India must remain ahead of the curve
THE din of the Lok Sabha elections is over. A duly elected government is in place and it is gearing up to face both domestic and external challenges. Some of these challenges are not new, though they have a different scale and dimension. But some will be novel and unexpected. On balance, the domestic landscape remains relatively more stable. There may be a coalition government at the Centre, but the BJP remains its largest constituent. Prime Minister Narendra Modi may have been politically diminished by the election results, but he remains the most popular and powerful leader. Temperamentally, he is unlikely to significantly alter the modus operandi he has relied upon during the past decade. He is more likely to double down in implementing his political, ideological and economic agendas than in stepping back into a more consensual mode. To the extent that political stability and policy continuity will matter in a world where even the more powerful countries, including the US, are descending into a period of mounting uncertainty, political polarisation and even fragmentation, India will be seen as a more stable and reliable anchor in the international system. That will be an asset it can leverage to advance its interests.
India is important to the world, but the world remains more important to India. A more modest external posture may help.
If India is able to sustain its current rate of GDP growth of around 7 per cent per annum over the next decade, as it seems likely to do, that, too, will make it an outlier among major emerging economies. The Modi government has been unusually business-friendly and this has improved the investment environment for domestic and foreign entities. It must now shift from a business-friendly to a market-friendly strategy which creates an enabling environment for all businesses to flourish. If it does, the economic transformation of India will become the great story of the next several decades. This could potentially expand the country’s diplomatic space. Foreign policy should be harnessed to promoting the interests of Indian businesses rather than those of a few chosen entities.
Unlike the domestic space, the external space will be far more challenging and India’s vulnerabilities will be greater. In a rapidly changing and fluid geopolitical landscape, the uncertainties unleashed by continuing and escalating wars in Europe and West Asia and the prospects of dramatic and deeply disruptive departures in the foreign policies of major powers as a fallout of impending elections will require an extraordinary agility and skilful diplomacy on the part of India. There seems to be an assumption that India’s value as a countervailing and constraining power vis-à-vis China would not only persist but also be enhanced. But as we had witnessed during the Cold War, the dominant powers often temper their confrontation with significant measures of détente and even collaboration at the cost of those allied or aligned with them. One should not rule out such strategic re-ordering of relations between the US and China which may shrink India’s own strategic space and heighten its vulnerability to Chinese pressure.
It is also possible that in meeting the China challenge in the Indo-Pacific, the US may attach greater value to its alliance systems and operational arrangements with other partner countries in the region. The US has worked hard to create a truly trilateral military alliance with Japan and South Korea, helping overcome the historical antipathy between Japan and South Korea. The three countries are now sharing intelligence, conducting military drills and coordinating their postures towards China and the region and this is becoming the core of American Indo-Pacific strategy instead of the Quad (India, Japan, Australia and the US). The AUKUS, comprising Australia, the UK and the US, which is a military alliance based on a substantial nuclear submarine force, will also gain in importance as it begins to be rolled out. The revival of the US-Philippines military alliance and the US gaining access to key bases in that country are another link in the American security chain. The Quad summit scheduled earlier this year in India has been postponed and is unlikely to be convened until after the US presidential elections. But its fate has become uncertain, and with that its value to India as a counter to China.
There are other vulnerabilities to be dealt with. The allegations regarding assassination attempts, perpetrated by Indian intelligence agents against Khalistani elements in the US and Canada who are accused of spreading terrorism in India, may adversely impact India’s relations with key Western partners. The allegation is that a US citizen, Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, was the target of an assassination plot hatched by an employee of India’s external intelligence agency, R&AW. It relied on an Indian citizen, Nikhil Gupta, to carry this through a hired hitman. The plot was foiled by the US authorities. The Indian government has promised a full investigation. There is an assumption that the US has enough stakes in its strategic partnership with India not to let the issue get out of hand. However, the extradition of Gupta to America from the Czech Republic and the initiation of judicial proceedings against him mean that the ability of the US administration to manage the fallout will be severely limited. If further damaging evidence becomes public during the trial, there will be even greater reputational damage to India and there will be demands in the US Congress and the American media for punitive measures against India. It would be prudent for the Indian government to work out a coping strategy and remain ahead of the curve.
It is hoped that the newly elected government will re-orient its policy towards its neighbourhood, including towards China. There needs to be a re-engagement with China and the search for a new equilibrium in the relationship. The opportunities for a resumption of dialogue at the summit level during the forthcoming summits of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the BRICS grouping should be grasped, even if the prospects of resolving outstanding issues are limited. The same goes for re-engagement with Pakistan, for which the conditions are much more conducive than before, given its grave economic crisis and geopolitical diminution.
The pursuit of global aspirations must be tempered by an awareness of more regional and immediate challenges. India is important to the world, but the world remains more important to India. A more modest external posture may help.
