China may play spoilsport
India’s foreign policy and national security establishments are going to be deeply tied up this year in meetings with members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the G20 grouping. They will have to meticulously prepare for the summit meetings which India will be hosting later this year. The SCO includes eight members, six ‘Dialogue Partners’, and four ‘Observer States’. The G20 Summit will be bringing together leaders of countries which constitute two-thirds of the world’s population, while providing 90% of global GDP and 80% of global trade. The year 2023 is set to become the most complex and busy period in India’s diplomatic history. It is also going to be a period when the country’s logistical and organisational strengths will be tested. The forthcoming summits will test our ability in bringing countries together in a constructive and harmonious cooperation at the highest level. The summits are coming in the wake of tensions arising from the military standoff in Arunachal Pradesh.
The issue of special interest will be whether Xi Jinping will participate in the forthcoming summits in the background of the current state of Sino-Indian ties.
There are a few points that New Delhi should bear in mind. It will enjoy unstinted support in the conferences from virtually all members of the G20 and Quad. Both Pakistan and China will be present in the SCO. Pakistan is now engrossed in dealing with its collapsing economy. It also has serious problems with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, and its own jihadis, the Tehreek-e-Taliban, across its 2,600 km border with Afghanistan and Iran. Given Afghanistan’s strategic location abutting Central Asia, China is keen to secure access to its mineral resources and keep in touch with its radical Islamist Taliban regime, especially in the light of its own tensions with its disaffected Uighur Muslims.
Chinese President Xi Jinping has displayed continuing hostility towards India. China is focusing attention on the joint production of its much-touted JF-17 fighter aircraft in Pakistan and in strengthening the Pakistan navy. The Gwadar Port in Balochistan has a growing Chinese presence, but Pakistan has more serious problems to deal with, with its dwindling foreign exchange resources. In the meantime, the IMF is insisting on stringent conditions before international assistance can flow in. Even Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have always been more than generous in bailing out Pakistan, are now making it clear that they will open their purse strings only after Pakistan fully meets IMF conditionalities. Across the world, many governments are recognising that the economic mess that Pakistan is now in flows from its own blunders.
There has, meanwhile, been a growing feeling in India that much of the tensions with China flow from deliberate actions of the Xi Jinping government, despite India having rolled out the red carpet during his India visit. It has been interesting to see a comprehensive assessment of India’s policies by Liu Zongyi of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies. Liu is one of China’s most prominent experts on South Asian studies. He has visited both India and Pakistan. In a recent article, which has received due attention in academic circles in our eastern neighbourhood, he has bluntly spelt out what China thinks about India and its policies. Senior scholars in China do not speak out of turn. They are a convenient medium to convey the thinking of the country’s Communist Party and government.
His study, titled ‘India’s Rising Great Power Strategy’, is multifaceted. On India’s domestic political issues, it alludes to the ascendancy of ‘Hindu nationalism’. On economic issues, he describes the ‘Make in India’ strategy as an effort to take over China’s place in the global supply chain. India’s strategy, according to him, will be to target China by building bases in Indian Ocean states, advancing the integration of India’s armed forces and improving border infrastructure, including in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. It also includes building military bases by India in small Indian Ocean islands.
In his conclusion, he notes: ‘Thus, the biggest divide between India and China is no longer related to border issues. In fact, border issues have now been instrumentalised. For the Indians, the biggest issue between India and China is the battle for the regional and global order. It is a geopolitical conflict, because India is a country that places a lot of emphasis on the idea of spheres of influence.’ Regarding India hosting the G20 and Quad summits, he notes: ‘Ultimately, the G20 Summit cannot be a success without China’s active participation. Even though the West lavishes praise on India, and even though India presents itself as the so-called poster child of developing countries, and the leader of the South, it will most certainly not succeed without China’s support.’ One cannot think of this as anything but a warning, bordering on threat.
Liu betrays an obsession with the growth of India-US relations. He avers that it is India’s strategy to work with the US to undermine and counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative to prevent the emergence of a ‘China led’ regional order. This is accompanied by his strong justification of recent Chinese military intrusions in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. Liu expresses serious concerns about India’s relations with the US and its involvement in groupings like Quad and I2U2. He conveniently forgets how China has been deliberately seeking to undermine India’s relations with neighbours across South Asia, notably with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and the Maldives. He even forgets the impact of China’s continuing and growing military relations with Rawalpindi, including its transfer of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities to Pakistan.
Under these circumstances, the issue of special interest in the coming months will be whether Xi Jinping will participate in the forthcoming summits in the background of the current state of Sino-Indian relations, and the widespread concerns in India about his assertive policies.
