It’s time Coast Guard was delinked from Navy

THE Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), aimed at promoting regional security and economic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, has come up with a seminal initiative by announcing the first-ever joint Coast Guard mission at sea, at its recent Leaders’ Summit in Wilmington, USA.

The official statement made it clear that the coast guards of the USA, India, Japan and Australia would work together closely and that the four maritime security organisations “plan to launch a first-ever Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission in 2025 in the Indo-Pacific to improve interoperability. Members of the Japan Coast Guard, the Australian Border Force, and the Indian Coast Guard will spend time on board a US Coast Guard vessel operating in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad intends to continue with further missions in the Indo-Pacific.”

As part of this mission, smaller countries in the Indo-Pacific will be trained in maritime security. This is clearly in response to the coercive and intimidating manoeuvres by Chinese ships and planes in the South China Sea (SCS), intended to compel other nations bordering these disputed waters to cede control.

Recent clashes, including the ramming of vessels of the Chinese and the Philippine Coast Guard in the SCS, have further heightened these concerns.

Though the Observer Mission, scheduled for launch in 2025, appears very limited in its scope with only one operating US vessel, further missions, as intended, would enhance the scope and level of participation in this first-of-its-kind Quad cooperation at sea.

Its significance lies in the fact that it’s the Coast Guard and not the navies, which are involved. The strategic offensive role of a navy is projection of force into areas beyond a country’s shores. And a multi-lateral naval presence in troubled waters, against a force like the PLA Navy, would be fraught with an ominous signature of a direct military threat. Moreover, the Coast Guard is primarily tasked with law enforcement, maritime policing and humanitarian missions and require less integration than the naval forces, where cooperation is more combat-oriented.

Since its birth in 1978, the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) has been acting as a maritime law enforcement and search and rescue agency in the EEZ (exclusive economic zone). It actively patrols India’s vast coastline. Functioning under the Ministry of Defence, it has evolved into an established and capable force that can intercept any illegal activities at sea and provide a full spectrum of non-military maritime services to the nation. It has also been carrying out joint sea exercises as far as Japan and South Korea.

The ICG achieved a historic operational success in October 1999, with the recapture of a Panamanian-registered Japanese cargo ship, MV Alondra Rainbow, at high seas, hijacked off Indonesia. This was the first successful prosecution of armed pirates in over a century.

After the 2008 Mumbai attacks in which the terrorists entered India from Pakistan via the sea route, the Indian government initiated a programme to expand the ICG force, assets and infrastructure for enhanced protection and surveillance of the Indian waters. The ICG has a fleet of 152 ships and 78 aircraft, with a target of 200 vessels and 100 aircraft by 2030.

The other Coast Guard of the Quad nations, while having similar roles, are distinctly different from their navies in terms of government control. The US Coast Guard operates under the Department of Homeland Security while the Japan Coast Guard works under the oversight of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism.

From its very inception, the ICG has existed in the shadow of the Indian Navy. While this may have been necessary in its initial years due to dependence for equipment, training, manning and officering of this new force, it may need a review now.

The Indian Navy is a large and growing service with a third aircraft carrier and more nuclear-powered submarines in the pipeline. These are clearly indicative of its power and reach, which now has to go far beyond the Malacca Straits and the Gulf of Aden in terms of force-projection capability.

For an emerging power like India, a large and modern navy is a most essential service. However, this deep blue-water navy has to be delinked from the ICG, especially in peacetime. The logical step, thus, would be for the ICG to be under the control of Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and not the Ministry of Defence.

This would also be in line with the way the Coast Guard of most developed countries operate, and would enhance its distinct identity while working with its counterparts in the foreign seas. Our border-guarding forces deployed on land borders, also come under the MHA. Looking ahead, apart from the Quad-at-Sea missions, the ICG will be most useful for roles like the protection of commercial sea lanes originating from India.

One such commitment would be the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) that aims to bolster economic development by fostering connectivity and economic integration between Asia, the Persian Gulf and Europe. It has not yet taken concrete shape due to the geopolitical turmoil and conflicts in West Asia, but is an idea which should fructify in future.

Initiatives like the Quad missions will have a beneficial spinoff for India in different ways. The sequencing of China’s force structure investments indicates the prioritisation of its strategic objectives. This also indicates that Taiwan and the SCS continue to have precedence over China’s wider global ambitions.

The Quad Strategic grouping of India, the US, Australia and Japan can play a key role by being more visible in the South China Sea, to which China would always be hypersensitive. It would well serve Indian interests to support and encourage quadrilateral Coast Guard exercises in the region.

The increasing presence of Quad forces in the SCS or its proximity would impact Chinese planners in recalibrating defence, focus and spending more towards the PLA maritime forces with a relative reduction for the ground forces.

The future Quad-at-Sea Missions seem to have already rattled Communist China, as evident from the speech of President Xi Jinping on the 75th National Day on October 1. He has warned his people that the road ahead would not be smooth due to the economic headwinds, intensifying rivalry with the USA and growing tensions with neighbours like India. Metaphorically, he even mentioned rough and stormy seas ahead for China.