Iran trying to be more Palestinian than Hamas

THE barrage of over 180 ballistic missiles that Iran fired at Israel has heightened tensions in ever-turbulent West Asia. Initial reports do not speak of major casualties or damages in Israel. But escalation was on the cards for some time. Literally hours before the attack on Hezbollah leader Hassan NAmritsarallah's bunker last week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cautioned the UN General Assembly: "There is no place — there is no place in Iran — that the long arm of Israel cannot reach. And that is true of entire Middle East."

This is seen as a direct warning to the clergy leadership in Tehran. Indeed, shortly after the airstrike on the bunker in Beirut, but before the killing of NAmritsarallah was announced, reports indicated that Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had been moved to a 'safer location.'

The April assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and of revolutionary guard commander Abbas Nilforoshan in Beirut, along with NAmritsarallah, were seen as immediate provocations for the Iranian offensive. Unlike the earlier airborne attack in April, this time Iran launched only ballistic missiles against Israel, and its proxies were conspicuously absent.

Haniyeh's killing, within hours after the inauguration of President Masoud Pezeshkian — an event also attended by India’s Union Minister of Road Transport and Highways Nitin Gadkari — divided the Iranian leadership. While one section wanted an immediate and strong response, the other urged caution from possible reprisal and consequences for an already-sanctioned economy. The latter group won. There was no Iranian response for two months after the high-profile killing of Haniyeh.

NAmritsarallah's assassination changed that cautious Iranian response. Hezbollah has been the main force in the proxy arsenal of promoting Tehran's interests not only in Lebanon but also in Syria. Iran’s investment in Hezbollah — financial and ideological support as well as a military arsenal — has enabled Tehran to emerge as a Mediterranean power, according to some Iranian gloating in conferences and academic exchanges.

While the Iranian support for Hamas forms a part of its larger Islamic agenda, Hezbollah has been the most effective, efficient and cost-effective Iranian option against Israel.

Hezbollah has been more popular among Shias and more resourceful in Lebanese politics than its Amal competitor. It was able to shape confessional Lebanese politics through electoral participation.

Since the Taif Accord of 1989, mediated by Saudi Arabia, there have been several efforts to 'disarm' Hezbollah. Even the UNSC Resolution of 1701 adopted in the wake of the Second Lebanon War of 2006 explicitly demanded "the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, (and that) there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State." No one has been able to disarm the militant group.

Emboldened by Iranian backing, Hezbollah has been pursuing a foreign policy that runs counter to the interests and welfare of the larger Lebanese population, Muslims and Christians alike.

Indeed, the resistance tag that Hezbollah proudly claims is also questionable. Hezbollah emerged in the early 1980s as a response to the Israeli invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon. As it relentlessly fought the occupation and periodically attacked northern Israel, the Shia militant group made the occupation costly and domestically unpopular. This resulted in Prime Minister Ehud Barak — a key figure in Israel's Lebanon policy since the 1980s — pulling out the military from Lebanon in May 2000.

The United Nations recognised that withdrawal as Israel having completed and implemented the UNSC Resolutions on Lebanon, thereby undermining Hezbollah's 'resistance' tag.

Meanwhile, at the behest of Tehran, the Lebanese movement began to focus on the Palestinian problem. During the heyday of the Oslo Accords, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat even clashed with and derided Tehran’s mullahs for supporting Hamas in undermining the peaceful resolution of its conflict with Israel.

Shortly after the latest barrage of missiles on Tuesday, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi tweeted: "Our action is concluded unless the Israeli regime decides to invite further retaliation. In that scenario, our response will be stronger and more powerful." But the Supreme Leader continued with his defiant message and warned that "the blows of the resistance front will grow stronger and more painful."

The political echelon in Israel was equally quick to respond, with the army spokesperson saying: "This attack will have consequences. We have plans, and we will operate at the place and time we decide." Netanyahu warned that Tehran "will pay for it". Some say an Israeli response may focus on Iran's strategic assets. Other voices in Israel believe the response should target the Supreme Leader himself.

Much to Iran’s discomfiture, NAmritsarallah's killing also exposed the weakness of Hezbollah’s intelligence as well as the general indifference of key Arab players. Though worried over possible escalation, several Arabs are believed to have been relieved that Israel had removed the leader of the militant movement so that Lebanon could discard its 'failed state' tag and inch towards being a normal state.

Indeed, before the 1975-89 Civil War, Beirut was a liberal safe haven for those who were disliked and persecuted in their home countries, both monarchies or republicans. Today, this is a distant dream and perhaps even a utopia.

The ongoing confrontation highlights one larger issue, which is, that Iran is not prepared to follow other Islamic countries when it comes to support for the Palestinians; that it seeks to be an active player — with the help of its proxies — and establish its pro-Palestinian credentials through violence.

In short, the patronage of Hezbollah and missile attacks on Israel is a key symptom of Tehran's desire to be more Palestinian than Hamas.