Eyeing a strategic leadership role in Asia
As a major Asian power, India needs to rightfully seek and perform its strategic leadership role in the continent. Its geostrategic location, the size of its landmass and population make it a natural contender for the pole position in the region. A growing economy which is the sixth largest by nominal GDP, the second largest standing armed forces which have played a lead role in UN missions globally and the largest democracy in the world — these are clear pointers of an ascendant nation. India has combated the scourge of the Covid pandemic, achieving daily vaccination targets of a magnitude in excess of the entire population of some countries and at the same time reached out for supplying vaccines to many nations.
So, what holds us back? Primarily it’s due to the geographical legacy of shared borders with two inimical and often hostile neighbours. Pakistan’s implacable hostility towards India colours its entire policy to the extent that it does not hesitate to act like a colony of China. Its quest for legitimacy compels it to aspire for a hyphenated identity with India while fermenting and supporting militant terrorism across the borders. China’s aspirations for superpower status are based on regional domination in Asia and settling disputes on its terms. While this major factor does not augur well for peaceful growth of our country, India has to ensure its rise internally and externally. In July 2011, the then US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, while visiting India for the second annual US-India Strategic Dialogue, had remarked: “India has to stop punching below its weight in Asia.”
Non-alignment remained a cornerstone of India’s policy in engaging with the world and it has always steered clear of any international alliances, while working through bilateral and multi-lateral strategic partnerships. The regional initiative in forming the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) could not realise its true potential due to the adversarial relationship between the two major members — India and Pakistan.
The Quadrilateral Strategic Partnership (Quad) between the US, India, Japan and Australia has not really manifested into any tangible structure beyond emphasis on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea (SCS). The recently held first in-person Quad summit in the US focused on issues such as infrastructure, space and cyber security. However, our past experience of reluctance or even denial in sharing niche technology by the other three countries, especially America, does not hold out much hope.
The trilateral alliance of the US, UK and Australia (AUKUS), has a major military dimension to it, aimed at China. While AUKUS may emerge as the Indo-Pacific version of the NATO to counter a different adversary in a second cold war, India is unlikely to have any alliance role in it even in the future, though its focus lies in our neighbourhood.
For a leadership role in Asia, India needs to align with partners in the region who have similar strategic interests and security concerns and are nations of some consequence, with a history of friendly relations with us. The two main players in Asia who fit the bill are Vietnam and Indonesia.
Vietnam, a very proud country that has a history of getting the better of France, the US and China, should be top of the list. It is the only country besides India which has had a direct armed conflict with China. The much-vaunted Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of Communist China has also been promoted in Vietnam to facilitate trade and connectivity. However, Vietnam appears circumspect and the existing problems remain. India-Vietnam relations have been warm and on even keel, covering a large gamut of bilateral cooperation, though there is ample scope for further enhancement.
Its size, strategic location and history of being colonised makes Indonesia a country capable of standing up to the crude bullying that China has made its weapon of choice to realise its maritime claims. Indonesia is one of the major countries in the Indo-Pacific region, with a maritime stake in the SCS, though it has refrained from being an active claimant and downplayed its differences with China. However, being part of the ASEAN, it will remain involved in the SCS dispute.
To our immediate East, we need to continue investing in our relationship with Myanmar, another very proud country that has received ample criticism but little sympathy for the problems it faces. The ethnic armies who use the drug trade and extortion as their main source of revenue and prevent the government from functioning in large parts of the country, never seem to attract opprobrium, while the Myanmar army is routinely painted as some kind of rogue force. We have been sensible and pragmatic in this regard and need to deepen our relationship with Myanmar, given its geographical location in the context of China.
Strategic partnerships with developed nations of the West have had limited benefits for India and while the Quad does not offer any help for our immediate security concerns, even the benefits that may accrue from shared technology are suspect. India’s place in the world stems from its pivotal location in Asia and it is countries in the neighbourhood which should be of greater importance to us. Vietnam and Indonesia are two such important countries where bilateral relations need significant enhancement.
While it makes sense to be in concert with dominant and leading world powers on strategic issues which are aligned with our national interests, it would be of great significance to invest in deepening our relations and partnerships with countries in Asia with whom we can have convergence of views vis-à-vis China.
