Challenge for India, US to keep defence ties on track

THE US will have Donald Trump as the new incumbent in the White House on January 20, 2025; he will be sworn in as the 47th President. He is returning to the Oval Office after four years.

Based on Trump’s track record in the first term, disruptive and transactional are terms associated with the US President-elect. Allies, partners, adversaries — all the interlocutors of the US will be fastening their seat belts, and India, like other nations, would have to brace itself for the churn that may be triggered.

The India-US bilateral relationship has steadily become more robust and consolidated since the 2008 breakthrough over the festering nuclear nettle. The defence vertical has acquired considerable traction, both by way of content and directivity. Will this relationship be reviewed, disruptively rearranged and adversely impacted in Trump 2.0?

On current evidence, it may be averred that after 2008, there has been an essential continuity in India-US ties across the board (political, economic, defence and societal), and that this orientation will continue — notwithstanding discordant issues that surface periodically and test the resilience of the relationship. The Gurpatwant Singh Pannun case, in which aspersions have been cast on Indian intelligence agencies, is illustrative.

A brief recap provides the context to this changing texture of the India-US defence/security relationship. After India’s 1974 PNE (peaceful nuclear explosion), the bilateral was described as bitterly ‘estranged’ and India placed under severe US-led technological and related sanctions. It took three decades for a rapprochement that began after India conducted the May 1998 nuclear tests and President Bill Clinton visited India in March 2000. By 2008, a modus vivendi was reached over the nuclear issue and this was possible because of the resolve and sagacity demonstrated by President George W Bush and PM Manmohan Singh.

From political estrangement and seemingly intractable dissonance over security and strategic issues, the bilateral defence relationship acquired traction in a steady manner. Following the acquisition of the landing ship USS Trenton in 2006 (it was commissioned as INS Jalashwa in January 2007), defence sales from the US to India increased. Almost $20 billion worth of American military inventory has been contracted since 2008.

In October, India concluded a deal to acquire high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) armed drones estimated to cost $3 billion, indicating that the US is emerging as an important arms supplier for Delhi.

Most of these inventory items have been acquired under the FMS (foreign military sales) and financing framework, and it is instructive that the last such sale by the US to India was in 1965. Over the previous 15 years, India has acquired transport and maritime reconnaissance aircraft (C-130J Super Hercules, C-17 Globemaster III and P-8I Poseidon); transport, naval and attack helicopters (CH-47F Chinooks, MH-60R Seahawks and AH-64E Apaches); Harpoon anti-ship missiles and M777 howitzers. With these acquisitions, India, while not being a military ally, is now the largest operator of C-17 and P-8I military aircraft outside of the US.

In 2016, India was designated as a “Major Defence Partner”, thereby enabling a higher degree of defence, trade and security cooperation privileges. Furthermore, in June 2023, the US and India launched a bilateral Defence Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS-X) to expand strategic technology and defence industrial cooperation. This framework for cooperation in strategic technology has considerable relevance for India, but as always, no nation parts with or shares such hi-tech military knowhow in a forthcoming manner. Progress in this domain will not be wrinkle-free, and how this is taken forward by both nations will be an indicator about the qualitative texture and directivity imparted to the India-US defence relationship.

This issue comes into focus with the decision taken in June 2023 regarding jet engines. A major US defence company, General Electric (GE) signed a $716-million agreement with India’s public sector entity HAL to jointly produce the F414 jet engine. This was heralded as a ‘breakthrough’ and was announced when PM Modi visited the US. Taken to a swift and satisfactory conclusion, this would have given the Indian light combat aircraft project a significant fillip; it has been floundering for years due to lack of technical and manufacturing competence in the critical area of jet engines.

However, the project has not moved as planned. According to media reports, the Government of India is considering imposing penalties on GE for this delay. This roadblock points to the challenges that have to be overcome. Will Trump 2.0 provide the necessary political direction to enable India in its quest for self-reliance (aatmanirbharta) in hi-tech defence sectors? And if so, what would be the contours and content of the ‘deal’?

This is where the issue of strategic directivity comes into play. The major breakthrough in India-US relations during the second Bush tenure (2005-2009) was related to the US assessment of China and how it was to be managed. Bringing India into the global nuclear framework was deemed necessary. Once this determination was arrived at, the White House did considerable heavy lifting in overcoming domestic reservations in the Washington Beltway to enable India.

Such reluctance was seen in Delhi also. While this civilian-nuclear agreement was of enormous value to India’s strategic interests, the BJP and Left parties had opposed the Manmohan Singh government. To his credit, he stayed the course and prevailed. Once estranged by security and strategic dissonance, the US and India now had a shared concern in relation to China; and a commitment to uphold the US-led, rules-based order in the global commons.

How US-China ties unfold under Trump 2.0 will shape the India-US defence relationship over the next four years. The Quad summit that PM Modi will host in 2025 will be a bellwether. After the Cold War, the relentless transactional pursuit in US-China relations trumped the abiding American strategic interest. Will Trump 2.0 chart a different course?