CDS faces challenge of jointness in operations

THE recent appointment of Lt Gen Anil Chauhan (retd) as the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) after an inexplicable delay of 10 months is indeed welcome news and puts at rest any apprehension about the rollback of this apex position in the hierarchy of the armed forces.

The amendments to the statutory provisions laid down for the three services for the selection of the CDS a few months earlier gave this appointment a somewhat political hue. However, any individual who meets the current selection criteria for the top job in the armed forces will undoubtedly be a professional of exceptional and proven calibre and competence and such is well the case with the present appointment.

What is the task ahead for the CDS? Primarily to bring about jointness in operations, logistics and maintenance of the three services. As the head of the Department of Military Affairs, the CDS also has to facilitate the restructuring of military commands for an optimal utilisation of resources. This would be achieved by bringing about jointness in operations, including through the establishment of joint theatre commands. The new incumbent has spelt out the need to look after the interests of all three services and build a synergised approach in going ahead in fulfilling the mandate.

There appears to be a strong desire for bringing about changes in the services, especially the Army. The armed forces have been constantly evolving their structuring, organisation, equipment and training according to the security requirements. Their doctrines are under constant review as per the changes taking place in threat perceptions and advances in technology. The desire for change should be focused on tangible capability-enhancing factors, like the induction of high-end technology into weapons and equipment of the three forces, which boost their lethality, mobility, battlefield transparency and survivability. What need to be shed are budgetary constraints and labyrinthine processes that have been a dampener on the acquisition of military weapons and equipment. These are the key areas and issues that need to be addressed by the CDS with a missionary zeal.

However, the desired level of integration, even in basic issues like the commonality of logistics and acquisitions, still seems a far cry despite having had a very proactive CDS for almost two years. In this vein, achieving structural and operational jointness appears to be almost a pipe dream. The prime reason, apparently, is the lack of desire to move in this direction by one or the other service headquarters by protecting their turf and safeguarding parochial interests.

In a joint theatre command scenario, the primacy of individual service will always be to the fore in specific structures. The integrated air defence of the nation must be with the Air Force and the maritime expanse of the Indian Ocean and beyond the domain of the Navy. However, the integrated theatre commands, looking after our land borders in the East, North and West, have to be with the Army as the lead service. All this calls for asking some uncomfortable questions and taking even more difficult decisions.

Air transport, even the biggest, is only an instrument to support the land Army. Siachen and other high-altitude deployments are sustained largely by air effort. Similarly, all helicopter operations, whether for ferrying troops or supplies, casualty evacuation or even in the attack mode, would be in support of the operations conducted by an Army formation. Even a bomber run is meant to destroy enemy assets with shock and awe tactics preceding a land offensive. The fact that the IAF has and will always be in support of the Army, which is required to combat aggressive and hostile neighbours, is a reality that has to be accepted. Not doing this amounts to frittering efforts, energy and resources, something that India can ill afford.

Momentous decisions on integration can be taken only by the political executive. Expecting the CDS to accomplish the integration needed for a joint structure is asking too much of him. Being first among equals, he may endeavour to build a consensus for change with the three service chiefs, but he is not empowered to force this change. Such decisions have been taken in other countries by the political executive.

Two examples pertaining to the restructuring of the armed forces of nations of global consequence amply support this approach.

In the US, it was the Senator Goldwater-Congressman Nichols Department of Defence Reorganisation Act in 1986, signed by the then President Ronald Reagan, that made the most sweeping changes to the United States Department of Defence by reworking the command and organisational structure of the armed forces. The Goldwater-Nichols Act was an attempt to fix problems caused by inter-service rivalry, which had emerged during the Vietnam War.

At the other end of the spectrum, in a totalitarian regime like China, the integrated theatre commands of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) emerged at an accelerated speed in the last decade due to the simple reason that this change was driven by the Central Military Commission, whose Chairman is the triple-hatted President of China and, more importantly, the General Secretary of the Communist Party.

Integrated command and formation structures are long overdue in the Indian context. Gleaning from the Prime Minister’s yearly address at the Combined Commanders’ Conference, the political executive is positively inclined to and desirous of this.

The creation of the CDS post was a decision taken by the political leadership, as was the decision to widen the pool from which he could be appointed. Both have gone through smoothly once decided upon by the Cabinet.

A similar top-driven approach is needed for the armed forces to evolve into a fully synergised joint organisation.

At some stage, the call has to be taken against turf wars and specious arguments for status quo. While the CDS can, and surely will, be a facilitator for this change, it has to be strongly driven by the political leadership so that we achieve the optimum utilisation of national efforts.