Blame game futile in China border row
It’s time for a blame game after the June 15 killings in the Galwan valley. The ‘WhatsApp University’ has started circulating how we lost the 1962 war and also the Coco islands in Bay of Bengal, both to China’s advantage. The villain, no doubt, is our first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.
I shall confine my remarks only on the border war as the allegation that India could have retained these old Portuguese islands is ridiculous. In 1882, the British acquired the Coco islands and incorporated it within British Burma, which was a part of British India. In 1937, Burma was separated from British India on the recommendations of the Simon Commission. By the same token, Nehru should be blamed for ‘losing’ Aden too, which was governed from Bombay till 1932.
A video figuring a friend of mine, who was our Air Attache in a West European embassy in the 1980s, has emerged calling Jawaharlal Nehru ‘spineless’ in not ordering our Air Force in 1962. This officer, who retired as an Air Marshall, says that India could have easily beaten the Chinese had we used our Air Force. I have no means of verifying whether this is genuine or morphed. If genuine, it would indicate a poor reading of history.
Nehru was aware of the capability of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) when the border tension with China erupted in the mid 1950s. Mao had challenged in Korea the strongest army in the world under General Douglas MacArthur who had defeated Japan in 1945. This was within a year of Mao’s win over Chiang-Kai-shek in December 1949 after the 1945-49 civil wars. Earlier, the UN forces under American leadership had pushed the Communists till Yalu river in the north.
However, in November 1950, Mao flooded Korea with four lakh Chinese ‘volunteer soldiers’ to help the North Korean communists. They pushed the UN forces back to the 38th Parallel. For two years, they held on despite suffering large-scale bombardment. America lost 34,000 soldiers in the battle which ended under an Indian-sponsored armistice on July 27, 1953.
India was closely involved in settling this crisis through the much maligned VK Krishna Menon. Former Congress minister Jairam Ramesh has narrated this role in his scintillating biography, A Chequered Brilliance: The Many Lives of VK Krishna Menon. A superpower like the US had to seek Nehru’s help in 1955 for the release of four US airmen held captive by China in the Korean War. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles also requested Nehru to convey to China the US alarm over Communist shelling of Quemoy and Matsu.
Nehru deputed Menon to visit China to hold parleys with Zhou en Lai and Mao. Menon reached China on May 11, 1955 and stayed for 10 days. On May 26, 1955, Nehru informed Eisenhower that Krishna Menon’s talks were successful and that the Chinese had decided to release the four US airmen. The news of their imminent release was announced by Menon in New Delhi on May 30, 1955. They were released the next day in Hong Kong. That was the highest point in our diplomacy. India did not have to run after the superpowers. Unlike now, they were soliciting our help.
Nehru was also reluctant to divert scarce national resources to war when there was a possibility of diplomacy succeeding in solving complex disputes. He also wanted to avoid ‘spreading the conflict’ without exhausting diplomatic negotiations. In this, he was remarkably similar to President Harry Truman. Despite ordering the dropping of atom bombs on Japan in August 1944 to end World War II, Truman did not agree with MacArthur’s suggestion in December 1950 of bombing Communist China to win the Korean War. He fired him in April 1951 for airing his views publicly. Later, he told the nation on April 11 that America’s aim was “to avoid the spread of conflict…and to prevent a third world war.”
Some sections of our public opinion feel that any criticism of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statement made at the all-party meeting on the Chinese incursions would result in undermining national solidarity, and hence, should not be permitted. Those who question government statements are being labelled as ‘pro-Chinese’. However, we did not follow any such norm or tradition of observing similar restraint during discussions in Parliament when the Chinese question was discussed since 1959.
On the other hand, Nehru was subjected to savage attacks provoking our most respected diplomat, the late KPS Menon to remark, as quoted by Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis: “The entire attitude adopted by Parliament during the crises was unhelpful. Brave talks that not an inch of Indian territory should be surrendered and so on, left the government with no room for manoeuvring.”
On December 4, 1961, AB Vajpayee, then a Jan Sangh leader, alleged that Nehru was suppressing information and “would even surrender Ladakh to China if similar kind of appeasement continued”. PK Deo of Ganatantra Parishad suggested an innovative way of dealing with the crisis by suggesting the transfer of border issue from diplomats to military leadership. Even during the war, Parliament’s attitude did not help the war efforts. On November 20, 1962, veteran PSP leader HV Kamath demanded that a parliamentary committee should supervise military operations on a
daily basis as the government was incapable. Fortunately, Nehru rejected this suggestion.
On the other hand, the Opposition’s obdurate stand inflamed Chinese belligerence. The 1954 Treaty of Trade and Commerce was allowed to lapse in 1962. China closed its posts in Calcutta and Kalimpong in May, 1962. In return, we closed our agencies in Gyantse, Yatung
and Gartok in June. This had a direct bearing on border tension. By July, massive military movement started in all sectors. On Sepember 8, 1962, the Chinese crossed the McMahon line and attacked us. After humiliating India, they declared a unilateral ceasefire in November and withdrew 20 km from the LAC on November 7, 1962.
It seems strange that the
Opposition’s call only for clarifications now is being considered as anti-national by a party whose forebears did not follow this restraint.
