India should engage more with Taliban
THREE years after the Taliban recaptured Kabul on August 15, 2021, and, for the first time, gained control over all Afghan territory, they remain firmly in the saddle. This is even though their emirate is not internationally recognised and their government is ‘interim’. Top leaders of the erstwhile Afghan republic are, except Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah, scattered outside the country; they have no capacity of mounting an anti-Taliban revolt, violent or non-violent, within Afghanistan. There have been reports of some small actions, but these do not constitute a threat to the Taliban.
The most important step Delhi has to take relates to resuming the grant of visas to Afghans who wish
to visit India.
The initial general international response towards the Taliban after their victory was to demand (i) the formation of an ‘inclusive’ government representing all sections of the Afghan polity, (ii) the Taliban should prevent terrorist groups to operate from Afghanistan and (iii) follow internationally accepted standards on gender issues. The US, smarting from its defeat in the ‘forever’ war, also froze more than $9 billion Afghan assets. Over the past three years, some countries have intensified contact with the Taliban individually. Indeed, China has sent a new ambassador. The international community’s engagement is through the ‘Doha process’ initiated by United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Antonio Guterres. Its third round concluded in Doha on July 1.
The demand for the formation of an inclusive government, a non-starter to begin with, has been abandoned. The focus is now on conditions set out in (ii) and (iii). There is global unanimity on (ii) because it impacts all countries. It is here that the Taliban are playing a skilful game. They are seeking to counter terrorist groups that are oriented against countries showing sympathy to their regime, including Russia and China, but are encouraging those they need to use as a card. In the latter category is the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP). The Taliban are also against the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan branch of ISIS. ISKP’s presence is a thorn in the Taliban side but is not a threat to their structure.
On gender issues, various countries are making the right noises but the Taliban are aware that all countries do not place the same degree of emphasis on them. Certainly, it is not a priority for China and Russia. On its part the Taliban’s theological position on them has not changed but its application on the ground is not as harsh as it was in the 1990s. Women wearing the hijab move around in Kabul, and, as of now, male doctors are permitted to attend to female patients if their families permit. A recent development is the placement of mullahs in major hospitals; doctors and staff are expected to attend their short daily discourses. Discriminatory practices against women from the middle level in education is being practiced.
United Nations reports on the Afghan situation persistently note the continuing impoverishment of the people. In his report to the UN Security Council in June this year — the latest on conditions in Afghanistan — the UNSG noted “Nine out of 10 households were struggling to feed themselves adequately…” Low-level economic activity is taking place, but the situation continues to be dire. Consequently, those Afghans who can leave the country are doing so even as Pakistan has forced the return of a large number of refugees living for decades there. Opium cultivation, a source of income for Afghan farmers in some provinces, has been banned and its production has fallen but not eliminated. Ephedrine is also produced to prepare methamphetamine, which is smuggled out of the country through Iran to the wider world.
Tensions within the Taliban interim government continue. The principal fault line is between the Haqqanis, whose power base is in the east, headquartered in Khost province, and the traditional Pashtun leadership based in Kandahar. By now, the latter, under the supreme leader, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada, has been able to establish its sway. The Kandahari leaders are more hardline and less exposed to the world. They can be expected to resist any dilution of their interpretation of the Sharia in running the administration, though on the ground, practical ways are found by the people in major cities to deal with their decrees.
The Taliban’s regional and foreign engagement has continued, though at a low level. Their relations with neighbours are stable, with the exception of Pakistan. The Pakistani establishment clearly feels that the Taliban leadership has shown scant concern for its core interests because it has not tightened the screws on the TTP. The Taliban are unlikely to change their position on the TTP, at least in the near future. Consequently, bilateral Pakistan-Taliban ties will continue to be rocky.
India should shed its inhibitions in opening full ties with the Taliban. The term ‘full ties’ does not imply diplomatic recognition. India’s interests demand that China should not be allowed to gain primacy in Afghanistan. The Taliban have been urging India to enhance its interaction with them. Indeed, India has taken some ‘practical’ steps. It should now openly clothe them formally. This could begin with calling the Technical Team what it actually is — the Indian embassy — and its head should be called a charge d’affaires. Doing so would not mean a move towards diplomatic recognition of the Taliban but accepting the reality of the Afghan situation. Also, India has already given humanitarian assistance to the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. It should now resume project assistance. This can be done keeping the security of personnel, if they have to be sent to Afghanistan, in mind. The training of Afghan professionals should be resumed.
The most important step India has to take relates to resuming the grant of visas to Afghans who wish to visit India, for instance, for medical and educational purposes. Naturally, security concerns would have to be addressed while doing so. The stoppage of visa issuance has deeply hurt Indian interests. The policy needs an immediate review. It was inexplicable to begin with and a foreign policy-oriented clarification on why it was undertaken needs to be given.