Keeping options open on strategic autonomy

AMONG all evolving strategic partnerships, Quad seems to be a top priority for the two-month-old Biden administration. The foreign ministers’ meeting of the four Quad nations — the US, Japan, Australia and India — was followed by the first ever summit-level talks, which took place virtually on March 12 between the US President and the Prime Ministers of the other three countries.

The major concern of the three members of Quad, other than India, is primarily to counter and check Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific and specifically in the South China Sea (SCS) in order to safeguard their geopolitical and maritime interests in this region.

India’s concerns with regard to China go much beyond this. Interestingly, during the recently held fourth session of the 13th National People’s Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that “China and India are each other’s friends and partners and not threats or rivals. The two sides need to help each other succeed instead of undercutting.”

This wooing of India not only highlights its geopolitical and strategic importance but also the weight it carries, politically, militarily and diplomatically. India has never been in an alliance with any other nation or nations. Post World War II, the Cold War came to be waged by forming alliances like Seato, Cento, Nato and the Warsaw Pact, to name a few. Smaller member countries have gone to the extent of even compromising on some aspects of sovereignty in exchange for the benefits of such alliances.

India, on the other hand, has been steadfast in staying on an alliance-free course. Being a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement, it clearly spelt out its political line in international affairs. NAM has since lost relevance but multi-polar engagements without any treaty or alliance overtones have been the defining foreign policy architecture for India. It has always stood for strategic partnerships and not any bilateral or multi-lateral unions, be it with Russia or the US.

What price does an alliance extract? During 2003, the US was deeply embroiled in Afghanistan and Iraq, leading to the alliance of the willing. While the military muscle and finances were majorly provided by it, the US was very keen to have other nations show their flags alongside, howsoever nominally, as the operations were outside the UN umbrella.

There was tremendous pressure on India to dispatch troops to Afghanistan and at one stage, it seemed like a done deal. However, India refused military participation outside the UN ambit. Compared to this, countries like Japan and South Korea, despite domestic, public and political opinion being very strongly against any involvement in Iraq or Afghanistan, were compelled to dispatch military contingents (for logistic support in case of Japan).

While the events on the LAC in eastern Ladakh over the past 10-odd months have accentuated the adversarial relations with China, in the past both countries have been largely on the same page on subjects like environment, climate change and trade issues vis-à-vis the US. During the Cold War era, India depended heavily on the USSR for military hardware and diplomatic support in the UN.

However, this bonhomie between the world’s largest democracy and the strongest communist bloc country was bereft of any political concessions and India’s geopolitical autonomy was never in doubt. Whatever be the hues and colours of the government of the day, strategic autonomy is something which has never been diluted or compromised in any way. In 1965, Pakistan initiated operations against India, greatly bolstered by state-of-the-art military equipment and professional military training provided by the US.

India, on the other hand, had to purchase armaments in hard currency from the Soviets, without any alliance or partnership overtures. In 1971, despite the genocide unleashed in the east, the US backed the Pakistan military government till its final ignominious defeat and even sent a carrier task force towards the Bay of Bengal. India had signed a Treaty of Mutual Friendship with the USSR, but pursued its objectives quite independently, realising these through an outstanding military victory. In 1999, too, the Pakistani Prime Minister had to rush to Washington seeking US help to end its ill-fated Kargil misadventure.

All these were periods of trial and stress for India. However, it did not let its autonomy be eroded by adversity and prosecuted its national aims as it saw fit. It did get help from both the US and the USSR at different junctures, but this was never allowed to grow into a patron-client relationship. This strategic autonomy makes India a valued partner in any grouping of nations, Quad being the latest.

The Trump era saw an unprecedented haranguing of European Nato members for their propensity to take a free ride. However, these countries, which include an economic powerhouse like Germany, a nation with widespread interests and assets like France, as well as a “has been’ power like the UK, that still view themselves as world leaders, behaved like chastened schoolboys, realising that Nato was essential for their relevance in international affairs.

Another interesting case is that of the ASEAN nations, which stick together despite major political differences, due to compelling economic realities.

A major takeaway from the Quad leaders’ summit meeting is the focus on Covid-19 vaccine production in India to meet a target of one billion doses, with financial support from the US and Japan. This is a clear recognition of India’s capacity and capability in this vital area with the nations of the Indo-Pacific region looking to benefit from it. Other than the expected flagging of security issues in this region, there was a mention of synergised efforts on the subject of climate change and, interestingly, the setting up of a group of experts for joint development of emerging technologies.

While India is in the pole position right now with its very tangible vaccine diplomacy, it needs to extract reciprocal benefits from the other Quad members, especially the US. India’s security concerns are away from the murky waters of the SCS and centred on the Himalayan heights and this needs to be emphatically emphasised. Also, the US has stayed away from sharing vital niche technology with us and this too needs to be given a concrete positive direction.