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The Army and Democracy:
Military Politics in Pakistan
The last few weeks have been a roller-coaster of a ride for Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, with the siege on Islamabad laid by former cricketer Imran Khan and cleric Tahir-ul Qadri, who are knocking on the Pakistan army's door to sack Sharif. The PM may survive, but the army may formalise its hold on strategic and foreign policy-making. And when India cancelled the scheduled foreign secretary talks recently, many in Delhi argued that it was futile to talk to Sharif since the army was Pakistan's final arbiter. Given the Pakistan army's overarching role, we in India naturally look forward to a book on it. The last two engaging books have been Anatol Lieven's Pakistan: A Hard Country, one of the best written and Ayesha Siddiqa's Military Inc, which says Pakistan's army runs like a corporation, which has great stakes in Pakistan's economy. As Aqil Shah of Dartmouth University points out in his fine and readable book, The Army and Democracy; Military Politics in Pakistan, the army hardly had an economic stake when it first took over governance in the 1950s. Thus, literalising the "Inc" does not fully explain its reluctance to leave governance to civilians. Shah says that the army was politicised from the very beginning and that a "socialisation" of the army led to its "tutelary beliefs": That no one was more professional than the army, that it was the final saviour, the guardian, and indeed, it was the nation itself. His is a scholarly examination that contrasts the experience of other military juntas with Pakistan's and gives a prescription for how the army can be permanently returned to the barracks.
Mohd Ali Jinnah's approach to governance was the initial mistake; he followed a system which accumulated power. Not long after independence came the war in Kashmir, setting the template of India as a mortal threat. Post Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan, there was no one of their stature to nurture the infant democracy. Most importantly, the denial of fair representation to East Pakistan led to a vicious circle, in which the army saw politicians fighting for their province's rights. It forced the army to be more authoritarian, which made the politicians fight harder for their province's rights; until the country broke. Shah writes about the Zia and Musharraf's reign and the army's good fortune, "Just as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had been a boon for Zia, the events of 9/11 were a blessing in disguise for the military because it once again became a critical frontline ally in the US fight against Al-Qaeda." Luck never lasts. What emerges is a constant struggle between the army and civilians for the crucial power to dissolve the national assembly, and to appoint service chiefs and judges. This tug-of-war endures because the army does not change its culture of thinking that only it knows how to run Pakistan; quite unlike the Latin American countries that after decades of military authoritarianism have finally settled on enduring democracies. Shah's prescription includes allowing two civilian transfers of power, the first was in 2013, the next would come if Nawaz Sharif is allowed to complete his term, making the defence ministry civilian-run with proper regulation and oversight, parliamentary scrutiny of the army, removing military intelligence from policing and civil intelligence, civilian control of military appointments and the democratic re-socialising of the army. These seem like a long-haul agenda, but it is a roadmap to full democracy nonetheless and the least we can do is wish our neighbours luck.
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Shah has interviewed
retired and serving officers from the era of Field Marshal Ayub Khan
to the modern era. He examines in-house journals and even National
Defence University course material to show how each generation of army
officers is indoctrinated into believing that they are the final
guarantor of the state; he also notes how little time they spend
studying their nation's Constitution.