Calling husband 'hijda' constitutes mental cruelty: Punjab and Haryana HC
Terming a husband as "hijda" or a transgender constitutes mental cruelty, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has ruled. The Division Bench of Justice Sudhir Singh and Justice Jasjit Singh Bedi further held that accusing a mother-in-law of giving birth to a transgender also fell within the scope of mental cruelty.
The ruling arose from a case where the appellant-wife’s plea, filed under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, was dismissed by Bhiwani Judicial Magistrate First Class, who ruled that the wife had not been subjected to domestic violence. The court also declared that the marriage between the couple had turned into "deadwood."
The Bench observed: "If the findings recorded by the family court are examined in the light of the judgments of the Supreme Court, it comes out that the acts and conduct of the appellant-wife amount to cruelty. Firstly, terming the respondent-husband as 'hijda' (transgender) and accusing his mother of giving birth to a transgender is an act of mental cruelty."
The court also noted that the appellant-wife in October 2018 had lodged a criminal complaint accusing the husband of subjecting her to cruelty, along with other offences under Sections 498-A, 406, 323, and 506 of the IPC. The trial for this case was ongoing. She had filed petitions, including a plea seeking maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC, which were also pending.
"Of course, the initiation of criminal proceedings cannot be considered cruelty unless the respondent-husband is acquitted in the case, but considering the overall acts and conduct of the appellant-wife and the fact that the parties have been living separately for the last six years, the family court rightly concluded that the marriage has ruptured beyond repair and has become deadwood," the court noted.
The Bench further added that there was no possibility of reconciliation, as the parties had been living separately for a significant period, and there had been no "resumption of matrimonial obligation and cohabitation between the parties for a long time." The court added it was the courts’ duty to attempt to preserve the matrimonial bond wherever possible. But no purpose would be served in ordering a reunion when the marriage had become unworkable and totally dead. “Thus, we find that the findings recorded by the family court do not suffer from any illegality or perversity,” the Bench concluded.