Army needs smartsizing to optimise resource utilisation
Rightsizing the Army has been an ongoing exercise for quite some time now, with the main focus being on reducing the manpower in support elements. The introduction of the Agnipath recruitment scheme is also an endeavour in cost-cutting. Army Chief Gen Manoj Pande recently spoke about optimising strength by achieving a reduction of one lakh troops over the next three years. Apparently, downsizing and rightsizing have become synonymous. That may well be in the fitness of things, but what needs deliberation are the ground realities and operational commitments on the one hand and options for downsizing on the other. Smartsizing our security forces may achieve an optimal balance.
The major portion of our land borders remains active and, at times, turbulent. With two inimical neighbours, India has a troubled history both along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China and the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan. In recent years, tensions have escalated at the LAC, marked by bloody clashes and standoffs between the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army of China. This has necessitated an increased deployment of formations in the hostile high-altitude terrain of eastern Ladakh. Unintended disclosures of operational happenings by the Army have made public the tense and violent shades of this ‘no war, no peace’ situation with our largest and most powerful neighbour. In the case of Pakistan, volatile incidents in J&K necessitate a multi-tier deployment to prevent or minimise infiltration by terrorists from across the LoC.
These issues, which impinge upon our national security and territorial integrity, are land-centric and have to be dealt with by infantry combat soldiers. The nature of the terrain and the type of conflict dictate a manpower-intensive employment. While it makes sense to replace animal transport units with alternative means and technology for logistic support, there can be no dilution in operational requirements in terms of force strength.
The challenges that the Army faces on the borders and internally are of a very different dimension from what other services encounter. A warship may hunt down pirates or hijackers who scoot well before its arrival or may shoot down an aggressive drone, but a soldier on the borders is facing enemy troops who are there to stay and fight. Terrorists (fidayeen) involved in fierce encounters are fanatics who are ready to kill or die. In such an environment, technology can only do as much. The real strength of the land forces lies in their numbers. Constant vigil and an ability to respond in force require boots on the ground. There is no substitute.
Moreover, the induction of technology may not lead to a reduction in manpower; on the contrary, high-technology equipment needs highly skilled manpower for operating and maintenance purposes. Downsizing the Army had earlier targeted technical support arms and technical services. However, as it transforms into a more technology-intensive organisation, this may not be viable. Similarly, the advent of unified theatre commands will lead to the optimum utilisation of resources but not necessarily a decrease in manpower. What the Army of the future needs is not downsizing across the board but smartsizing. This would entail a relook at the current commitments away from the borders and a review of some of the logistic systems.
Today, there is a slew of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs), which have expanded in size, with more raisings on the anvil. A few of these CAPFs are categorised as border-guarding forces, such as the BSF, ITBP and SSB, while others are employed for various security duties internally. The CAPFs are manned by the same human resource that populates our Army. They are adequately resourced and have seen the induction of a good deal of modern weaponry and technical equipment. It should be well within their capability to take on internal security tasks, including counter-insurgency, in their entirety. This would free the military manpower for their primary role. What seems to be lacking in these forces by way of training can be provided by the Army with its first-rate training establishments. There is also ample scope for the lateral induction of trained personnel at various ranks from the Army into these organisations.
The tendency to employ the Army for any contingency or calamity also needs to be curbed. Organisations like the National Disaster Response Force have been created and resourced for such tasks. Not having the Army as a first responder does not imply its non-use in emergencies, which may be restricted to exceptional situations. This would alleviate the burden on an overstretched Army, where the operational tours of duty and peace-station tenures of combat units are becoming unfavourably skewed.
A key area that needs to be addressed for achieving meaningful smartsizing of the Army is non-core logistics. This would cover most parts other than munitions and all warlike material. Supplies such as fuel (excluding those required for specialist systems), rations and the repair and maintenance of non-specialist vehicles and equipment can all be outsourced. All this would require the implementation of proper procedures and safeguards. There are various models of such outsourcing available in the armies of developed countries, where non-military logistic organisations have been employed in support of large-scale overseas deployment. One example of this is the Kellogg Brown and Root, also known as KBR Engineering & Construction, a unit of Halliburton Company, which provides military support services — a function earlier performed by US military personnel.
Corporatisation of ordnance factories has the danger of becoming a perpetual work in progress. Some of the most sought-after weapon systems in the world, from small arms to field guns, are made in the private sector. India need not be any different. The resultant savings will be much more significant than by any force reduction. For giving an impetus, an organisation on the lines of the South Korean Agency for Defence Development (ADD) would be appropriate. The ADD primarily helps South Korean private defence industrialists streamline research and development, acquire foreign military technologies and directly engage in product development.
Smartsizing of the Army, indeed the entire defence sector, is a pressing requirement. It will be in sync with operational and economic realities and can ensure optimisation of the combat potential of the forces.
