China as peace dealer

IT is important not to overstate, nor underplay, the recent Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement brokered by China. As The Economist has noted, this is a ‘transactional agreement, not a transformational one’. But the fact that it has been brokered by China is significant, especially since plans are now afoot to follow it up with a regional summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, Iran and China later this year.

China has mediated between nations earlier, too, but its footing has been cautious and not usually successful.

The Shia-Sunni conflict goes back far in history, and it will be a brave person who suggests that this agreement will see the end of a rivalry that has seen the two fight proxy wars in Yemen, Lebanon and Iraq in the last three decades and more. Both have their reason for calling a ceasefire of sorts. The Saudis want to end the debilitating war against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen, which directly impacts its security, while the Iranians are worried about the mounting price and domestic consequences of the US-led embargo on them.

None of this excludes other developments such as the deepening of the Iran-China ties, or the Saudi desire to obtain US security guarantees and help for a civil nuclear programme as a price for normalising ties with Israel. Meanwhile, Iran’s nuclear programme is reaching a point where it could upend the entire Middle-Eastern security order. And Israel remains the dangerous joker in the pack.

For countries like India and the US, what is more compelling is the country that acted as the mediator — China. New Delhi and Washington have significant interests in the region, the former as a neighbour with a huge diaspora and economic interests, and the other as the global hegemon that has run things there, though now its own interests have been declining.

Beijing’s new moves in the region could presage a shift in the global order. While negotiations were conducted in the past two years through Oman and Iraq, it is China that was able to clinch the deal because of the equity it has in both countries. It is Saudi Arabia’s largest export market, and represents about 30 per cent of Iran’s trade.

Whether or not the deal works will depend a great deal on the intentions and actions of the two interlocutors themselves. In the Middle East there is no shortage of spoilers, but for China it is a cautious but important step in the direction of promoting its worldview now incorporated in the Global Security Initiative (GSI).

The somewhat nebulous proposal aired at the 2022 Boao Forum by Xi Jinping himself was aimed at promoting ‘common, comprehensive and sustainable security’ by peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation. The GSI is linked to China’s worldview wherein it is in competition with the US, as is evident from the references to ‘Cold War mentality’, ‘sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction’ in Xi’s speech.

In the past, Beijing adopted a globally self-centred approach claiming that ‘China does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries or impose its will on others.’ This reflected as much on the Chinese inability to do so, as also the fact that often their interests have been better served by cynically not doing anything.

But now China has developed economic and political interests across the globe and finds it much more difficult to sidestep issues. Indeed, to protect and further its interests, it is, in a way, being forced to involve itself in dealing with local tensions and conflicts. In South Asia in the past decade, Beijing has offered to mediate between India and Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, and has been involved in resolving issues between Myanmar and its ethnic rebels, as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan. But its footing has been careful and cautious and it has not usually been successful.

In 2018, China rejected UN intervention as a means of settling the Maldivian crisis created by the standoff between President Abdulla Yameen and former President Mohamed Nasheed. The Chinese were seen as being close to Yameen and the efforts ended once he lost the election later that year to President Ibrahim Solih.

The limits of Chinese activity, both self-imposed and more often than not, forced by circumstances, are evident in Myanmar, where China has been involved in resolving its complicated ethnic quarrels for some time now. In 2016, it had persuaded three rebel groups — the National Democratic Alliance Army, the Union League of Arakan Army and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army — to participate in a biannual Union Peace Conference run by the Myanmar government.

Simultaneously, it also helped create the rebel-backed Federal Political Negotiating and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), which had sought to negotiate with the Myanmar government. But Chinese efforts have ground to a halt after it backed the military regime which ousted the government led by Aung San Suu Kyi in 2021. Neither have Chinese efforts to help resolve the Rohingya crisis worked.

China had also stepped up to the plate in Afghanistan as a mediator. In mid-2017, it began a formal process to mediate to ease Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions. Foreign Minister Wang Yi shuttled between Kabul and Islamabad and managed to hammer out a two-point agreement that saw the establishment of a crisis prevention and management machinery and a trilateral dialogue between China, Pakistan and Afghanistan, whose first meeting took place in December 2017. But eventually what worked was the Doha process involving the US and the Taliban.

The problem is that in Afghanistan, the Chinese lacked incentives — negative and positive — to influence the parties. All they offered were ‘good offices’, but usually in many such situations that is not enough. As it is, it was probably seen by the Taliban and Kabul as a pro-Pakistan actor. The coming period will determine whether the Iran-Saudi deal will mark a turning point in global affairs for China, or remain a mere flash in the pan.