A re-look at history
Randeep Wadehra

The Partition of India
by Anita Inder Singh.
National Book Trust. Pages 91. Rs 35.

Even after six decades, Partition does not fail to arouse deep interest—both at emotional as well as intellectual levels. There have been serious attempts in the past to find out whether the Partition was avoidable and/or who was primarily responsible for it. This book takes a re-look at the events and tries to ascertain the culpability of main actors in the tragic drama.

While reading this history-in-capsule, one realises that the author has identified three main dramatis personae on the sub-continental stage, each working at cross-purposes with the others as the momentum for India’s independence gathered strength, thus pushing the events towards cataclysmic denouement. The British were loathe to give up their hold on India as it was vital to their post-World War ambitions for retaining their global power. If at all it became essential to grant independence, then it would be to an undivided India that would allow Great Britain to hold Defence and a few other important portfolios. The Congress wanted an absolutely sovereign and united India while remaining in the Commonwealth. The Jinnah-led Muslim League was working towards carving out a homeland for Muslims—an independent and sovereign Pakistan. So, prima facie, it should have been natural for the Congress and the imperial government to unite in thwarting Jinnah’s designs. But it was a strange paradox of history that the British sided with the Muslim League till it was too late. The author attributes this to the psychological barrier on the part of the British. She gives clean chit to both the Congress and the imperialists and blames Jinnah for the blood-drenched partition.

This raises certain questions. For example, didn’t the Congress party allow Muslim League to win by default when it boycotted the NWFP plebiscite—a strategic blunder in its attempts to prevent the partition? Even if joining hands with the Congress was anathema to the British, what stopped them from promoting the inter-communal Unionist Party—rather than the virulently communal Muslim—as a counterweight? After all the Unionists had majority support in the Punjab and had cooperated with the Crown’s war efforts during the World War. Moreover, they had been generally non-confrontationist in attitude. If the British were serious about leaving behind an undivided India, why the likes of Suhrawardy were allowed to get away with engineering riots in Bengal? More pertinently, when the League’s National Guards were canvassing for support in the Punjab by resorting to communal propaganda the Governor turned a blind eye. Consequently, the vote share of the Muslim League rose from about 4 per cent in 1937 to 80 per cent in 1945! Their silence and inaction denoted acquiescence to Jinnah’s designs. Obviously, the British had no interest in India’s unity. This becomes clear when you witness their subsequent policy on the Kashmir issue.

Singh has also not done justice to Patel’s role in forging of a united India even as she eagerly stands up against "Nehru-bashing." She is right in rebutting certain myths that have inevitably crept in with the passage of time, but to lose sight of the big picture is not acceptable.

Finally, in the very first chapter, she avers that countries partitioned on religious and ethnic grounds have only resulted in "running sores" and have done no good to world peace. She cites Ireland, Cyprus, Palestine and other countries as examples, and blames big powers for the same. She is right, especially when one witnesses the reunions of ethno-religiously near-homogenous but ideologically divided nations like Vietnam and Germany. But what about the two Koreas? Perhaps their reunion does not suit the geo-strategic interests of China, Russia and the USA.

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