. Efforts of the current political dispensation have been to delay the elections as much as it can to be able to buy more time to swing the electoral sentiment in its favour. The political leadership intends to continue to pursue cases against Imran through the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), the country’s top anti-corruption agency, to remove him from the political scene and delay the elections. Ironically, during Imran’s tenure as the PM, NAB was used to target former PM Nawaz Sharif.
After Imran’s exit from the PM’s office in April last year, many developments have demonstrated complex power dynamics and deep polarisation within society and state institutions. The judiciary and the military stand divided between pro- and anti-Imran lobbies. The state is undergoing a constitutional challenge where the prime institutions are targeting each other and their credibility is being questioned. The ongoing political drama comes amid an economic crisis. Pakistan desperately requires assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The global body has shown no flexibility on its valid demands for structural changes in Pakistan’s economy. Unlike in the past, Pakistan’s traditional donors have also refrained from offering unconditional financial aid.
Imran has been on a rally spree, trying his best to maintain the popularity he enjoys among the youth and the middle class. With charges of corruption, terrorism and treason levelled against him, and his deplorable performance as Prime Minister in terms of fulfilling his election promise of ‘Naya Pakistan’, an important question is: why Imran continues to enjoy mass support?
There are four important factors behind his cult following. Imran is a man of narratives, and his strength has been creating and popularising narratives for his political objectives. First, Imran was brought onto the political centre stage by the absolute support of the military, with the image of a leader free of corruption. People in Pakistan are exhausted with dynastic politics and corrupt political leaders, and Imran managed to create a clean image for himself despite the corruption charges levelled against him. The popular sentiment is that political families — the Zardaris and Sharifs — have looted the nation colossally for decades, and Imran is fighting selflessly for the welfare of the people of Pakistan. Second, he managed to tap the suppressed public sentiment against the deep state. The military takes a large share of national resources for its own profile and image building. It runs large businesses and owns a lion’s share of land holdings. The debate that Pakistan has not prospered economically due to the military’s high stakes in the economy has existed for decades and Imran cashed in on the sentiment after he lost the confidence of the military establishment. The military’s projected stance of neutrality provided a fertile ground for Imran to build an anti-establishment narrative.
Thirdly, the Shehbaz Sharif government was compelled to take tough financial decisions to fulfil IMF conditionalities and this led to anger against the current regime making it extremely unpopular. Fourthly, Imran largely built his popular base on social media and managed to garner legitimacy for his narratives much more actively as compared to other political leaders in Pakistan. He even predicted his arrest in a pre-recorded video clip and released it on social media just before leaving for court on May 9.
Even though Imran enjoys the support of the masses, and the military till now has restrained itself from stepping in overtly to exercise its direct control, the fact remains that Imran cannot come back to power if he maintains his tough stance against the military. The arrest was aimed at compelling him to agree to the terms and conditions of the establishment. The military’s image has been tarnished and senior officers have been called corrupt and traitors by Imran in public. History suggests that anti-military campaigns do not have a long shelf life in Pakistan. The military’s media wing, Inter-Services Public Relations, in a press release, has warned Imran’s supporters of ‘severe retaliation’ if the attacks on military and state installations continue. The use of force and intimidation to curtail opposition has been part of Pakistan’s military culture. A crackdown on PTI workers has begun and there have been many arrests. Action against Imran marks the beginning of efforts by the military to step in finally to take control of affairs in Pakistan. While direct military rule will have complex repercussions, the continuation of a hybrid regime could be a preferred choice for the military.
