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J&k
The tragedy of Jammu and Kashmir has been that most of the chronic troubles afflicting the state, its government and its society, for the last six decades have been avoidable. Take the most recent case that shook the state all through last summer, paralysed its state apparatus and sent shock waves across rest of the country and beyond. Retrospectively, it was avoidable; not only as it started but at every stage of its blood-stained trajectory. Perhaps what one could still hope for today would be that such a thing is not allowed to recur in the year 2011; or ever. But, those who know ‘Kashmir’ would not like to risk a bet on that proposition. Repetition of mistakes, over and over again, has been the only constant feature of the state’s post-Independence history. Kashmir is a multi-dimensional, multi-layered problem. Its complicated internal dynamics propelled by ethnic, regional and communal strands of the state’s composite identity, are intricately linked with the external as well as international dimensions of the larger issue. Outbreak of the Amarnath land row in 2008 and the outburst of mass anger and alienation in 2010 brought this phenomenon into sharper focus. Distortions inflicted upon the composite identity are having a crippling impact upon feeble attempts at undoing the damage. Arresting and eventually reversing radicalisation of Kashmir politics poses the foremost challenge at the turn of the year. Moderate politicians, moderate trends and moderate ideologies have been sidelined and rendered ineffective by the devastating fallout of events in 2010. The so-called mainstream (pro-India) political component of the society found itself immobilised and reduced to impotence, along with moderate segments within the separatist camp, as alienation and anger surged with unprecedented fury, with radical elements capturing the field without any resistance.
Call it ‘revolt’, ‘intifada’, ‘stone pelting’ or whatever, the upheaval in the Valley last summer has given a new face to the popular resistance movement which is not wholly separatist or Pakistan-instigated. Its marked feature is the palpable shift of popular mindset away from tilt towards Pakistan, in spite of widened estrangement with ‘India’ at the other end. This shift became more pronounced during the September visit of the all-party delegation of MPs when entrenched mental and ideological barriers were crossed to offer a refreshing breakthrough. For the first time, a representative entity belonging to mainstream Indian national political spectrum engaged directly with alienated strands of Kashmir politics including, notably, separatist leaders—-moderates as well as hardliners. For the first time since 1947, a window of great opportunity was flung open. For the first time, popular mindset in Kashmir, including both varieties of thought-mainstream and separatists-discovered an entity from within the Indian national spectrum with which it could do business. This breakthrough is loaded with promising prospects but, unfortunately, the message appears to have got lost in transit somewhere between Srinagar and New Delhi. Instead of following it up, as it indeed should have been the case, the central government’s thoughtless decision to substitute a vibrant representative political instrument with an uninspiring oddity called ‘interlocutors’ put paid to nascent hopes of consolidating a delicate breakthrough. The euphoria generated by the interaction between local leaders and visiting MPs from the mainstream national spectrum has nearly died down. So much so that even the pro-India segment comprising the National Conference, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and a section of the Congress have expressed their dismay by reluctantly consenting to New Delhi’s wish to engage with non-political interlocutors who have not been popular visitors, unlike the all-party delegation of MPs. What New Delhi does, or does not do to reorient its own perspective in the coming few months will considerably determine the course of events on the ground in 2011 and beyond. Insulation between local politics and national mainstream has been one of the major factors responsible for perpetuating acute deficiency in emotional integration between the people of J&K and those in the rest of the country. So long as ‘India’ remains narrowly synonymous (in Kashmir) with the government of India, within the popular psyche of Kashmir, failures and shortcomings in local governance would continue to fuel anger and alienation against ‘India’. Every government in the state is willy nilly perceived to be New Delhi’s proxy and its shortcomings in performance go into the debit account of ‘India’. Events in 2008 as well as 2010 showed it beyond any doubt. The political fallout of Omar Abdullah-led coalition government’s avoidable administrative failures in tackling ordinary incidents snowballed into an anti-India upsurge. New Delhi’s own admission of ‘trust deficit’ and ‘governance deficit’ in J&K tells it all. There is no need to evolve new formulations. Implementing the ones gathering dust would be more useful. The Centre’s 8-point package is a case in point. That New Delhi should be publicly advising the state government to ‘allow’ peaceful protests (a part of the 8-point package) reflects poorly not only on the efficacy of the local administration but exposes the ugly reality of how actually (Indian) democracy is stifled in this part of the country. Union home minister P Chidambaram’s promise about ‘quiet dialogue’ has been too quiet to be noticed, much less acted upon, a year after it was made. Recommendations of the working groups set up by the Prime Minister’s Round Table on Kashmir have been forgotten. Confidence building measures capable of yielding substantial political dividends towards lasting solution of the basic dispute have been left hanging. It appears that some of the useful CBMs mooted by Omar Abdullah have been spiked by the military establishment known to be enjoying out-of-the-way supremacy over the civilian establishment in New Delhi so far as J&K goes. India and Pakistan are militarily poles apart (between them) from where they were way back in 1947. India in 2011 can afford to act with greater self-confidence in tackling its chronic Kashmir problem. For sure, that could be a game-changer. A churning has begun. Fissures within the NC-Congress ruling coalition over some of the key political issues is echoed by a wide open ideological rift within the separatist camp. This process of political and ideological re-alignments, triggered by the fallout of 2010 events, should be allowed to take its natural course in 2011 rather being artificially channelised with coercive intervention. The writer is a senior journalist and commentator based in Srinagar
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the
If still the ground
situation did not worsen to the extent it could have, the credit
should go to the sagacity and collective wisdom of the ordinary people
who remain wedded to their traditional composite identity. Reclaiming
their lost space is the task number one for the mainstream forces.
Easier said than done, though.