Inquiry may pinpoint reasons for Mi-17 crash
The unfortunate Mi-17 V5 chopper crash over Coonoor brings an all too familiar sense of déjà vu for a military aviator like me with decades of aviation experience under his belt. Whilst this particular accident would grab international eyeballs for other reasons, every IAF accident leaves a mark of its own poignancy, personal travails and sorrow. But then as a fighting service, the soldiers learn to bash on regardless and the professionalism reinforces human emotions.
The fact that most personalities involved, including from the host service and even the officer deputed to undertake the Court of Inquiry are very much known to this author makes it even more difficult to look at the happenstance in a balanced manner. As I picked up strands of the initial reportage in my super active National Defence Academy coursemates’ WhatsApp group, the coincidence of the 109 Helicopter Unit at Sulur (from which the particular aircraft came) heading for a golden anniversary celebration soon and some of my friends wishing to attend it, was not lost on me.
It is indeed ironic that the first human reaction that follows an air accident in the IAF — very sadly though — is to hope that one did not personally know the victims. But then, that is just the natural human angle bit and does not in any way reduce the gravity of the tragedy.
This accident immediately brought to mind another IAF accident at the very same location. I was undergoing the Defence Services Staff College course at Wellington around 1987-88 (where indeed General Rawat and his entourage were headed) and heard the horrific clap of an IAF Jaguar crash right across our residential area in Gorkha Hills and abutting the Wellington Gymkhana. It was a holiday and the pilot who tragically succumbed was a known and respected colleague. He was of course indulging in what the flyboys traditionally call “beating up” (as some of my course- mates were perhaps buddies of his), and apparently made a wrong call whilst pulling out of a dive, crashing perhaps onto the same hill where the General’s chopper came to grief. But then, life in the Air Force teaches you to face such tragic incidents stoically, especially when one happens to be in a position of authority and responsibility, like the Commanding Officer of the squadron or unit and the morale of the other youngsters in your flying unit is involved.
The standard recourse in the IAF is to meet over a drink in the evening and get airborne as early as possible to reinforce confidence levels amongst the aviators. This, of course, was a tradition in the Air Force and when the accident is in the civil domain, the sorrow doesn’t diminish one bit but the systemic throwback appears kind of muted unlike what happens in a fighting unit. As an old fogey who managed to reach the ubiquitous “old and bold” category in military aviation, one then tends to recall air accidents one has had occasion to witness or hear about, up close with work colleagues. The reasons for such serious accidents vary from technical defects to human error, environmental and aeromedical aspects, or in rare cases, remaining “unresolved”. Flying indiscipline (such as the one mentioned above ) or CFIT (Controlled Flight Into Terrain) are other possible, rare causes of air accidents in the military or civilian domains.
The service itself has a very proper and systemic method of inquiries, overseen by a Directorate of Flight Safety and its agencies at Air Command and Flying Station levels. After all, assets and human lives are involved and the IAF owes it to the nation to do a professional job of it, this coming from one’s own experience in conduct of such Courts of Inquiry into some fatal and other accidents over a three-decade service tenure.
The main difference between the civil and defence catastrophic air accidents is mostly in the number of casualties, mainly on account of the number of crew and passengers involved and the likely collateral damage on the ground. And of course, the peculiar nature of defence tasks and operations constitutes a risk and demand professional acumen of an even higher order. Though individual prowess cannot be discounted, especially whilst the recovery of a stricken bird, such as the by now famous landing here in the Hudson of a flamed out airliner that lost engine power post a critical seagull ingestion right after take-off from New York’s La Guardia airport. Around 155 lives were saved by this heroic act. The Court of Inquiry itself is a highly involved and time consuming process (as the well made Hollywood movie Miracle on the Hudson into Captain Sully’s fantastic feat shows), the main intent being to ensure that similar accidents do not recur.
Modern aircraft have state-of-the art equipment that aid in the reconstruction of flight paths just prior to the incident or accident, such as cockpit voice recorders and “black boxes” that capture an entire slew of flying parameters, including engine settings, flight parameters such as height, speed and course and with crew conversations superimposed on them.
Thus inquiries, especially these days, whether done by the Accident Investigation Board in the USA’s FAA, NTSB or any other professional flying agency, tend to be a highly introspective affair involving the operators, manufacturers and even witnesses and bystanders. In fact, even as the inquiry is in progress and certain aspects emerge, the authorities pass on maintenance and operating instructions to the field simultaneously.
