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India-Pakistan War 1971 The 1971 India-Pakistan War started mainly due to the internal problems of Pakistan. The two wings of Pakistan were well separated and had deep differences. The book recounts the various milestones of the India-Pakistan War of 1971 and is an interesting, well-woven account. The author has appropriately dedicated this book to Indira Gandhi and Field Marshal Manekshaw, who played leading role in India’s brilliant victory in 1971 war. The book written by Major-General Kuldip Singh Bajwa starts with strategic developments which were relevant to India and Pakistan in 1971. In Asia, China had consolidated its borders with India but was distrustful of Russia, while détente was slowly emerging between USA and the erstwhile Soviet Union. The USA was supplying Pakistan with various weapons systems and economic assistance. Meanwhile, India had turned towards USSR for the purchase of weapon systems. When relations between India and Pakistan deteriorated while the US attitude became anti-India, India wisely signed the Indo-USSR military pact. The 1971 India-Pakistan War started mainly due to the internal problems of Pakistan. The two wings of Pakistan were well separated and had deep differences. Though East Pakistan had a bigger population, it was ruled by West Pakistanis in an indifferent manner. When the Awami League won the elections in East Pakistan in 1970, it demanded autonomy and later even independence. The military dictatorship of Pakistan decided to crush them using maximum force. Pakistan was aware of the possibility of war with India. According to Pakistan’s strategy, the defence of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan. It meant having the bulk of the army in West Pakistan and dealing with any Indian threat to East Pakistan by launching a major counter-offensive on India in the Western theatre. Pakistan also expected China to attack India from the North. The Indo-Soviet Treaty and its effect on China were not given a serious consideration. Meanwhile, the ruthless and cruel crackdown by the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan resulted in over 9 million refugees crossing over to India, which India could not possibly look after and Pakistan would not take back. In 1971, Pakistan had three divisions, along with 13000-strong contingents of para-military forces. The book logically analyses the territorial strategic considerations, including the terrain, before dealing with the war. The Indian strategic operational design was of attacking East Pakistan simultaneously from all sides on to achieve a quick victory, which it did. While analysing various important battles, the author first discusses plans of opposing commanders, then describes the way the battles were fought and, finally, gives his assessment. He is quite frank in praising successful commanders and is equally critical of those who did not conduct the battles properly. The author rightly praises Lt-General Sagat Singh GOC 4 Corps for his bold leadership and rapid advance to Dacca.
The author correctly claims that war in the Western Theatre in 1971 has not received the attention that it deserves from the point of view of generalship. The Pakistani military leadership failed to launch a strong counter-offensive in the Western Theatre to help its forces fighting in East Pakistan, which it had originally planned to do. According to the author, "the hallmark of higher commanders in Pakistan was mediocrity, indecision and general operational incompetence". On the other hand, it was India which launched an offensive with I Corps attacking between Jammu and Pathankot. Pakistan attacked in J&K in the Poonch sector, where it failed to achieve any success, while in the Chamb Sector, Pakistan captured Chamb for which the author blames Indian Corps Commander who had given dual tasks to 10 Infantry Division. The author, after describing various battles fought in the Western Theatre, has in particular adversely commented upon the performance of the Indian armour. According to him "The Indian armour performed creditably well while it was deployed in defence but when it was tasked to lead the advance it was over cautious to the point of timidity." The author has highly praised the performance of the Indian Navy in the 1971 War. The Navy had decided to strike first with bold and decisive action in the West and to impose a sea blockade in East Pakistan. The Karachi port, which was the main base of Pakistan’s Navy, was attacked in an audacious, brilliantly planned and well-executed operation, states the book. The book praises the Indian Air Force also for its effective performance during the 1971 War. It gave much-needed air support to the Indian Army, fighting the Pakistan forces, both in the Eastern as well as the Western Theatre, while attacking Pak airfields to destroy Pak aircraft. It is a well-written book on the 1971 India-Pakistan war and should make a good addition to any library.
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