China’s quest to replace ‘Tibet’ with ‘Xizang’ is destined to fail

THE term ‘South Tibet’ frequently pops up in Indian media, uncritically disseminating misinformation from Chinese news outlets. A recent report claimed that China has renamed 30 more places in Arunachal Pradesh, which Beijing asserts are part of ‘South Tibet’.

In common parlance, Tibetans may refer to the eastern, western, central or northeastern regions of Tibet, but there is no term ‘South Tibet’ as a geographic proper noun in the Tibetan lexicon – a fact easily verified by consulting any Tibetan dictionary or encyclopaedia. This term is an entirely new Chinese construct.

Beijing truly deserves recognition for its exceptional mastery in the politics of names. Their prowess in manipulating names — whether of people, places or concepts — as strategic political tools to assert power, control narratives, shape identities and influence public perception is a masterclass in propaganda.

A classic example of China’s dominance in shaping the narrative on the Sino-Tibetan conflict is evident from their definition of ‘Tibet’ itself. The ‘Tibet’ referred to by China is geographically distinct from the Tibet that exists in the hearts and minds of the Tibetan people. The People’s Republic of China, established in 1949, considers only the ‘Tibet Autonomous Region’ (TAR), created in 1965, as Tibet — an ancient nation with a rich history spanning thousands of years! Traditionally, Tibet consisted of three regions: U-tsang, Kham and Amdo. When Tibetans speak of ‘Tibet’, they mean all three regions, encompassing approximately 2.5 million square km.

In line with the classic colonial divide-and-rule policy, the so-called TAR includes only U-tsang and parts of Kham, with the remaining areas fragmented as autonomous prefectures and counties, and incorporated into the neighbouring Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Sichuan, Yunnan and Gansu. Qinghai, for example, is composed entirely of the traditional Amdo and parts of Kham.

The composition of the current democratically elected leadership of the exile Tibetan polity highlights the stark incongruity of China’s definition of Tibet. For example, both the current and former Sikyong (President) of the Central Tibetan Administration belong to areas outside the so-called TAR. The current Sikyong, Penpa Tsering, belongs to Amdo Chentsa, now part of Qinghai province, while former Sikyong Lobsang Sangay belongs to Kham Lithang, which is currently within Sichuan province.

In previous Sino-Tibetan talks, a key demand from the Tibetan side was the establishment of a single autonomous Tibetan administration encompassing all Tibetan autonomous areas. This is crucial for the genuine implementation of China’s constitutional provisions regarding national regional autonomy.

Between 2002 and 2010, nine rounds of formal talks took place between representatives of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Government. Beijing, however, rejected our entire proposal, including our request for a single Tibetan administrative unit. They claimed that the proposed autonomous region would be too large and that Tibetans have historically never been governed under a single administration. This claim is a clear distortion of historical facts. I quote an excerpt from a speech by former Kalon Tripa, Prof Samdhong Rinpoche: “Tibetans were under one administration until the mid-ninth century. Later, Tibetans were again re-integrated into one administration in 1260 under Drogon Choegyal Phakpa. This was offered to him by emperor Kublai Khan and this offering explicitly refers to the three Cholkas with a clear demarcation of its borders. Such unified administration remained until the 1730s.”

China further distorted the definition of ‘Tibet’ by introducing the notion of ‘Greater Tibet’. While Tibetans, like people from any other nation, proudly refer to their homeland as great, Beijing has very deftly rephrased this as ‘Greater Tibet’. This is a vicious distortion of Tibetan territorial identity. For Tibetans, there is no concept of ‘Greater’ and ‘Smaller’ Tibet; there is simply Tibet, as understood in our collective consciousness.

Beijing has now gone a step too far by attempting to supplant the term ‘Tibet’ with ‘Xizang’. It is important to note that Beijing’s definition of even ‘Xizang’ differed both before and after the invasion of Tibet in 1949-50.

In ancient times, such as in the Sino-Tibetan treaty of 821-822, the terms ‘Great Tibet’ and ‘Great China’ were used. Before 1949, the Republic of China employed the terms ‘Inner Tibet’ and ‘Outer Tibet’ to differentiate regions within Tibet, similar to the use of ‘Inner Mongolia’ and ‘Outer Mongolia’ for Mongolia. ‘Inner Tibet’ referred to the areas under Chinese control at that time, while ‘Outer Tibet’ denoted independent Tibet. These terms also appeared in the Simla Convention (1913-14), which involved Great Britain, China and Tibet.

China’s gradual military conquest of eastern territories of Tibet was swiftly followed by the renaming of the newly annexed places. For example, Ziling was renamed Xining, Dhartsedo became Kanding, Bathang (my homeland) was changed to Ba an, and Chamdo was renamed Changdu. China then developed and promoted its own narrative, claiming that only the territories under the effective control of the Government of Tibet at that time constituted Xizang.

They believe that by renaming places annexed through military conquests and forging new identities and historical narratives, they can gradually root out and erase the deep, centuries-old bond between the people of these areas and historic Tibet. The current reality, however, is quite the opposite. Since the disintegration of the mighty Tibetan Empire in the ninth century and the eventual inception of the Dalai Lama’s Gaden Phodrang Government in Tibet in 1642, what is ubiquitous across the Tibetan plateau today is a strong, deep sense of common territorial and national identity.

Beijing’s quest to replace ‘Tibet’ with ‘Xizang’ is, therefore, destined to fail. If history is any guide, the imposition of Chinese identity through the distortion of historical and cultural narratives will only further alienate the Tibetan people and strengthen their sense of distinct national identity.

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