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On China Henry Kissinger is a name to reckon with and not only because under the easily forgotten US President Nixon (1968-74), best remembered as "tricky Dick", he served as his country’s National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. A prolific writer, Kissinger has almost a score of books to his credit. By no means lightweight stuff, these are heavy, large-size impressive tomes forbidding, and formidable, in their sweep. Embracing weighty subjects, they range over a vast field, and a long span of years. Some of the titles picked up at random read: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace: 1812-22, White House Years, Does America Need a Foreign Policy: Towards a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance, and American Foreign Policy. Kissinger has been to China almost fifty times and engaged in intimate, one-to-one, parleys with its top leaders, including Mao, Zhou and Hua, as well as Hu Jintao. His brief included problems of war and peace and the international order. For the record, he does not always agree with the Chinese perspective but deems it necessary to understand it. More so that Beijing, as he rightly underscores, is destined to play a big role in the 21st century. Spanning almost a score of chapters starting with the Macartney Mission and the kowtow question (1792) and ending with the new millennium, it is difficult, if not impossible, to pick and choose from an unusually generous, impressive, fare. The best may be to touch briefly on problems nearer home: the India-China imbroglio and the Dalai Lama’s Tibet.
"Khrushchev`85 . As to the escape of the Dalai Lama from Tibet, if we had been in your place, we would not have let him escape. It would be better if he had been in a coffin. And now he is in India, and perhaps will go to the USA. Is this to the advantage of the socialist countries? Mao: This is impossible; we could not arrest him then. We could not bar him from leaving, since the border with India is very extended, and he could cross it at any point. Khrushchev: It is not a matter of arrest; I am just saying that you were wrong to let him go. If you allow him an opportunity to flee to India, then what has Nehru to do with it. We believe that the events in Tibet are the fault of the Communist Party of China, not Nehru’s fault." At the tripartite (British India, China, Tibet) Simla Conference (1913-4), realising how important Tibet was, Beijing’s game plan was to abort the end result. In the event, the Chinese initialled but refused to sign or ratify the convention. "Initialling", Kissinger tells us, "freezes the text. It signifies that the negotiations have been concluded. Signing the document puts it into force." China maintained that the Tibetan representative lacked the legal standing to sign, since Tibet was part of China and not entitled to the exercise of sovereignty. Kissinger underlines the fact that almost all postcolonial countries have insisted on the borders within which they achieved independence. To throw them open to negotiations would invite unending controversies and domestic pressure. As a backdrop to Beijing’s massive armed assault (November 1962) on an unsuspecting if perhaps na`EFve New Delhi, Kissinger reveals that Mao had ascertained that "under present circumstances", the US would not support a KMT offensive in the Taiwan strait. This information doubtless played a "very big role" in Beijing’s final decision to proceed with operations in the Himalayas leading to a large, heavy and solid incursion across the Indian frontiers. This was in consonance with the strategic plan to produce a shock that would impel negotiations or at least end the Indian military probing for the foreseeable future. A couple of years later (1964,) the Soviets were highly critical of Beijing’s policies, noting that its aggression against India came at the moment of maximum difficulty for Moscow and that the Chinese in effect "aided the most reactionary circles of imperialism". Referring to his knowledge
of the world, Kissinger maintains that among the ten American Presidents
he had known, Nixon had a "unique grasp" of long-term
international trends. He has a warm word of praise for Deng who had
"tamed and re-invented" Mao’s legacy, launching China
headlong on a course of reform that was, in time, to reclaim the
influence to which its performance, and history, entitled it.
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In
a revealing exchange with Khrushchev, Mao insisted that the Chinese
should have eliminated the Dalai Lama rather than let him escape (June
1959).