Air strikes on terror sites at the core of US strategy
THE American withdrawal from Afghanistan, this time albeit in a much hastier fashion than the one carried out by it earlier during the Soviet era, is bound to have a remarkable politico-military impact globally.
It is unthinkable that the US establishment would not have thought through the implications of its withdrawal from Afghanistan on the war on terror, generally, and counter-terror missions against the likes of the al-Qaeda and ISIS cadres, specifically. The other terror groups operating in the area, including the Pakistani Taliban and the Uighur ETIM (East Turkestan Islamic Movement), LeT and JeM, are all bound to be emboldened after the Taliban success in Afghanistan.
The 40-odd erstwhile Afghan Air Force aircraft that were flown into Uzbekistan just prior to the Taliban overrun and, more importantly, their American-trained pilots are sought to be returned to Afghanistan by the new Afghan regime, though it is believed that they would pay with their lives in that event, thanks to what the extremists see as people who caused them considerable damage through air attacks in the intervening period.
Much as the Taliban have been pressurising the Uzbek government to return their planes and pilots, it does appear, for now, that the US has turned the screws to have its way in rehabilitating these pilots and restreaming them for other purposes.
These pilots and their families are reportedly on way to US air bases in the UAE and elsewhere, initially mainly to ensure their security. Down the line, it is foreseeable that these assets would be employed by the US to continue the air operations against the terrorist entities, possibly in concert with the ongoing resistance movement in the Panjshir valley.
Now, where can air attacks against the Taliban be ideally orchestrated from? Clearly, bases in the UAE, Qatar or Kuwait, traditional allies of the US, are too far away to prosecute an air campaign. Pakistan and Uzbekistan may not be considered suitable by the Americans on account of their professed sympathy with the Taliban.
It is in this light that one sees a role for India, however unpalatable the Modi government may find the proposal. Addressing the US media recently, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken hinted at a possible understanding to use north and north-west Indian territories to carry out air operations during the air war on terror expected to ensue in Afghanistan.
The Biden administration and its spokespersons have been hesitant to divulge details on their strategy for the air war on terror. The latest concept being articulated by the US is the option for an “over the horizon” air targeting. Having decided not to have any “boots on the ground”, clearly they would spend their energy on getting a basing option with a suitable ally.
How the Indian establishment tackles this request is another matter. Possibly, the specifics could revolve around air attacks out of Indian bases such as Leh and Thoise or even Srinagar and Awantipur to timely target terrorists across the Wakhan Corridor into Afghanistan. A suitable understanding with Pakistan would, of course, be called for to use the airspace over Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).
Even if India decides in favour of acceding to the American request for basing in its north, suitable diplomatic recourse will have to be thought through by the South Block mandarins, especially should any unfortunate collateral damage be caused, as indeed, did happen in the last American drone strike against the ISIS-K elements in Afghanistan.
As for the US, such operations are bound to be carried out under the aegis of a deniable CIA cover. India would be well advised to adopt a similar ambit for playing along with such covert air operations, should they become inevitable.
Should the American option be to indeed use India’s northern air bases, they are mostly likely to undertake Predator and Reaper drones for the counter-terror missions, if only to provide a non-embarrassing situation to the Indian establishment. Basing of regular USAF fighter aircraft on Indian soil is bound to be politically inadmissible to India. But even to achieve Pakistan’s Jacobabad type of arrangement (the then President Pervez Musharraf had, after George W Bush’s remark — ‘you are either with us or against us’ — agreed to the US use of airfields such as Shamsi and Jacobabad in Balochistan for Predator strikes against al-Qaeda leaders) would call for a quantum upgrade of Indo-US defence cooperation. Perhaps, treaties such as the SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) would have to be perforce reworked for any such understanding between the two allies to become effective.
The Quad face-to-face between PM Modi and Biden next week could be a crucial event in this regard, wherein a direct pitch may well be made for anti-terror ops under the Quad umbrella.
One way India could make the exercise politically amenable is if the US goes along with including some terror groups directly threatening India, such as the JeM and LeT. And that is where the US-Pak closeness will end, as is once again being indicated by Secretary Blinken when he said that they would soon re-evaluate Pakistan’s role in collaborating with the Afghan Taliban.
For India, it would mark a quantum change in government policy from that practised since time immemorial to permit US air operations against terror targets. The only plausible condition in its favour would be the possible targeting of figures such as Hafiz Saeed, who, in any case, feature on the CIA’s hit list.
The entire “war on terror” launched after the 9/11 attacks would now assume an altogether different hue, what with terrorist havens in the Middle East and South Asia inimical to American interests being fair game.
