Ethnic divisions may queer the pitch for Taliban

A week since the Taliban coup against the NATO-supported Ghani government, there was no formal announcement of an Emir, a supreme leader, president, prime minister, supreme council or ministers. Only on the ninth day, some non-formal announcements were made for three important ministries. The Arg Presidential Palace’s Twitter account remains offline and there are no pictures of the Taliban hoisting their flag atop the palace or parliament. Contrary to expectations, the much anticipated killings and incidents of vile behaviour with women, music and sports are few and far between. However, the fear of the Taliban and its reputation of the ’90s have kept the momentum going in its favour.

Despite its current reign over popular imagination, that of a unified whole, united under an Islamic goal, Taliban is not a unitary organisation. It is a collation of a large number of local militia, banded together on ethnic/tribal lines.

The Helmandis were reported to have taken over the Ministry of Finance on August 17, reflecting their desire to control that ministry, possibly in order to facilitate their control of opium and heroin production in Helmand — the largest producer of opium in Afghanistan. Surprisingly, a week later, Helmandis were appointed, not just as Finance, but also as Ministers of Interior and Defence. This tilts the balance between the rustic, rural, opium-rich Helmandis and the militarily superior Haqqanis. There are also contradictory reports of Helmandis/Kandaharis and Haqqanis taking over control of the security of Kabul, both sets of factions not very keen to cooperate on sharing the spoils of war. This regionalisation, added to ethnic factionalism, makes this coalition very difficult to build.

There is another set of divisions, that of history and ‘experience’. The Haqqanis are the oldest fighters, with real ties to the al-Qaeda and with military experience since the 1980s, while some from the south are youngsters who were children during 2001. A large element contributing to hierarchy and respect is also due to the glory of being UN-designated and having survived for several years despite a large bounty on each designated head. This factor has clearly provided a thick edge to the military wing, over the Doha political wing.

There are reports of women being told to stay at home in Kabul, Helmand and Herat and not go to work or to school/college, contrary to the original announcement of Zabiullah Mujahid (spokesperson) on August 16, while he overturned that statement (August 24) saying women were asked to temporarily stay away. This was exacerbated by the presence of Ghani’s woman Minister of Education at a meeting on August 24. The Haqqanis, Wardakis and Logari factions are vocal in asking women to work and study as they were doing pre-August 15. The Pashtun factions seem to be at cross-purpose on the subject at a time when jubilation over winning the war should have set aside differences.

Just as governments all over the world look to provide representation to all races, ethnicities and regions, it is a moot question as to how the spoils will be distributed between the Pashtun tribes, the major ones being Durrani and Ghiljai, while the other groups from Jalalabad and Nuristan have also raised their demands. These wouldn’t include those manning the check-points on highways and in small towns, already collecting ‘taxes’ and implementing unknown and undeclared rules.

The key differences that appear to be emerging are on policy with regard to women, education, narcotics, source of riches and China, despite its vicious violations of the rights of Uyghur Muslims, an anathema to an Islamic Emirate.

Then there is the question of whether the Taliban can be believed. One comment stands out in an overview of the mass of videos available on the social media, that of Crystal Bayat, an Afghan women’s rights activist, who was outspoken in leading a demonstration on August 19, to retain the Afghan flag. She recounted an incident during the protest, “every Talib was saying, for only 20 days, you guys are free”.

This would imply September 7 as the end-date for freedom, closer to when the Americans are expected to have exfiltrated all citizens and special immigrant visa (SIV) holders. This date would also be close to the iconic date — 9/11. Declaring victory over a superpower on that date would offer similar Islamist movements, in Africa and Asia, symbolism and motivation, something that the Indian security regime needs to watch out for. This symbolism, if amplified in social media, could be similar to Baghdadi’s speech of Mosul in 2014.

Multiple other schisms are emerging, including the absence of representation of the northerners, the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras — main beneficiaries of the past two decades and with a large presence in Kabul’s 5-6 million population. The more the Taliban beat common people on the streets with chains and with every single wanton killing, they are to be seen as an occupational force by these segments, making their victory tenuous.

Hamid Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah are sustaining well in negotiations, as seen from the photographs of them meeting Kabul’s acting Governor Abdul Rehman Mansoor on August 21 and a delegation of intellectuals from the Panjshir Valley, as also including women and children from their families in the photographs. This does imply a clear messaging of inclusion from the Taliban leadership, obviously due to international and Pakistani pressures. However, some observers refer to these two prominent personalities as under house arrest.

All these inherent contradictions are confused with Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan, which promise to make the formation of a government very difficult, leave alone its continuance. Pakistan is clearly focused on an inclusive government, concerned that the Pashtun versus others sentiment must not emerge, else its original concern, that of an independent Pakhtunistan, will cause it serious bother.

Some experts are of the view that discussions on government formation are focused on leaving security, defence and religious affairs to the Taliban, while those with experience in civil governance, members of the Karzai/Abdullah group, could possibly handle infrastructure, development and foreign affairs. However, this view is based on the fact that after the departure of Westerners, Taliban will forget the blood that it shed, a memory rarely forgotten in tribal Afghanistan. The killing of the ex-commander of Kabul, after he had surrendered, bears testimony to the need for revenge in Afghan society. As factional negotiations continue, the words of Dr Mike Martin of the Department of War Studies, King’s College, London, sound a note of caution: “What allowed the Taliban to take over — a series of local deals along tribal lines — may well stop them from forming the political coalition necessary to form a government.”