Another phase of dictated democracy imminent in Pakistan
AS Pakistan prepares for the general election, complex dynamics are playing out, signalling another phase of dictated democracy with the military’s support.
Pakistan’s Election Commission has rejected a resolution passed recently by the Senate, which wanted the February 8 election to be put off. The poll panel has stated that all arrangements have been completed and it won’t be ‘advisable’ to postpone the polls. On January 5, the Senate had passed a non-binding resolution seeking a delay in the election, citing extreme weather conditions and an alarming security situation in Pakistan, with continued terror attacks by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
The political arena is witnessing curious twists that raise serious questions about the credibility of the upcoming election.
Former Prime Minister Imran Khan, supposedly the most popular leader in Pakistan, is behind bars, fighting a bunch of legal cases. There seems to be no legal respite for him, and it looks extremely unlikely that he will be able to leverage his popularity in the political space anytime soon given his strained relations with the establishment and the military’s renewed confidence in Nawaz Sharif and his party, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N).
Khan’s nomination papers were rejected by the Election Commission on moral grounds, and his party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), disintegrated after the military-led crackdown (following the riots of May 9, 2023). A significant number of party loyalists have exited the party and joined a newly formed party, Istehkam-i-Pakistan Party (IPP), under the leadership of former PTI leader and sugar baron Jahangir Khan Tareen. Varied steps are being taken to target PTI’s position, and reports suggest that PTI candidates are being intimidated and dissuaded from fighting the election.
Nawaz is back with the tacit support of the establishment, and the army seems to believe that he has the mass appeal and will be able to strengthen PML-N’s position in Punjab and also facilitate much-needed financial and strategic support from the Gulf countries, given his amiable relations with the Muslim world. The recent judgment of the Supreme Court quashing the lifetime disqualifications for convicted leaders has brought relief to Nawaz, who is now eligible to contest the election. The Supreme Court’s decision is not surprising, and it is not unfair to assume that Nawaz’s return to Pakistan was conditioned on the assurance from the military that legal cases against him would be closed. The PML-N is working towards expanding its support base in the most crucial province, Punjab, where it lost ground to the PTI in the 2018 election.
However, at present, PML-N’s prime rival in Punjab, PTI, is stranded and less threatening. The Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam Fazl has reached an agreement with PML-N for seat adjustment and collaboration in Punjab. The two parties will also work in alignment in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
In Balochistan, ‘electables’ play a crucial political role, and Nawaz reportedly has the support of over 20 of them in the province. In Sindh, Nawaz’s party is preparing to give a strong fight to the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) with the cooperation of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement Pakistan and the Grand Democratic Alliance. The PPP, which is not the military’s favourite, appears frustrated and has been complaining that it is not getting a level playing field. The PPP’s prime ministerial candidate, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, not only lacks charisma but has also failed to draw the military’s patronage.
Even with the military’s blessings and past record of popular following in Punjab, Nawaz seems to be struggling to get the election momentum in his favour. Postponement of the election would have benefited the military, potentially providing it more time to manipulate the political stage and sway public sentiment in favour of Nawaz. Manipulations of elections by the military are not new in Pakistan, and the present dynamics represent a full circle for the nation, where democracy and the will of the people are consistently challenged by the vested interests of the establishment.
Every national election seems to be a step backward for Pakistan’s democracy. Given the emerging political dynamics, it appears that a coalition government is likely to come into power with the PML-N in a dominant position. Although the military’s choice for this election is the Sharif brothers, it might not essentially view an absolute majority for PML-N as serving its best interests. How far the military-Nawaz bonhomie will continue remains to be seen, given Nawaz’s well-acknowledged personality of being assertive and independent in decision-making.
What does this entail for New Delhi? India needs to continue to be watchful of these developments, as instability in the neighbourhood has a spillover impact. If Nawaz comes to power, the noxious environment that Imran Khan’s tenure sustained with his and his party members’ relentless anti-India or anti-Modi statements could possibly see a shift. Statements on starting a dialogue with India are not unlikely, as we have sensed this since Nawaz’s return. The civilian regime in Pakistan following the election will be dealing with a military that has bolstered its position through constitutional and military measures in an effort to refurbish its ‘tarnished’ image and has a firmer grip on economic and strategic decision-making. The newly formed Special Investment Facilitation Council in Pakistan, formulated to expedite foreign investment, has provided the military with an institutionalised role in the financial domain. The military’s strategy vis-à-vis India has remained unchanged and revolves around using covert warfare through terrorism, narco-terrorism and false propaganda. Will the next civilian regime in Pakistan, which will come into power with the patronage of the Generals, act differently in its policy against India?
