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THE author is a postgraduate physician who joined the Indian Revenue Service (Custom and Excise) after passing the Civil Services Examination in 1989. That background reflects his capacity for hard work and academic research on the subject. He wrote this account because he felt that the common one-dimensional Indian perception of Chinese treachery in the 1962 India-China conflict is too simplistic and there is an “urgent need to enlighten the India public about the chain of events that led to the month long war and the reasons behind the severe reverses suffered by the India military in the armed conflict.” Post-Independence, the fact that Pandit Nehru went out of his way to befriend China is well known. The author's claim that this was part of a two-pronged policy which involved “bolstering India security using northern buffer states and extending administrative sway up to the McMahon Line” is questionable. The fact is that Nehru ignored Chinese military occupation of Tibet despite Sardar Patel’s written advice in November 1950 (contents of this letter were kept secret for 18 years). In mid-1950s, while pursuing Panchsheel diplomacy with China, he allowed it to use Calcutta Port facilities to consolidate their military hold in Tibet. On July1, 1954, after learning about Chinese territorial claims up to Demchok (Ladakh) and that they had extended patrolling to the undemarcated Indo-Tibet border (except in Sikkim) all along, he directed printing of maps with a delineated boundary and erection of check posts in disputed areas, leaving little room for negotiations. Meanwhile, the Chinese suspected that India was helping the Khampa rebellion and had enabled Dalai Lama’s escape to India. This alongside skirmishes on border posts resulted in the hardening of attitude and diplomatic breakdown. Meanwhile, sensing failure of the government policy, public in India put Nehru under intense pressure. This led to his famous public statement (and direction to the military) on throwing out the Chinese from the intruded Indian Territory.
In the remaining chapters, the author narrates politico-military issues in much detail. He writes about civil-military alienation under Krishna Menon, Thimaya’s retracted resignation, Kaul’s political patronage and climb and the resultant dissension amongst senior military officers. Under these circumstances, Nehru approved the strategically disastrous ‘forward policy’ advocated by an unprofessional coterie (Menon, BN Mullick, BN Kaul, MJ Desai). This political direction led to military movements without concern for communications and logistic reach, eyeball to eyeball confrontations on Thagla Ridge and Namka Chu (with Kaul trying to lead from the front at a company level!) and the ensuing larger battles in the Northeast and Western fronts. The author scores high marks in historical research and the political and military details of the events leading to the conflict and its aftermath. But he shows lack of strategic maturity in his analysis. A military strategy is subservient to grand strategy and works for the achievement of a grand strategic aim. The causes for starting an ill fated war are more political and less military, particularly when the latter is substantially outside the decision making loop and physically and mentally unprepared for it. When the Chinese escalated the border skirmishes into a full-fledged war, our foreign office and intelligence organization (under B N Mullick) abdicated all their responsibilities. The author highlights military command failures but tends to underplay intelligence and foreign policy roles for the war. He is reluctant to put sufficient blame on Pandit Nehru and his cabinet for messing up the diplomatic dialogue, thoroughly neglecting military preparedness and for military demoralisation and dissensions. There was little institutional handling of the “Dividing line”. If such lessons are not brought out, our political leaders and civil servants will never learn the importance of civil- military relations. In fact, the current politico-military scenario is not too dissimilar to what existed in 1962. The author's statement revalidating Clemenceau's adage that “war is too important a matter to be left to generals” on the India-China conflict is grossly out of context. Our political leaders of the time did not have Clemenceau's personality and grasp nor did they make any effort to visit and understand the ground situation like Clemenceau did in World War 1. The book is well organised and brings out several pieces of information that are not easily available in the public domain. It is brief without missing the essentials and reads well.
There was little institutional handling of the 'dividing line'. If such lessons are not brought out, our political leaders and civil servants will never learn the importance of civil- military relations. In fact, the current politico-military scenario is not too dissimilar to what existed in
1962.
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Raghavan traces the origins of the Sino-Indian boundary discord to imperial Britain's Russo-phobic ‘great game’, messy cartographic flip-flops and territorial occupation through subterfuge. (Even at the time of India's Partition, the Imperial General Staff had recommended that Northern Kashmir should go to Pakistan!). He also brings out the historic ebbs and flows of Chinese activism in reclusive Tibet. At the time of India's Independence, the Government of Tibet lost India's sympathy and goodwill when it put in sweeping claims for the “return of territories on the boundaries of India and Tibet” involving Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and some areas of Ladakh. 
