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The United States Ballistic Missile Defence: International Chaos or Deterrence THIS book explores whether the development and deployment of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system strengthens deterrence, as conceived by the US at different points of time, or adds to the already enough chaos and reduces the impact of deterrence. It essentially deals with relationship between deterrence and BMD during the Cold War, and the changes in relationship during the post-Cold War period when the weapons were seen as instruments for prevention of war rather than for destruction.
The chapter BMD and Deterrence gives insight into various deterrence relationships, positive as well as negative. To understand the relationship between BMD and deterrence, as well as defence, one must appreciate that the aim of any missile defence system is to identify enemy missiles and to destroy them before they hit the target. However, the US missile defence has always been adversely commented upon by experts and analysts. Sha Zukang, China’s top disarmament official, had this to say on the potential threat of the proposed US missile defence system: "It’s a paper tiger—fierce enough to frighten away cowards only." The author explains how the withdrawal of the ABM treaty by the US resulted in complete fall of the doctrine of the Mutual Assured Deterrence (MAD) and why it led to the belief in the US that BMD would provide more credibility to the concept of deterrence. However, three main arguments go against the missile defence doctrine—first, the missile defences do not support deterrence theory; second, it would provide first-strike capability to those countries which do not possess BMD; and third, the efficacy of missiles against biological weapons and cruise missiles remains low. The author has also attempted to analyse US President Obama’s new security challenges after taking over. During campaigning, Obama showed interest in attaining goal of ‘global zero’ rather than building BMD. However, due to many considerations like proliferation nexus, i.e., the China link and cooperation among Pakistan, Iran and North Korea, he is likely to have a re-look at the BMD policy. It has been established that though BMD can deal with some of the missile threats, it does not strengthen deterrence posture and is not fully effective technologically. Also, economic investments made in the BMD program and huge dollars spent in Iraq and Afghanistan are some of the other factors which the US has to consider. The US relationship with China and Russia, in the background of their security concerns, is the subject matter of another chapter. As it is well known, the USA’s growing domination of South East Asia is of special concern to China because of the Taiwan issue. The US and China are competing with each other for dominance of this region, which is the fourth largest trade partner of the US, and so it has strengthened its military alliance and cooperation with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia and Philippines to counter Chinese threat perceived by these countries. The chapter Assessment of Political and Technical Implications of BMD provides useful insight into the impact of the US missile defence on China and Russia’s nuclear deterrence credibility and their response. The last chapter sums up the utility and/or futility of the BMD program. The US administration must listen to the sane advice of Franklin D. Roosevelt who commented, "You cannot organise civilisation around the core of militarism and at the same time expect reason to control human destinies". At places the author repeats the argument to support her viewpoint, which may be seen by the reader as an effort to stretch the useful material. She wants the reader to "note the distinction between deterrence and defence" on page 3 and also ‘clarifies’ it on page 56 using exactly the same words. The ‘Notes’ and the ‘Annexure’ add value to the book as a good reference material for research scholars and defence analysts.
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According
to the author, the concept of ‘balance of power’ adopted during
the 18th and 19th centuries before the introduction of nuclear weapons
was similar to the concept of deterrence. Nuclear weapons were seen as
a ‘means to deter’, and not as means to achieve victory, as they
were ‘non-usable’ because they could result in complete
destruction in a few seconds. Though the Soviet Union had nuclear
weapons as far back as 1949, the concept of nuclear deterrence made
war obsolete as it made the victory in war too dangerous to fight for.
Bernard Brodie in his book The Absolute Weapon said, "The
chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From
now on its chief purpose must be to avert war."