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Security
ONLY last year, the then Army Chief, General VK Singh, had talked of "critical operational hollowness" in our defence capability. But the steps taken recently are only seen as belated "patch-work" and a lot remains to be done to counter-balance the twin threats from China and Pakistan. After much delay, the government has cleared the raising of a new mountain "strike" corps along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China. But, this has come at least 10 years too late; elements of the strike corps were a part of the Army's Perspective Plan prepared in 2000. What is worse is that it could take at least six to eight years for the mountain strike corps to be fully operational. The government has finally also cleared the acquisition of 145 M 777 ultra-light howitzers from the USA in a direct government-to-government purchase, breaking the jinx which has prevailed since the Bofors deal in 1986. While this will fill a void of light artillery in the mountains, the Army faces a huge void in self-propelled and tracked pieces of artillery and air defence for plains and desert areas. While the hardware purchases, which have been ordered, will help bolster the 1.13-million strong Indian Army which already has three strike corps among the 13 such formations, there is much more that needs to be done if India has to exercise the capability to launch a counter offensive into Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in the event of a Chinese attack, while blunting the threat from Pakistan. Besides the obsolete 1960s' vintage AD guns, the Armed Forces are without a dedicated state-of-the-art attack helicopter for both mountains and plains. For want of a light tank for offensive operations in mountains, the proposed mountain strike corps could end up in a mere "holding" instead of a "strike" role. India is going in for the six additional C 130 J aircraft to beef up the existing fleet of the six Super Hercules planes. These are crucial for providing airlift capability for the proposed mountain strike corps in the East. The aircraft carrier, renamed INS Vikramaditya, which was purchased from Russia nearly 10 years ago, is finally on its way to India. It is supposed to give the Indian Navy an added ability to counter-balance the Chinese foray into waters closer home. However, it may take at least two years before the "floating hull" becomes a serviceable platform and is fully equipped with its aircraft fleet, radars and surface-to-air missiles. Since the construction of the six Scorpene submarines is delayed and the project of stealth submarines is still tangled in red tape, the loss of the submarine, INS Sindhurakshak, last August has depleted our strength of 14 conventional diesel-electric submarines. Though details of the cause of the vessel's sinking are awaited, preliminary reports suggest that the accident may have been caused by "violation of safety regulations". This obviously underlines the need for tighter in-house procedures. The Indian Air Force is short of its 42-squadron authorised strength of combat aircraft and the outgoing IAF Chief, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne, recently indicated that if the 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft, Rafale, are not inducted by 2017, our deterrence capability will be hit. There has already been considerable delay in signing the Rafale deal, which is expected to fill the gap between the existing Sukhoi-30 aircraft and the Indian Light Combat Aircraft, Tejas. Since we lag behind in indigenous production of military hardware, we remain vulnerable to "freeze" by other countries during armed conflicts. Rankling within the defence establishment during the past few years may also also affect the morale of the services’ rank and file. In fact, the image of Services Chiefs took a beating during the tenure of General VK Singh as Army Chief. Some of these controversies, including the issue of civil-military relations, resurfaced following the publication of his book, Courage and Conviction: An Autobiography recently. A somewhat related issue is the purchase of Agusta Westland AW 101 helicopters, which went awry. Since these choppers were for VIP use, there is no direct bearing of this on the operational readiness of the Armed Forces. But since the name of the former IAF Chief, Air Chief Marshal SP Tyagi figures in bribery charges, the image of the Service Chiefs stood corroded. The three Services have often blamed the Ministry of Defence (MoD), especially the civilian bureaucracy, for many of their ills. However, with the Services Chiefs and senior officers getting embroiled in unsavoury controversies, there is need for introspection on the part of the Services themselves. Besides, instead of tinkering with the system with piece-meal measures, the government should restructure the MoD, ensure greater jointness among the tri-Services and take the long-awaited step towards a viable Higher Defence Organisation. Unless this is done, the civil-military relations will remain on edge, which is bound to have a direct bearing on decision-making during war and peace.
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