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Afghanistan and Pakistan:
Conflict, Extremism and Resistance to Modernity
It may be recalled that almost a millennium and a half earlier, the Kushan rulers of India held sway over large swathes of Central Asia which no doubt embraced Afghanistan. More recently (1823), on the eve of Pax Britannica, the Sikh ruler Maharaja Ranjit Singh annexed Peshawar and the adjacent districts west of the Indus. Presently, mounting anxiety over an expanding Czarist Empire in Central Asia led to the British waging two disastrous wars against Afghanistan (1838-42, 1878). The second resulted in the Treaty of Gandamak (1879) which brought them the Khyber and the districts of Kurram, Pishin and Sibi. In 1893, the Raj reached an agreement with Russia whereby the latter conceded that Afghanistan, and the Oxus (Amu Darya), lay outside its sphere of influence. A fateful development in recent years was the Soviet invasion in December 1979; the quarter century that followed has been tumultuous at best. This book deals essentially with this period. In a three-part study, the first and perhaps the most crucial is the "Afghan context", a saga of continuing conflict. It covers both the post-Soviet withdrawal phase (1989-95) as well as the years that followed 9/11 and dilates on the interests and concerns of outside powers. The "Pakistani context" embraces the challenges of extremism, of religious militancy coupled with the lukewarm response of civil society. Above all, the threat that the weak and inept governance poses. Sadly, the Taliban-dominated/ruled Afghanistan held out little hope. To the contrary, it was a glaring example of the failure of governance by a radical orthodox Islamist outfit. So also the sceptre of a Talibanised Pakistan that may well be a recipe for an unending civil strife. Meantime, Al-Qaida and its extremist ideology pose a qualitatively different challenge whose primary victims are host Muslim countries, and communities, that it tends to weaken, disintegrate or destroy. The author heavily underscores the issues of poor governance and institutional deterioration in Pakistan and underlines their relevance to the upsurge of extremism and violence. And their impact on Pakistani society. This study posits the view that while it would be "sinful" to be complacent, a number of factors work in favour of Pakistan’s ability to ride out the current storm. Among these are its demographics, its large urban population and sizeable middle class which, he believes, has the ability to survive the bane of extremist violence. While the Taliban and their ilk may disrupt life, it is hard to imagine that they could capture cities or rule Pakistan’s large urban sprawls. Another factor in Pakistan’s favour is its sizeable army which is strong enough to be able to hold it together. There is also society’s openness, with the media asserting itself as a strong, positive force, that serves as a check on political leadership. The author’s conclusion that the pace of Pakistan’s progress will depend on clear thinking in the public discourse on the demands of modernity and the collective vision of its political and intellectual leaders borders on the purely academic and the theoretical. What the aam admi in Pakistan, and outside, would like to know is where precisely he stands: what are his chances of survival in the maelstrom in which he finds himself so completely engulfed. Riaz Mohammad Khan has served as Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary (2005-8) and Ambassador to China, the European Union and Belgium (1995-8) as well as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. His earlier work Untying the Afghan Knot (1991) dealt with much the same theme.
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A major nerve centre of
disquiet and turbulence that threatens peace in this part of the world—and
not only there—is the Af-Pak fault line. At the crossroads of history
and essentially an artificial construct of tribes often troubled by
internal strife—and unremitting pressure from outside—Afghanistan
has known little peace since the day it was born (1747) under its first
ruler, Ahmed Shah Durrani (Abdali).