Loss made Pakistan recalibrate its choices
The India-Pakistan relationship has gone through phases of intense hostility and tensions, and the two nuclear-armed neighbours have fought four conventional wars and dealt with the challenges of the threat of nuclear weapons (in their respective ways). While the bilateral relationship has been strained for most years, the terror attack on January 2, 2016, on the Pathankot Air Force Station led to the complete suspension of diplomatic dialogue. India’s decision to revoke Article 370 on August 5, 2019 came as a complete surprise for Pakistan, and since then, there have been a series of strong reactions/actions focusing on targeting India on the international front, attracting global attention and seeking mediation on Kashmir.
Pakistan’s strategic posturing against India revolves around the use of sub-conventional war, build-up of its conventional and nuclear capability, maintaining a projection of low nuclear threshold and intensifying its anti-India narrative. There have been alterations in the tactics and intensity of posturing but the underlying objectives and position have been by and large consistent for the last 50 years. The study of Pakistan’s history suggests a significant shift in its thinking, actions and strategy (vis-à-vis India) after its humiliating defeat in the 1971 war. Not only was the Pakistani leadership and populace disgraced and disgruntled with the division of Pakistan, their leadership was convinced that it would not be possible to militarily defeat a conventionally superior India. After the 1971 war, two issues became critical for Pakistan: First, it was time to look for options to stay on a par with India, if not defeat it; and second, at no cost allow further disintegration. The existing insurgencies in Pakistan’s tribal belt in Balochistan and restlessness in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then North-West Frontier Province or NWFP) did pose a constant challenge to the ruling elites.
The loss of East Pakistan in 1971 not only altered the political and ethnic scenario in Pakistan but also the ideological dynamics of Pakistan. The division of Pakistan created a fear of further segmentation, and the ruling elites increasingly believed that religious ideology would be the best option to unite people in the name of religion. Also, in the early 1970s, the disturbances in Balochistan created tremendous unrest and kept the leadership in Pakistan engaged. The Balochistan insurgency provided the military an opportunity to project Afghanistan as an additional threat and to support the growing military expenditure and maintain Pakistan’s image as a garrison state.
The 1970s and 1980s witnessed the re-emergence of Islam as a potent global force, starting with the spread of Saudi Wahabi ideology. The Iranian revolution drew attention towards the significant changes that were taking place in many Muslim countries across the globe in the 1970s.
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto turned towards Islam to counter his Islamic critics and also to strengthen ties with the oil-rich nations of the Gulf. Ironically, it was the same Islamic ideology that was used by General Zia-ul-Haq to overthrow Bhutto.
Bhutto took forward the idea of Islamic Socialism and, thus, enforced Islam as a major factor in statecraft. Zia put the state at the services of Islam and took steps to inculcate Islamic practices within the state. In 1976, General Zia-ul-Haq was appointed as the new Army Chief and was allocated the responsibility to Islamise the Pakistan Army. In this period, the Army developed close links with various Islamist groups and religion was used deeply in its strategic thinking. The Tablighi Jamaat (an Islamic missionary society) was allowed to operate freely within the Army.
Pakistan’s conviction for nuclear deterrence strengthened after the 1971 war and the leadership was convinced that the acquisition of nuclear weapons was needed to neutralise India’s conventional superiority. Starting 1970s, Pakistan’s nuclear programme was shaped by the increasing militarisation of state policies and its strategic alliances. Pakistan sought financial support from the Middle-East countries to assist in the building of the Islamic Bomb and eventually, consistent generous Chinese assistance contributed enormously to its nuclear and missile build-up. Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons capability in 1987 (even though the overt nuclearisation took place in 1998) and adopted an unofficial code based on Indo-centricity, credible minimum deterrence, strategic restraint and first use. Interestingly, and rather ironically, the code asserts the principles of a peaceful programme revolving more around maintaining a balance against the Indian force build-up, but it includes making the first strike in response to not only a conventional attack but also a posed threat from India. Pakistan’s efforts have been to project a low nuclear threshold for enhancing deterrence.
After 1971, the evolution of Pakistan’s grand strategy was critical in shaping its strategic choices and alliances (that we see today). The grand strategy after the 1971 war incorporated two important objectives which decided the future course of action for its leadership: First, to expand territory eastward (take Kashmir). This implied a rise in covert activities in J&K and added emphasis on radical Islam in the name of jihad. Thus, terrorism was to be adopted as a foreign policy tool, nuclear weapons aimed at war prevention providing a shield to the strategy of sub-conventional war.
Second, to expand control westward (to gain leverage in Kabul). This implied creating strategic depth in Afghanistan and also facilitating Pakistan-friendly governance. This has been the strategy Islamabad pursued for decades in Afghanistan and it sees the fall of the democratic regime and the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in August 2021 as its strategic victory.
