Central Asia summit needs right outlook

FOR the first time, Prime Minister Narendra Modi will hold a virtual summit meeting on January 27 with the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The summit is being held at a critical time when the diplomatic tightrope has been wearing thin for Delhi against the escalating tensions between the West and Russia and also the US and China. While the Quad and the Indo-Pacific drew India’s attention, Delhi has lately faced geopolitical setbacks, from tensions with China to a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

The summit comes after President Putin’s recent visit to Delhi that may have allowed India to leverage Russia to moderately balance China in Eurasia, and to contain the threats from the continental domain that have increased manifold after the Taliban takeover.

The recent unrest in Kazakhstan signified new actors vying for geopolitical influence in Central Asia in the post-Afghan era. Motives remain obscure: whether to bring regime change, targeting Russia, sabotaging China’s BRI, thrusting Islamisation et al. The outcome has, however, boosted Russia’s role as the main security provider to what Moscow considers as its ‘near abroad’ — indeed a setback for China, the US and Islamic zealots.

The upcoming summit is the culmination of an idea that germinated in 2012 during a Track 1.5 format when the “Connect Central Asia” policy was launched in Bishkek. It was followed by the inception of the India-Central Asia Dialogue at the Foreign Ministers’ level, the third meeting of which was held in New Delhi in December 2021.

For three decades, Central Asia remained a cauldron of outside actors, leaped into the fray using various instruments — from economic, military and ethnic to religion — to carve out their zone of influence. An intensified foreign rivalry also served Central Asia’s own economic and domestic purpose — but not anymore.

The Kazakh outbreak exposed the limit of their multi-vector balancing act of playing on to everyone’s interest, especially in the face of increasing rivalry among Russia, America and China. The Islamists too have been eyeing to launch their holy jihads to establish new Khilafats there.

In fact, no one had a clue that the trouble in Central Asia would ensue so soon after the US forces left Afghanistan overnight — declaring they are not mortal enemies of the Taliban. Regional analysts have estimated that some 8,000 ISIS and Takfiri extremists have been waiting in North Afghanistan to infiltrate across the 2,245 km long porous border.

The situation has been alarming for India. But for now, Putin’s action has ensured that Central Asia remains out of bounds for jihadis and ‘coloured’ revolutionaries while China’s ambition is also checkmated.

India has been keenly watching Central Asia; maintained excellent diplomatic ties with all the five states where Indian Prime Ministers have visited, including PM Modi in 2015. Yet, India’s commercial success has been negligible at a paltry $1.4 billion trade in 2019.

In 2017, India eagerly joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as a means to reach out to the region. But SCO is only a sluice gate to regulate the Russian and Chinese hitherto subliminal rivalry — to prevent either power from overtly dominating the region. India joined the bandwagon with Pakistan. Moscow tends to use it for regulating India-China tensions.

The India-Central Asia Dialogue so far resembled more like the US C5+1 format launched in 2015, except that the Indian format includes Afghanistan to cover a broad spectrum of deepening economic, security, connectivity, energy and cultural linkages with the region. Predictably, China too went for a copycat 5+1 format in 2020, ostensibly on the pretext of extending Covid-19 related support to the region.

The summit is a huge stride for India’s diplomacy, which so far found itself retrenched, while academically rediscovering its past linkages with the region. To be effective, Delhi first needs to get its big-picture imagination of the region right.

Central Asia is undoubtedly a zone of India’s civilisational influence and still enjoys a range of attributes. Let’s not evade that the Ferghana Valley was India’s crossing-point on the Great Silk Road to connect with China and Europe. Buddhism spread to the rest of Asia from here.

While Ferghana still connects India with three countries — Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the Indian icons of the medieval period are being resurrected as their main national figures: Babur in Uzbekistan, Haidar Dulati in Kazakhstan, Bairam Khan in Turkmenistan, and Bedil in Tajikistan.

New Delhi needs to clarify its interests, set an enduring policy goal besides pursuing the usual transactional interests.

All the while, when others have drawn their respective perspectives for the region: China from economic (BRI), Russia from strategic (CSTO), Turkey from ethnic (Turkic Council), and the Islamic world from religious (OIC), it would be befitting for India to give a poignant cultural and historical perspective to the region through a summit-level annual meet. Afghanistan could be a part of this format to signify the followings: 2022 marks the 30th anniversary of India’s diplomatic relations with these states. We are also close to marking the 500th anniversary of the Mughal empire — invoking the legacy will have a huge international significance. It will contrast Pakistan’s extremist agenda and others in pursuit of expansionist goals.

Since the region is a critical lynchpin to India’s security policy, the summit will have a waterfall impact to facilitate India’s multifaceted policy towards the region. Needless to say, a string of cultural events highlighting the facets of medieval culture, art and painting, including Sufi traditions, should be highlighted.

Central Asia carries no specific outlook toward any country with the exception of Russia. The current scenario is like multiplayer gambling being played by an assortment of actors on a single chessboard through a mix of bilateral and multilateral approaches while each actor tries to ensure that the threshold of their presence is not faced by a counter flow.

While their strategic visions are often opaque, they certainly remain wary of China as compared to closer affinity towards India. But they certainly can’t help without having close economic ties with China compared to little or no economic dependency on India. Compared with a decade ago, the region’s negative attitude towards Pakistan is waning, either due to the gradual Islamisation of the population or perhaps due to Russia’s changed attitude towards Pakistan.

The notion of “Hindustan” in the popular imagination and traditional fondness for Bollywood movies and songs are critical factors, but with generational change, attraction for Indian soft power influence is gradually fading that needs to be arrested. Apart from commerce, only a value-driven cultural policy can replace the currently rather ill-defined goals of rebuilding India-Central Asia bonds.