China distorts history to lay claims of convenience
The Chinese troops’ latest misadventure in Ladakh is blatantly violative of the consensus arrived at during the ongoing military and diplomatic engagements. This proclivity to change the status quo highlights the steadfast policy of territorial expansionism pursued by the Chinese Communist Party, using a variety of dubious mechanisms. The Chinese bid for land grab, with manufactured historical justifications, can best be described as claims of convenience. Their intransigence along the borders in Sikkim, which were considered the only settled borders along the entire stretch of 3,488 km, demonstrates these shenanigans.
The joint statement issued during Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit in 2005 stated that China recognised ‘Sikkim State of the Republic of India’. Wen even handed over an official map of the People’s Republic of China to Singh, showing Sikkim as a part of India and accepted the legitimacy of the India-China borders in Sikkim. The 220-km-long boundary in this sector starts at the tri-junction between India, Bhutan and China at Batang La in south-east Sikkim, runs north along the Dongkya range, crossing the Himalayas, and then turns and goes westwards up to the Jongsong peak, which marks the tri-junction of India, Nepal and China.
The significant feature of this boundary is that it runs along the watershed between the Teesta in India and the Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) and Amo Chu flowing in the Tibetan Plateau and the Chumbi Valley, respectively. The watershed lies across the Himalayas in north Sikkim and the Teesta originates from the Teesta Kangse (Pahunri glacier) in the north Sikkim plateau before turning south and flowing through the Himalayas at Giagong.
The Chinese have laid claim to areas up till Mount Gyamochen in south-east Sikkim. This lies about eight-odd km further south of Batang La and the area in between the Batang La-Merug La-Sinchel La ridge in the north (the China-Bhutan boundary at the tip of the Chumbi Valley) and the Gyamochen-Jampheri ridge in the south is referred to as the Doklam Plateau. It is 60-odd sq km of undulating terrain, which lies in the Haa district of Bhutan and is now being claimed by China. The strategic importance of Jampheri is well known as from here the terrain rolls down to the narrow Siliguri corridor, which links India with its North-East.
The Chinese, in support of their claim, have been referring to Article 1 of the Anglo-Chinese Convention signed between British India, China and Tibet on March 17, 1890, demarcating the India-Bhutan boundary. The crux of the Doklam issue originates in the perception of the tri-junction due to the ambiguous wordings of the 1890 Convention, which states that the boundary commences from Mount ‘Gipmochi’, the coordinates of which were not given. This has given rise to an erroneous and convenient identification of Mount Gipmochi as Mount Gyemochen by China.
John Claude White, political officer in the administrative charge of Sikkim in the 1890s and early 1900s, had published a British map of 1904, which clearly shows Gipmochi next to Batang La, as the tri-junction. The Government of Sikkim, in its notification of the Pangolakha wildlife sanctuary in 2002, also clearly states Batang La to be Gipmochi, which is based on old maps of the Survey of India.
The tri-junction near Batang La (Gipmochi) is at an altitude of 14,698 feet and higher than Mt Gyemochen (14,494 feet). The Batang La-Merug La-Sinchel La ridgeline is hence the natural extension of the Dongkya range eastwards into Bhutan and is the watershed separating the waters flowing into India, China and Bhutan.
Any dispute or confusion about the identity of Gipmochi as Gyemochen notwithstanding, the fact of the matter is that the Gyemochen-Jampheri ridgeline, claimed by the Chinese as the border with Bhutan, is clearly lower in height and not the watershed in the context of this boundary. The Chinese claims are but a canard to justify its actions on the Doklam Plateau.
Interestingly, China quotes the 1890 Convention, to which Bhutan was not a signatory, to assert its claims while it rubbishes the 1914 Convention vide which the Indo-Tibetan boundary was demarcated, with a Chinese representative also in attendance.
As the India-China boundary moves north along the Dongkya range, it crosses the Himalayas and then turns westwards, skirting the Sikkim Plateau which is contiguous to the Tibetan Plateau. The boundary here runs along the rim of this plateau and is demarcated by cairns, which are simple stone markers along this watershed. The PLA’s attempts to intrude across the cairns while patrolling leads to standoffs and scuffles which at times turn rather aggressive.
As the watershed and the boundary move further west, they rejoin the Himalayas at the end of the Sikkim Plateau, and continue till the Jongsong peak. Here, the area to the south is the isolated Muguthang sector of north-west Sikkim. The watershed and the boundary cross over the prominent pass of Naku La. The land slopes southwards into India and about 1,200 metres inside, there is an irregular heap of stones, up to a metre high at places, stretching about a kilometre across, with gaps in between.
A mention of these ‘stone walls’ can be found in Francis Younghusband’s book India and Tibet (1910), which is about his campaign in to Tibet. He had encountered such stone walls, possibly rudimentary defence works to provide some form of a firing position, at Yatung, Gyantse and other places on the way to Lhasa. This craggy heap of stones cannot be construed to represent the alignment of the border, instead of the watershed, in any manner whatsoever. These may have had some defence value for the locals against any Tibetan marauders venturing across the pass. Clearly, these stone heaps had a purely local significance and had nothing to do with any boundary.
The Chinese were quick to seize upon an opportunity to create another dispute by claiming this stone heap as the boundary with India, howsoever ridiculous it may appear. The Chinese ignore both history and geography when they conveniently forget about the watershed at Naku La lying well to the north, which is the boundary as per the 1890 Convention.
These are but a few examples of China’s claims of convenience based on distorting historical facts. The surest way of giving the lie to such manufactured stances is to counter them very strongly at every opportunity.
