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PAKISTAN
WITH Pakistan entering 2011, a crucial year for the region, the country is exuding confidence and clarity regarding the geopolitical scenario, but there is confusion in domestic politics. This confusion has set the stage for political change, whose contours are not yet clear. On the regional scenario, Pakistan has started preparing for a post-America Afghanistan, with the US now even more dependent on Pakistani cooperation for the success of its strategy in that war-torn country. In fact, it would be no exaggeration to state that the political future of Barack Hussain Obama largely depends on how Pakistan assists the US in providing for an honourable and dignified military exit from Afghanistan. To prepare for this eventuality, Pakistan has made some significant moves:
On India, unlike allegations of "compulsive hostility", General Kayani is clear that India has a legitimate role and interests in the region but these should not be at Pakistan’s expense. When their meeting ended, Obama promised Kayani that "I will read every word of your paper." For a change, Pakistan’s leaders in mufti and khaki are on the same page as far as this strategic worldview goes. The biggest worry for Pakistani policy-makers is that the US brass might try to convert their failed military strategy in Afghanistan to make Pakistan a scapegoat, as seems the inclination through orchestrated media leads. In the last couple of years, Pakistan has withstood pressure from India’s ‘coercive diplomacy’ with US leaning on Pakistan to start a new offensive in North Waziristan. If there is clarity on Pakistan’s foreign policy, Pakistan’s political landscape presents confusion and an unravelling of the government that replaced the Musharraf Order in 2008. In the last couple of weeks, two key coalition allies of the government have bid goodbye to their PPP partner. This crisis comes in the context of three basic realities in Pakistani politics. First, a growing political distance between President Zardari, who remains the boss of the ruling party and his chosen Prime Minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani. Gilani is seen by Zardari as growing "too big for his boots" and taking decisions in an impulsive knee-jerk fashion, without clearance from the party chief, the latest example being the sacking of two ministers, which was the catalyst for the current crisis. Second, the Pakistan power structure is today no monolith, controlled exclusively by the military or political establishment. There are multiple power centres now that include the military and the political establishments, a truly independent judiciary run by the powerful and popular Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, a fiercely free media in which there are no ‘holy cows’, and a vibrant civil society, which influences perceptions and public opinion. In other words, no single institution or individual is in charge. Third, despite the crisis and the confusion in domestic politics, the military has no stomach to part with its hard-won credibility and popularity in the post-Musharraf era through its professionalism and apolitical approach. The military has no desire to meddle in politics or influence the course of political events. So, two things can be ruled out as of now: There will be no military takeover, and among the political forces, none of them is ready right now for an early election, with the country still combating terrorism and trying to overcome the aftermath of the flood devastation. There can be a range of political options in the current scenario:
Whatever happens, this is a sign of the coming of age and maturity of Pakistani democracy. At no time during this political wrangling has there been any call by the politicians for the military to intervene and, equally important, the military is showing a safe distance from politics, with neither the inclination nor interest to step in. That in itself is a positive sign for Pakistan as it enters what promises to be another turbulent year, with "great disorder under the heavens", as the Chinese would aptly put. The writer was a Senator and a former Cabinet Minister
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The centrepiece of this
Pakistani strategic worldview was clearly enunciated in a 14-page
document presented by Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, to President Obama during their meeting in the White
House in October 2010 on the sidelines of the Pakistan-US Strategic
Dialogue. In what is probably the most concise and clear enunciation
of Pakistan’s core national security interests on Afghanistan, India
and the US, General Kayani, a cerebral general with a calm demeanour,
talked candidly of the Pakistani perspective, urging the need for a
political strategy that can supplement military moves, while also
ensuring what is clearly the bottom line: Pakistan should not be
caught in ‘the wrong corner of the room’ when the time for the US
military exit comes.