Ecological guardrails being dismantled

AS a frequent visitor to the incomparable mountainscape of the Himalayas, I have been saddened to witness the relentless spoliation of their fragile ecology by unregulated, unrestrained and unplanned activities in the name of development. Environmental degradation has reached unprecedented levels, with projects justified on the grounds of national security or promotion of religious pilgrimage to hitherto remote locations. Little attention has been paid to the shifting terrain of the Himalayan zone, where the mountains are still rising as the Indian tectonic plate continues, millimeter by millimeter, to push against the Tibetan plateau. The blasting that takes place for the construction of highways or hydroelectric power projects renders the terrain ever more unstable, resulting in frequent landslides, avalanches and flashfloods. The benefits brought to local communities through improved connectivity, access to power and expansion of economic activity are short-lived as multiple disasters follow, such as the subsidence in Joshimath or the collapse of the under-construction tunnel at Silkyara on the national highway to Yamunotri in Uttarakhand. These have followed other environmental disasters in the same Himalayan zone, including the Kedarnath flashfloods in 2013, which led to a huge loss of life and property. And yet no lessons appear to have been learnt.

The Ministry of Environment has permitted homesteads in private and deemed forests in Goa and Mussoorie. This is likely to open the door to commercial exploitation of protected green sites .

I was associated with the post-mortem of the Kedarnath disaster. Some conclusions arrived at are revealing. Warnings from the Met department of possible storms and heavy rain in the Kedarnath region and the real possibility of a storm surge, endangering pilgrims staying at Kedarnath, were ignored. Apparently, the concern was that the income earned from religious tourism would be affected if an evacuation was ordered on the basis of the probability of adverse weather.

It emerged that most of the deaths took place due to the pilgrims freezing in the sub-zero temperatures outside their guest-houses. These were heated by gas-fuelled heaters. The pilgrims did not have adequate winter clothing. At 18,000 ft, there were several hundred pilgrims in these temporary hutments. No one seemed to have asked whether such a high-altitude location had the carrying capacity for so many pilgrims.

It is not clear whether the post-mortem led to major changes in managing religious tourism. I do not think so. It will be recalled that as a result of the Kedarnath floods and storm surge, most of the guest-houses, hotels and tea shops on the Gangotri highway were washed away. In any case, they should not have been allowed to be constructed right on the banks of the river itself. As a result of the disaster, it was announced that no construction would be allowed at least 100 metres from the mid-river channel on to the river bank and the area 300 metres beyond would be treated as a regulated zone. When I travelled on the Gangotri highway a few years later, the guest-houses, hotels and tea shops were all back right next to the river itself.

It is not one’s argument that there should not be any economic activity in the Himalayan zone, nor that the demands of national security should not be addressed. Religious pilgrimage is a legitimate activity in a country where faith is so much part of our lives. However, all these activities must take into account the ecological fragility of the Himalayan zone. Projects, of whatever nature, should be undertaken only after very rigorous environmental impact studies. When projects are approved, it is imperative that the regulations laid down are scrupulously followed. Often, they are not.

There are strict rules regarding debris disposal whenever major earthwork is undertaken. In most cases, one finds the debris being dumped next to the construction site itself. This blocks the natural drainage in the area, leading to waterlogging in the upper reaches and severe drought in the lower reaches, adversely affecting local communities and their livelihood.

There are also strict rules on maintaining an appropriate distance between blasting sites. I recall that while I was undertaking border infrastructure surveys during the period from 2004 to 2015, the gap to be maintained between blasting sites was 12 km. But blasting was sometimes carried out for a road project even within a 3-km range because of the pressure to complete projects expeditiously. This has the effect of greatly disturbing an already shifting and loose terrain in the Himalayas.

The amended Forest Conservation Act, 2023, has eased the curbs on project activity in the Himalayan zone by exempting from its purview those which are of national security importance up to 100 km from the international borders, the Line of Actual Control (with China) and the Line of Control (with Pakistan). This is self-defeating because if the built-up border infrastructure, including roads, is frequently washed away or damaged by landslides, defence preparedness itself would be adversely impacted. The government was in any case able to get exemptions even earlier when a persuasive case was put forward for relaxing forest conservation regulations in view of defence needs. It is also rather odd that the amended legislation provides for ecotourism, safaris and zoos as legitimate activities within forest zones. A nature reserve is already a natural habitat for animals. Why should a zoo be planted in a forest?

We now have a letter from the Ministry of Environment, permitting homesteads in private and deemed forests in Goa and Mussoorie. This is likely to open the door to commercial exploitation of protected green sites still remaining in these hill areas.

Historically, legislative action and judicial activism had raised the guardrails protecting India’s remaining forest cover, which is around 23 per cent of its total area. There are plans to expand the forest cover so as to provide an additional carbon sink to absorb 2.5 to 3 billion tonnes of CO2. Recent policy measures may not be compatible with this target.