4 years since Galwan

Four years since the first face-to-face military confrontation between India and China in over five decades, the shadow of the Galwan valley clash of June 15, 2020, looms large, hugely impacting the strategic calculus of the two countries. India lost 20 Army personnel in the clash in eastern Ladakh. Beijing has acknowledged only four casualties, though western researchers put the figure at 40. A resolution of the border stalemate, especially the standoffs in critical areas, remains a contentious issue. A series of military and diplomatic engagements have yielded little. There’s now a sense of permanence to the massive military build-up on both sides. Heavy weaponry has been inducted by India to counter the relentless offensive posturing by China; land and air connectivity is seeing an upgrade along the entire Line of Actual Control. The trust deficit has only widened. It is to no one’s advantage.

To Beijing’s call for normalisation of ties beyond the border dispute, New Delhi has steadfastly held on to its stance that the relationship cannot be normal without restoring the status quo ante along the border as of April 2020. Is there a way forward? Amid the entrenched positions, it is difficult to imagine any toning down of the belligerent posturing and rhetoric by Beijing. The prospects of a constructive dialogue on critical regional and global issues appear remote amid the border tensions. For India, the options are limited. It has to stay the course on bolstering its defences, reducing dependence on Chinese imports and protecting its digital sovereignty.

The appointment of the Chinese ambassador to New Delhi after 18 months may suggest a willingness to explore a fresh start to reduce the tensions. But as experience has shown, India cannot afford to lower its guard.