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India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear
Stability in South Asia INDIA and Pakistan have had a violent relationship since the Partition of 1947. Pakistan has remained unhappy with the territorial arrangements and continued to view the division of Kashmir as "illegitimate". This has resulted in both the countries fighting four wars, and the mistrust and bitterness between the two countries have in no way reduced since then. The possession of nuclear technology by both the neighbours since 1998 and rapidly growing economy of India in recent times make South Asia a major player in international affairs.
It is important that the entire debate about nuclear stability in South Asia in the book is seen in the background of how the term "deterrence" is understood and interpreted. Assured destruction is the essence of the whole deterrence concept, as massive retaliation raises the cost of war which outweighs the gains from aggression. Ganguly believes that nuclear weapons have helped stabilise the security environment between India and Pakistan in the past, and are largely responsible for improved relationship between the two bitter enemies and that these improvements will continue in the future as well. Kapur, however, puts across a different argument that nuclear weapons have had a destabilising effect on South Asian security in the past, and have very little to do with the present improved relations and may destabilise the region in future. Growing instability in Pakistan is not a new thing. The new thing is that she has not learnt any lessons from the history and is speeding towards self-destruction. This is dangerous for India, with whom Pakistan will continue a proxy war at all costs. When the focus of Pakistan should be fighting terrorism, it is focusing on development of more nuclear warheads. The well-known link between the Taliban and Pakistan and many other terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and its parent organisation Jammat-ud-Dawa (JuD) operating in Pakistan has led to the growing fear of the bomb falling in wrong hands in future. This possibility has given a severe jolt to the US, a major player in the complex game, particularly after the 9/11 attacks. A chapter assesses the past impact of the nuclear weapons on South Asian security environment. While Ganguly asserts that three major confrontations of the nuclear era—the 1990 standoff, Kargil War and 2002 standoff—did not develop into a full-fledged conventional or nuclear war only because the two countries possessed the nuclear weapons. Kapur maintains that the three crises were facilitated by the nuclear weapons and had nothing to do with the crises not becoming major wars. The current strategic environment in South Asia is the subject matter of another chapter. Here Ganguly argues that the possession of nuclear weapons is responsible for the recent thaw in India-Pakistan relationship, in spite of many provocations for India from across the border. Kapur, on the other hand, argues that the credit for any improvements in the relationship of the two enemies or the current cold peace does not go to nuclear weapons but to economic, diplomatic and domestic compulsions of the two countries. The authors also look at the future Indo-Pakistani relations based on several global and regional levels. In this context, the role of the US and the evolution of existing political order in Pakistan are the two vital factors. Detailed notes at the
end of the book have a wealth of reference material which supports and
reinforces the basic argument of the authors throughout the book. It
provides a deep insight into the impact of nuclear weapons on the
rivalry between India and Pakistan. This well-written book can be
useful to policymakers, defence analysts and officers in the armed
forces.
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After
the US used nuclear weapons on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, such weapons became the first category of weapons that
appeared non-usable and the concept of "nuclear deterrence"
was introduced, which made war obsolete. Countries with nuclear
weapons realised that victory in war was too dangerous to fight for.
The fear of irreparable damage prevented war and the escalation of
conflict in the Cold War period. Presently, all available analysis of
nuclear proliferation anywhere is coloured with the experiences of
Cold War history. However, Ganguly and Kapur have adopted the unique
approach of debating the two different points of view related with the
impact of nuclear weapons on South Asia’s past, present and future.
This helps the reader to develop a more pragmatic and balanced
understanding of the issue on his own.