India, China must overcome trust deficit

THE most significant takeaway from the 16th BRICS Summit hosted by Russian President Vladimir Putin in Kazan was the brief meeting between the leaders of India and China. It may be interpreted as the beginning of a nascent thaw in the troubled bilateral relationship that had been vitiated by the 2020 Galwan incident. Chinese troops violated the peace and tranquillity agreement of 1993 when they transgressed the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Soldiers were killed on both sides in the ensuing clash.

Chinese troops occupied five sectors beyond the LAC — Galwan, Gogra Hot Springs, Pangong Lake, Depsang and Demchok — and prevented Indian soldiers from patrolling these points as per the earlier protocols. Since then, there has been no high-level contact between the two Asian giants.

The MEA statement was forthcoming about an ‘agreement’, but the Chinese Foreign Ministry was reticent and opaque about the Kazan meeting.

In the run-up to the BRICS Summit, India stated on October 21 that an ‘agreement’ had been reached between the two nations, “leading to disengagement and a resolution of the issues that had arisen in these areas in 2020”. This tentative rapprochement enabled the leaders to engage in a meeting. Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Chinese President Xi Jinping on October 23 on the sidelines of the Kazan event.

This was the first proper meeting between the two leaders since 2019. It should be welcomed cautiously. Suggestions about a breakthrough would be invalid, for there was no joint communiqué regarding the meeting, let alone about any ‘agreement’ as regards the border issue. While Xi noted that China and India should manage their differences properly, Modi asserted that mutual trust, respect and sensitivity would guide bilateral relations.

It is instructive that while the statement by India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) was forthcoming about an ‘agreement’, the Chinese Foreign Ministry was reticent and opaque about the Kazan meeting. The Indian statement noted: “Welcoming the recent agreement for complete disengagement and resolution of issues that arose in 2020 in the India-China border areas, Prime Minister Modi underscored the importance of properly handling differences and disputes and not allowing them to disturb peace and tranquility.” It added that the two leaders agreed that the SRs (Special Representatives) on the India-China boundary question would meet at an early date and explore a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the boundary question.

On the Chinese side, official news agency Xinhua reported: “The two leaders commended the important progress the two sides had recently made through intensive communication on resolving the relevant issues in the border areas. Modi made suggestions on improving and developing the relationship, which Xi agreed to in principle.”

India has sought a return to the pre-Galwan status quo and at this stage, it is not evident if China has agreed to this formulation. Furthermore, what has dismayed India is the manner in which Beijing chose to violate previous agreements. They include the 1993 peace and tranquillity agreement and the 1996 military confidence-building agreement. These agreements are now in tatters and the challenge for India is to restore the sanctity of these pacts, the first of which was shepherded by then PM Narasimha Rao and President Jiang Zemin.

The fine print of how the disengagement along the LAC will proceed and the patrolling by India as per the pre-Galwan pattern in all sectors will be restored will have to be verified on the ground. The latest reports indicate that the process of disengagement of troops has begun in the Depsang plains and Demchok. While they have a legacy (they predate Galwan), disengagement there would be important in reaching a final settlement. Depsang remains a contentious area, and a consensual patrolling arrangement there could pave the way for moving towards de-escalation.

The Army Chief, Gen Upendra Dwivedi, has dwelt on the need to ‘build trust’ in the first instance; this prudence is not misplaced. Whether China has disengaged, as sought by India, will be more evident next summer, when more robust patrolling would be possible. Dwivedi has added that the two sides “need to reassure each other that we are not creeping into buffer zones that are created and build trust before tackling disengagement, de-escalation, and de-induction phases”.

The buffer-zone concept along the LAC came into existence after the Galwan clash; it referred to a demilitarised area at the five friction points where India and China agreed to a limited disengagement. These zones were stabilised by September 2022, and the implication was that Indian troops were not allowed to access areas they had patrolled in the pre-Galwan period.

Thus, the erasure of the buffer zone in all contested sectors and a verified return to the pre-Galwan patrolling protocols along the LAC would be a prerequisite for a satisfactory disengagement, which could lead to de-escalation and de-induction. These complex tactical issues call for strategic patience and prudence on both sides.

Speaking about the Kazan summit, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi noted on October 25 that the BRICS nations had a shared pursuit. He added that China had called for joint efforts “to build BRICS into a primary channel for strengthening solidarity and cooperation among Global South nations” and emerge as a vanguard for advancing global governance reform. The current US-led global system has been less than effective in dealing with the challenges that threaten peace and security across the world. The wars in Ukraine and West Asia, climate change and nuclear sabre-rattling are bleak examples of such ineptitude.

However, the aspiration for BRICS to become a more credible grouping cannot be realised unless there is a major review and rearrangement of the India-China relationship. The received wisdom based on China’s actions in relation to India is that it seeks multipolarity at the global level (to reduce US primacy), but wants to impose Chinese unipolarity in Asia. This is a conundrum that the guardians of the Middle Kingdom will have to grapple with. Whether the Kazan meeting will lead to such objective introspection in Beijing is a moot point.

For India, in the context of the LAC, the desirable policy option would be to trust and verify, while proceeding slowly. Finally, a comprehensive white paper on the Galwan setback would help illuminate many strands of the bilateral relationship that remain shrouded in unwarranted secrecy.