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India’s Higher Defence Organisation and Management
Reviewed by P. K. Vasudeva
IT has been convincingly affirmed that the military debacle of 1962 is directly attributable to the failure of the Higher Defence Management (HDM). If the Indian leadership of 1947 had the resolve to establish the Higher Defence Organisation (HDO) through a Cabinet resolution within weeks of gaining Independence, nothing would have gone wrong in the first 15 years of Independence and subsequently, too. Exploring the past and discovering the genesis of Indian defence management from the Vedic Age to the post-Kargil reforms, besides the role played by Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) in the absence of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) till date, have been explained by the author in great detail.
The author discusses higher defence during the British era as to how the Governor-General ruled the country with the help of the Council of four Commanders-in-Chief (C-in-Cs) military members and four Governors of Presidencies. They ruled through the principle of divide and rule policy. The author has described in detail the sepoy mutiny of 1857, which could have been a success story of Independence if our own people had not played the double game of supporting the British Empire secretively and treacherously. After World War I and World War II, the HDO was changed to give more powers to C-in-C. But after Independence in 1947, the office of the C-in-C was abolished and the three heads of Army, Navy and Air Force were appointed, now known as Chief of Army/Navy/Air Staff. Lord Ismay recommended a model wherein the three Service Chiefs were to provide independent professional advice to the Defence Minister through a set of committees and sub-committees. The author brought out that in contrast to the 1962 fiasco, proper planning and integrated operations by the three services and also national consensus on 1971 Indo-Pak operations resulted in a resounding success. The most encouraging aspect as regards the higher defence in 1962-71 remains the political maturity in understanding the military needs displayed earlier by Lal Bahadur Shastri in 1965 and by Indira Gandhi in 1971. This cohesion of politico-military milieu provided a great success in defeating our adversaries. The author has elaborated the HDO of the advanced countries the UK, USA and France based on their strategic objectives. That is why it cannot be tailor made for India to follow as it has its own strategic compulsions. The author has analysed Kargil conflict in great details. It is unfortunate that neither the Kargil Review Committee under the chairmanship of K. Subrahmanyam nor the GoM reports under the chairmanship of L. K. Advani were discussed in Parliament, because the Parliament would have demanded more accountability from the government and the Army. The most important aspects of the reports were the appointment of Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), integration of MoD with Services Head Quarters (SHQ) and the functioning of the tri-service commands. The government’s contention was that there was no need of having CDS, as the services already have Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) in place. The COSC has no executive powers and is only an advisory body hence CDS must be appointed keeping in view that all the countries has this appointment for better command and control, especially when India has its effective nuclear arsenal. The concluding chapter brings out that India has military preponderance in both the nuclear and conventional capabilities for an overwhelming military superiority in South Asia and relative parity with China. The vision of growth cannot become a reality unless an insurmountable professional military establishment with the support of political leadership guards India’s political and strategic interests Besides being a rich
source of information to students of history, politics and military
science, the book will be of immense value to policy makers, defence
personnel and even the general public, whose stability and prosperity
are indirectly impinged upon a strong military driven by a robust HDO.
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The
opening chapter has covered historical perspective of defence management
right from the Vedic Age (1500 BC-1000 BC), birth of national defence
management: Magadhan imperialism (400 BC-200 BC), pioneers of integrated
defence foreign policy: Gupta dynasty (250 AD-550 AD), birth of navy and
significance of diplomacy (700 AD-711 AD), to Muslim rulers, including
Maratha and Sikh rulers (1150 AD-1750 AD). The author has brought out
that there is a definite need of an HDO with a clear understanding of
military requirements with the maturity of the Mauryas and integrated
outlook of the Guptas.