China ups the ante with Chabahar push

IN hindsight, the recent statement of Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif wasn’t unexpected: “China wants to play a role in the Chabahar (port) project”. It’s Iran’s nudge to India about the arrival of Beijing in a territory where New Delhi enjoyed prime privilege for some time. Does it constitute a major breakthrough by the Communist Party of China (CPC) by creating a coveted space for itself to counter and confront India in a strategic seaport in a third country? Can India avoid future pressure and tensions in a long, connected terrain spanning Pakistan, Iran and Turkey?

Indeed, true to its fresh understanding of geography, the CPC has posed an extremely challenging task to India, dealing with which could be an arduous long haul, with unprecedented situations likely to emerge. What thus far appeared to have been trumpeted by India — that the India-Iran Chabahar project was New Delhi’s answer to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’s (CPEC) fulcrum, the Gwadar port — now constitutes an acid test of India’s ability to continue with its avowed power play beyond South Asia.

Although ‘unfriendly’ China started late, it learnt the geography of the sea fast. That subject has rarely been the forte of Indian rulers since time immemorial. Else, how does one explain the constantly changing political maps of India with virtually no naval tradition and an uninterrupted loss of territory from 1947 to 2021?

Hence, compulsively, it’s time to learn from China the supreme importance of geography for a sovereign nation’s self-interest. Else, India will continue to be projected as a ‘future potential power’, which shows no sign of shedding its tag of laggard.

Coming back to Chabahar, Iran has been forthright. It has given India the signal that the Chinese are more than welcome in Chabahar. “Chabahar is open to cooperation for everybody. It’s not against China or the Gwadar port. It’s a place where we can all come together to help Afghanistan… the Chinese are interested in playing a role elsewhere in Iran and also in Chabahar,” the Iranian Foreign Minister said. The choice of words is aimed at assuring China and Pakistan. But no mention of India means no assurance to India as such.

The message is loud and clear: China looms larger than all South Asian nations taken together because Beijing is “interested in playing a role elsewhere in Iran” and “also Chabahar”. Chabahar may be a late addition to Chinese ‘interest’ in Iran, but its overall importance in Tehran’s eyes is long-term. And, why not? When India, owing to US pressure, stopped Iranian oil import in 2019, Tehran’s anxiety of dealing with traditionally friendly India was understandable. India couldn’t go on its own in the Delhi-Tehran bilateral. Rather, it’s been following instructions of the US. Little wonder, China wholeheartedly grabbed the opportunity for long-term fuel supply at financially favourable terms. Holding cold and calculated ‘national interest’ above everything else. Consequently, both Iran and China are today on the same page on Chabahar, where India was once perceived to be a weighty player.

Of course, India still retains its position and visibility in the Persian Gulf; nevertheless, Beijing has marched a step ahead owing to New Delhi’s seasonal foreign power play.

Chabahar is part of an important Iranian pivot, with the region adjacent to it accounting for 70 per cent of the world’s proven oil reserves and 40 per cent of its natural gas reserves. That one country-bridge connects the great Eurasian space, South Asia, western highlands of China, the great arc of the Sunni world with unrestricted access to the Indian Ocean after crossing through a narrow channel of a virtually landlocked water body called the Persian Gulf.

Hence, what’s unique is the Chinese ‘sea sense’ of ‘forward deployment’. With mounting tensions in the eastern and south seas surrounding mainland China, it’s time to switch flanks for a fresh, flexible frontier. Chabahar opens up options for mobilisation during a crisis. In a straight east-west coastline of 365 nautical miles, the Chinese navy, mercantile marine and fishing vessels have attained advantage over others. From Pakistan’s Karachi-Gwadar stretch (289 nautical miles), it has now 76 nautical miles of the Iran-Pakistan Chabahar-Gwadar connect.

The history of ‘forward deployment’ by the British at the height of European imperialism and the US command and control of oceans in the 20th century comes alive with 21st-century Chinese understanding of geography. No doubt Chabahar is prima facie projected for economics, commerce and trade. Nevertheless, no port in a strategic location can only be for economics. That’s highly unlikely, especially once China comes to the fore.

China’s role in Chabahar should be seen beyond the Delhi-Beijing tug of war, as its span and scope are much larger and deeper than that. It’s a first step towards a Chinese navy foothold deep inside US Central Command territorial jurisdiction which has its headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The Chinese urgently need more than Djibouti for its expanding armada as its naval competition with the US becomes fiercer.

It has to be admitted that the US Navy is no longer the force that it was at the turn of the 20th century. Today, the gap between strategy and resources is a stark challenge to the US in the West Pacific, arguably the most sensitive and strategic region. China, therefore, definitely proposes to create a fresh seafront in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean to expand and consolidate. China has already scaled up its naval inventory to more than 350 combat ships, thereby leaving the US stuck at around 300 vessels. The strategic US goal for 355 combatants remains unrealised. Hence, with three ports (Karachi, Gwadar, Chabahar) in a straight line of 365 km, China has laid the foundation for multiple options and opportunities for a multi-front crisis in the sea along with fresh availability of the Persian Gulf to the Beijing-Shanghai landline, thereby avoiding the potentially turbulent and choppy Indian Ocean-Singapore Strait-Pacific Ocean sealane. It’s real-time geography and economics of sea and port craft.