Afghan peace, stability may stay elusive
Former Ambassador
For long, Afghanistan has been the less-favoured child of history. In this difficult journey, it has often been betrayed by the powers and people it trusted. Former Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, the US and its agent Zalmay Khalilzad are the latest inclusions on this black list.
The Taliban are a natural fit. They had long anticipated their return to power, and had years to prepare for governance. Once earlier, in the 1990s, they had wielded the ruling stick in Kabul. Yet, they were caught unprepared by the suddenness of their victory.
The Afghan people, abandoned by their leaders, were quick to accept the new reality; that life under the Taliban would be brutish for the general public and short for the regime’s opponents. To add to their misery, the country is already facing a devastating humanitarian crisis and a free-falling economy.
Yet, the Taliban remain fixed in their ways. This means women are unlikely to get their place in society and the girl child will continue to be denied her right to education. It also means freedom of expression and democracy are terms for farther shores. The media, such as it is, will remain muzzled and the parliament building constructed by the sweat of Indian workers will not host debates after the abolition of the Election Commission by the Taliban.
Unless there is a radical course correction, chances are that the Afghan economy will steadily regress towards the very bottom it had reached during the previous Taliban rule.
Afghanistan’s economic figures tell an entire story. Throughout the Taliban rule, and up to 2001, the Afghan GDP remained at around $2.7 billion. From that rock bottom position, it climbed steadily over the years to achieve a GDP of $19.5 billion in 2017.
It was the same case in per capita GDP terms. From a low of $119 in 2001, it reached $550 in 2017. The exports reveal a similar picture; Afghanistan’s exports in 1996, during the Taliban rule, were a pitiable $90 million. By 2017, they had reached a reasonably respectable figure of $784 million.
Now, with international sanctions in place, the slide to the dismal state of the 1990s may not take long. Rather, the conditions could worsen. During the first Taliban rule, there was virtually no opposition to the government. This time, the government itself is divided between factions. There are rumours of a growing rift between the Haqqani network— a Taliban faction based in the east — and a Kandahar-based faction of Taliban co-founders in the south of the country. Moreover, ethnic minorities like the Hazaras are restless, and the substantial population of Tajiks remains on edge. There are also reports that the Taliban are forcibly evicting hundreds of ethnic Uzbeks, Turkmen and the Shi’ite Hazara minority from their homes and land.
Separately, the Taliban are being undermined by the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) group. Gradually, and as frustration with the hardline methods of the government grows, other pockets of resistance could emerge. Discontent may also become more pronounced within the Taliban ranks, in part, because of the Haqqani group’s domination in critical security positions. All these are formidable odds for a new government. Still, the Taliban’s discipline and resourcefulness might ensure that its regime endures.
As for the outside world, its choices are limited and not too pleasant. Still, some contact must be established so that the Taliban are reminded from time to time of the expectations of the outside world. The UN has a chance to do so after the adoption in December 2021 of the UNSC resolution to provide humanitarian assistance. This resolution has put in place a monitoring mechanism to ensure that the aid it provides, reaches people. It also called on all parties to respect the human rights of all individuals, including women, children and persons belonging to minorities. Whether this call will be heeded by the Taliban, and whether they will make a fundamental switch in their approach, remains to be seen. But there is no harm in the UN making this pitch. Meanwhile, the best the outside world can hope for is the following: Afghanistan remains intact geographically, in its present form; over time, as economic and societal issues begin to overwhelm it, the Taliban might make some concessions to ease the lives of people; the unemployed cadre of the Taliban are not deployed for terror activities in other countries.
These are minimal expectations, yet the Taliban might prefer to keep walking down the negative path. Then, the way ahead could be challenging for it and the region around it. As it is, there are critics who maintain that India should offer refuge to Afghan minorities such as the Hazaras, Tajiks and Uzbeks etc. But this appeal for generosity ignores the security implications these vast numbers pose, nor does it take into account the societal impact of accommodating a large influx. Europe’s discomfort in having accepted a rush of refugees is a case in point.
Then there are those who find fault with India for saying, during the pre-Taliban phase, that it was on the same page as America. The counter to this being: would they rather prefer that India announced it was not on the same page as America?
What’s needed is a balanced view that takes into account India’s historical experience. Over centuries, India gave refuge to the Afghans. This fact did not deter Afghanistan from sending volunteers to fight alongside Pakistani tribals in J&K in 1947-48. India’s aid to Afghanistan has been consistently significant. This received an appreciative nod from the people, but India was never regarded as a partner of strategic significance by Afghan governments. The Northern Alliance played a hopeful role for a brief period. But it was never powerful enough to pose a challenge to Kabul. In any case, it was a product of circumstances and overlapping interests then. These no longer exist. Russia follows a different trajectory and so does Iran. It will now be unrealistic and hazardous to expect India to launch a solo foray.
Given the turbulence that lies ahead, it will be prudent for India to maintain some sort of informal contact with the government in Afghanistan without getting involved one way or the other. Chances are that the churn there may end up singeing those who take an intrusive interest in its affairs. This applies equally to Pakistan, which wishes to act as an overlord in Kabul without taking on the responsibility of nurturing Afghanistan. Consequently, misunderstandings and frictions between the two may increase steadily.
Another result could see Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand divide combine in common cause against Pakistan. Where that leads to, time alone will tell. Meanwhile, the ISI could divert the unemployed Taliban cadres to terror assignments in the region. Either way, it holds out a cautionary warning for the outsiders; that every Afghan stone is soaked in blood and that throughout its troubled history, this land has been the graveyard of empires. The current Taliban interlude will be the chapter that follows, and it might turn out to be equally bloody.
