China ups the nuclear ante

FOR some time now, China has been signalling a change in its nuclear weapon policy. It usually makes no announcements or declarations. But, on September 25 — for the first time since 1980 — China tested a long-range strategic missile whose dummy warhead landed in the South Pacific Ocean, near the city of Bora Bora in French Polynesia, over 12,000 km away. In this case, China actually announced the test and provided the required notification to the sea and air traffic control. Most Chinese missile tests take place within Chinese territory, with missiles being fired into the Taklamakan desert in Xinjiang.

Officially, China maintains a ‘no first use’ policy, which it announced at the time of its first nuclear test in 1964.

According to the Chinese, the missile fired by the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) was part of a “routine arrangement in our annual training plan” and fell in an ‘expected area’ in the sea. The statement said it was “in line with international law and international practice, and is not directed at any specific country or target.”

They said they had notified countries concerned about the test in advance and it was confirmed by the Philippine authorities that two NOTAMs (notice to airmen — sea and air navigational warnings) were issued prior to the launch. Analysts said the missile was in all likelihood fired from the Hainan region and passed through north of the Philippines. The US said it had received “some advanced notification” of the test. Japan complained that it had not been warned about it.

The missile in question could be the DF-31AG, China’s long-range weapon that can reach targets in the US. It is capable of being fired from mobile transporter-erector-launcher systems.

There is a great deal of speculation as to why the Chinese conducted the test the way they did. It came amidst rising tensions among Japan, the Philippines, China and the US. Chinese and Philippine vessels have been involved in multiple collisions near Sabina Shoal, just 86 km from the Philippines’ west coast; in June, there was an encounter at the Second Thomas Shoal nearby.

Another factor may have been the recent US decision to deploy its new mid-range missile system known as the Typhon in the Philippines for an exercise; according to reports, the system remains deployed there.

This may also be related to the large-scale purges that shook the Chinese rocket force on account of corruption. Last December, China had announced the dismissal of nine senior military officials of the PLA, many of them senior officers of the PLARF, for “serious violations of law and discipline” — a phrase used to refer to corruption. So, this could be seen as a reassurance of sorts for the Chinese public.

Officially, China maintains a “no first use” policy relating to nuclear weapons, which it announced at the time of its first nuclear test in 1964. It has since reaffirmed this in its 2015 and 2019 defence white papers. India, too, has such a policy, which is based on not being the first to initiate a nuclear strike, and relying on the concept of assured retaliation.

But unlike India, China has been expanding its nuclear arsenal rapidly. The 2023 China military power report of the US said Beijing had 500 operational nuclear warheads in May last year as compared to 400 the year before. The US believes that China will have more than 1,000 warheads by 2030 and is accelerating its intercontinental range ballistic missile programme. The US had disclosed the size of American holdings as of September 2023 — 3,748 warheads that are in the process of being modernised.

According to the Pentagon, the PLA is implementing a Launch-on-Warning posture under which a warning of a strike leads to a counterstrike before the enemy weapons actually land. This posture is similar to that of the US and Russia, but not the Indian one, where you first sustain a strike and then hit back.

In 2021, observers detected three vast missile silo fields under construction in north-central China, where hundreds of additional long-range missiles could be deployed. Though commercial satellite imagery has provided substantial detail on these silos and their rapid construction, the Chinese Government has chosen not to comment on them.

These silo fields are clearly related to the PLARF’s expansion programme. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has detected extensive support infrastructure of command and control, electrical power supply and roads, though as of now, the FAS says the fields are still many years from being fully operational.

The build-up certainly raises questions about China’s stated minimum nuclear deterrence policy and its “no first use” pledge. China has so far rejected the notion of limiting its arsenal, arguing that it is Russia and the US that need to take the lead in nuclear disarmament. But, given the trend, China, too, could reach that status soon.

Remarkably, India is rarely mentioned in these discussions, even though the relations between Beijing and New Delhi are not good. As long as both Delhi and Beijing were committed to maintaining minimum deterrence with a ‘no first use’ pledge, things would have been stable. But with the changed calculations in China and its expanding arsenal, India will have to rethink its options.

Hardly noticed in the media was a recent test in the Karakoram area near the Indian border by the PLA — a subsonic cruise missile was successfully intercepted by a surface-to-air missile at an altitude of 5,300 metres. Observers said the test was a deterrent message to India and that it was reported by Xinhua on August 29 — the day the two countries held the 31st meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination in Beijing to discuss their border dispute.