Bolster IAF to counter China along LAC
THE recent clash between Indian and Chinese troops at Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh and the increased probability of such incidents recurring have raised the question of how important an operational role the Indian Air Force (IAF) has to play in countering the belligerent adversary along our 3,488-km-long border, which runs along Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.
The traditional non-employment of kinetic weaponry by both sides is welcome as it prevents a larger conflict. The latest incident also showed the initiative of the lower-rung leadership of the Indian Army which does not always look over its shoulders for sanction from seniors.
Indeed, this professionally aggressive stance of the Indian armed forces, along with the training that soldiers have undergone recently through exercises such as ‘Yudh Abhyas’, is what riles the Dragon enough to bare its fangs periodically.
The IAF, coincidentally, undertook large-scale air exercises along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and a NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) also talked of an impending intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test off our eastern seaboard. Important as would be the political signalling in dealing with the recalcitrant, ill-intentioned neighbour, a calculated and measured response is required to counter such border transgressions.
It is a fact that aggressive use of air power does traditionally tend to accentuate tensions in hair-trigger standoffs. So the scope of employment of air power in such scenarios during peacetime would no doubt be limited, albeit somewhat advantageous, considering the inhospitable terrain involved, with heights touching 17,000 feet above the mean sea level, testing the limits of human endurance.
Even the reportedly limited air activity by the Chinese in the Tawang region needs to be noted, especially J11s from airfields across the LAC such as Hogan, Kashgar and Gar Gunsa. Another fighter-capable airfield is being developed at Shakche. But regardless of the buildup of the border infrastructure by the adversary, the Chinese are handicapped in terms of air power projection such as load and range limitation. Another limitation, of course applicable to both sides, would be the shrunk radar horizons, thanks to the terrain.
India would seek to counter Chinese air deployments through combat air patrols at its airfields in the Kashmir valley in the north and Tezpur and Hasimara in the east, where Rafale-class aircraft have been reportedly deployed.
As for the radar pickup limitations, we would need to employ traditional air defence methods such as ‘broadcast control’ with suitable mobile observer unit arcs to facilitate timely fighter detection and interception in the hostile terrain.
Another vital role for air power is lateral switching of combat troops between valleys. This is where platforms of Chinook’s ilk would play a crucial role. Our transport fleet, including IL-76s, C-17s, AN-32s, the ensuing CN-295s and the Super Hercules C-130Js would also find employability in rapid and timely lateral movement of troops and equipment between the combat zones. As for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), kinetic attacks by armed UAVs would be few and far between until UAV capabilities improve dramatically in the future. Counter-air and air interdiction would play important roles in bottling up enemy air power, thus facilitating our own ground manoeuvres. Some analysts have been articulating as to how ballistic missiles could replace conventional air power to make up for numbers. It needs no gainsaying that missiles do have a role in future hot-war situations, but that would be limited to the planned strategic air campaign of the IAF, of course armed with conventional warheads.
As for border infrastructure enhancement, suitable stretches of the upcoming road networks along the LAC need to be constructed for ‘dual use’ to augment airfield paucity in some sectors. Bulk petrol installations and bomb dumps would also need positioning to support an offensive in mountainous terrain. The newly raised Mountain Strike Corps would have its task cut out, especially for special operations in the valleys and over enemy airfields.
The IAF needs to scale up its high-altitude armament delivery training capabilities at locations such as Tosa Maidan, Kartso, Dollungmukh and other ranges across the LAC. Other aspects of air power employment in a hot-war scenario would involve the use of our low-speed assets such as trainer and combat helicopters of the Prachand variety for ground attack and anti-UAV operations.
The combat-support operations such as photo recce along valleys, casualty evacuations and air-transport operations will have their place in any future air war along the LAC. Target areas would need geological studies to assess vulnerability to landslides and avalanches, as those would be standard operating procedures for mountainous air operations.
Some counter-air and strategic targets could well be engaged by way of the BrahMos with conventional warheads. Air warfare in the mountains is challenging and elaborate peacetime training would be called for the aircrew to achieve proficiency. We need to take a cue from air wars already fought in such terrain such as the Bekaa Valley operations by Israel in 1982 during ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’ in Lebanon, wherein the deadly duel between fighters and surface-to-air missiles was vividly demonstrated.
In any war, doctrinally, a fighting force needs to pit its strengths against the enemy’s weaknesses. So, we should capitalise on the strengths of the IAF in combat efficiency, superior training and international exposure to achieve war aims in any future armed conflict, especially when confronting an adversary, perhaps numerically superior but weak in modern air-war fighting.
