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Global Power Shifts and Strategic Transition in Asia A large-size, heavy tome running into almost 400 pages of close print ‘Global Power Shifts’ deals with some challenging issues relating to Asia, the end-product of a seminar held at Delhi in the first week of February (2008) to discuss the ‘strategic outlook’ of Asia’s major political actors and their multilateral framework for ‘managing conflict and fostering cooperation’. The book is divided into four parts, the first two dealing with regional perspectives while the third spells out how Asia’s transition could be managed through a cooperative framework. The last and the final segment furnishes an overview of trends in the discourse on Japanese and Chinese nationalism and how the two may impact the ‘stability and security’ of Asia. On the face of it, here is an ambitious work that raises important issues deserving of close and careful scrutiny. The editors start with the general premise that Asia is witnessing ‘a profound transition’ from a conglomerate of disparate and ‘essentially agrarian and inward looking’ states to one ‘increasingly regionally/internationally integrated’ network, which is at the same time ‘urbanised, industrialised, (and) outward-looking’. It is tempting to start by questioning the premise and asking whether modernisation and adaptation to globalisation are by themselves Asia specific. More, is the ongoing realignment in the great power relations and the ‘increasing tendency for armed struggles, terrorism and other violent expressions’ of discontent limited to this part of the world? Again, is a ‘significant spread of democracy’ in the post-Cold War period only an Asian phenomenon? Which part of the world today including the US, one may ask, is immune from terrorist attacks? Afghan-Pakistan is certainly much in the news but how about Israel or Palestine. And Iraq, or Iran, for that matter?`A0And nearer home, the more recent Naxalite/Maoist bouts of raw violence in Jharkhand. The sad fact is that today one searches in vain for a land that is at peace with itself. The book throws up a rich variety of interesting themes, including ‘the Asian transition’ and ‘India’s emerging strategy’. What excited this reviewer’s curiosity were the ‘Chinese concept of ‘Twenty Years’ strategic opportunity and its implications for Asian security’, ‘the history and practice of unilateralism in East Asia’, ‘Australia and the Asian strategic context’, ‘Japanese nationalism and its implications for Asian security’ and ‘Chinese nationalism and India’s security.’ Some observations make for interesting reading. Russia ‘perhaps’ fears the eastward extension of NATO and therefore wants to secure itself through the Chinese connection; notwithstanding Western sanctions, ‘Iran will survive because of China’; Beijing is investing heavily in America’s backyard—in Canada, Cuba and Venezuela. And there is talk too of a pipeline all the way from Brazil to Beijing. The latter’s desire for a peaceful international environment is real for it has inter alia promoted the concept of an East Asian community and improved relations with the European Union, Russia—and India. In an ever-anarchic international order the concepts of ‘bandwagon and balance’ should go hand in hand, both are necessary policy tools for states. While in opposition, the mandarin-speaking Australian premier Kevin Rudd’s qualified approach towards Japan could be contrasted with his post-assumption of office enthusiasm for a more comprehensive, and longer-term, China connection. There is a great deal on the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), especially in its relationship to the current geopolitical crisis in Central Asia. The initiative is seen as a thinly veiled attempt to blunt the American influence and implant a Russian foothold in Asia. China is keen that SCO develop into a nascent trading organisation loosely based on the European Union model. More, it wants to use SCO as a template for creating a China-centric ‘architecture of relations’ in Asia—and the world. A comparison of ASEAN and SAARC makes for interesting reading. The latter comes out poorly, especially in its failure in enhancing regional economic and environmental security and controlling transnational organised crime. There is a growing concern about Japanese nationalism raising its ugly head again. A revealing statistic—whereas in 2005 only 32 per cent of Japanese entertained a friendly feeling towards China, the figure was 50 per cent a decade earlier, in 1995. The strong and weak points of this study are rooted in its origin. Seminar papers by definition date and before long are overtaken by events, new research and fresh insights. They are uneven at best. More, this is an IDSA in-house publication. And the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses is a Ministry of Defence outfit funded entirely by the government.
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