Chinese handshake costing Pak dear in Balochistan
RECENT attacks on multiple targets in Pakistan’s Balochistan province mark an escalation in hostilities. The attacks were a consequence of festering problems and the damage to Balochistan’s sociocultural and economic fabric. A major reason for the attacks was the CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) desire to run an ambitious communications corridor from Xinjiang to Gwadar through Balochistan, a move not supported by residents of the province.
A close ally of China for decades, Pakistan has sought to use the Chinese largesse to address many of its problems. While their India-centred agenda has several convergences, Pakistan hoped that China would align with it against India. A review of the period since 1947 reveals that while China’s diplomatic and military support to Pakistan may have been overtly nuanced on occasions, its covert facilitation and huge military supplies are central to Pakistan’s operational capability and vital for Pakistan’s missile, nuclear and submarine development.
Unfortunately, strategic relations between unequals demand concessions from the less strong partner. From the act of ceding the Shaksgam valley of Kashmir to China in 1963, based on a specious boundary settlement, to the hosting of the CPEC and virtually surrendering control of northern Gilgit, the list of Pakistan’s strategic giveaways to China is long.
Enabling the Chinese to reach the high waters of the Arabian Sea through the Khunjerab Pass on the Karakoram mountains up to the port of Gwadar has been one of the major giveaways. This mega plan promises to transform Pakistan with a goal of 2.3 million jobs, 2-2.5 per cent additional growth and an enormous upgrade of road, rail, industrial and electrical facilities. For China, its 12,000-km oil transportation journey from the Gulf gets reduced to 2,395 km, with a saving of about $2 billion a year (according to present estimates). It also negates China’s Malacca dilemma and furthers its ambition to have a base in the Arabian Sea. The heart of the CPEC projects lies in Balochistan, a province that has never been integrated and remains restive. For the Balochis, their identity, autonomy, human rights abuse by the Pakistani state and the extraction of economic gains without returns remain major troubling issues.
Historically, Pakistan has chosen alliances mostly based on security and development-related priorities. The country’s engagement with the US has given it a slew of advantages. Pakistan’s centrality to the conflicts in Afghanistan, coupled with its own convoluted priorities, however, left it more divided, scarred and economically deprived. Its flawed vision of using covert entities to get leverage in Afghanistan and seek strategic depth has unravelled. Consequently, insecurity prevails in the region, including Afghanistan. In its pursuit of powerful allies like the US and China, Pakistan has neglected to integrate the western provinces and their people.
A complex and twisted issue that has fomented resentment among Afghans, Pathans and Balochis is the Punjabi centralism and exceptionalism. Further, Pakistan has always preferred to use military force to deal with resistance movements instead of focusing on reconciliation. This has caused the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Baloch movements to converge in resisting the Pakistani approach.
In February 2022, then Pakistani Interior Minister Sheikh Rasheed Ahmad officially acknowledged this reality. Later, in November 2022, ill-fated talks with the TTP collapsed. Five main Baloch nationalist groups have seldom been approached for reconciliation. The brutal killing of Akbar Bugti, a Baloch leader, in 2006 by the Pakistani army marked a definitive break for the Balochis. For Pakistan, pursuing powerful and demanding foreign powers while letting deep internal fractures widen is hardly strategic wisdom.
At 11,317, the year 2009 saw the highest number of fatalities because of internal conflict in Pakistan. The number slumped to 365 in 2019 due to military measures and its focus on Afghanistan. However, since the beginning of 2020, there has been a clear upswing in violence and death toll, with the number (1,502) peaking to a six-year high in 2023. In the current year, the toll stands at 1,240. In 2023, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan accounted for 90 per cent of all the fatalities and 84 per cent of all attacks in Pakistan. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan saw a surge of 54 per cent and 63 per cent, respectively, over 2021. In the current year, so far, 92 per cent of all fatalities in Pakistan have taken place in these two regions.
Operationally, it is evident that the Baloch groups have benefited from the shared knowledge, tactics and combat orientation of the TTP. Both Baloch nationalists and the TTP have been aggressively focusing on difficult targets like the army, police, coast guard, high-ranking officials as well as Chinese nationals and assets. They have also claimed responsibility for the downing of a GOC XII Corps helicopter in August 2022, a crash that killed all those on board. The areas around Quetta have been wisely left to the TTP. Both have benefited from the International Security Assistance Force/NATO equipment, left behind by the NATO forces when they withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021. The advantage of secure bases in Afghanistan is immense and makes difficult the pursuit of strategic depth by the Pakistani establishment.
The recent attacks on the death anniversary of Akbar Bugti carried a distinct message — from brutal assaults on security and police personnel to an infrastructure strike in Bolan and ethnic targeting of civilians. They underscore their ability to attack Punjabis at will and strike at the vital Bolan commercial connectivity.
The Pakistan security establishment in the region is headed by a three-star officer. The force component is assessed by its nine infantry battalions, six police wings and several civil armed force units. The Pakistan Maritime Security Agency operates in ports and coastal areas. It reportedly also has seacraft from Pakistan and China. There are always large numbers of Chinese nationals and workers in the project areas.
These attacks present a compelling challenge to the security establishment. While intelligence and operational imperatives are significant, they will be impacted by the popular local support, secure bases and the will-o’-the-wisp tactics of the Baloch quintet. By pushing the Chinese agenda in an insecure environment, Pakistan seeks to use fire to quieten a firestorm — whatever the outcome, the country is fated to be burnt by it.
