Mushroom shadow
Sridhar K Chari

Second Strike: Arguments about Nuclear War in South Asia.
by Rajesh Rajagopalan. Penguin Viking. Pages 237. Rs 395.

It seems a little late in the day to release a book arguing that notwithstanding the nuclear tests of 1998 by India and Pakistan, the nuclear dangers in the subcontinent are exaggerated and the two countries are not exactly on the verge of a thermo-nuclear exchange. This is the essential theme of Rajesh Rajagopalan’s book, and to that extent, the effort does not escape a dated feel. And one is not even thinking of how the recent Indo-US joint statement might begin to change the equation.

The fact is that Indian strategists, scholars and students of international relations and members of whatever passes for think-tanks in India have been debating this question since 1998. The "no dangers here" argument has been made several times. And they have also run into an interesting paradox.

To counter international pressure, which was largely on the lines of "we can have it but you can’t, because we know how to take care of it, but you don’t", India has had to argue that the nuclear equation in South Asia is no more unsafe or unstable than it was during the Cold War in the West. On the contrary, nuclear deterrence is all about holding out an effective and credible threat against either all hostile action, or against nuclear weapon use. In many ways, arguments stressing stability are almost counter-productive. Much therefore has been written about nuclear doctrines and strategies, about no-first-use policies, and whether the 1998 tests have enhanced our security. To many, Pakistan has played the game better, by stressing the dangers and seemingly indicating a very low threshold at every opportunity.

Rajagopalan’s book does not really dwell on this paradox. Rather, his aim is to conclude that the "nuclear threshold and the nuclear taboo is not about to be violated in South Asia." His approach is to tackle the question using the nuclear doctrines adopted by the two countries. India actually has some kind of a declared doctrine, with an initial "draft" followed later by an actual policy articulation. Pakistan’s doctrine is largely inferred. Pakistan has refused to reciprocate India’s ‘No-first-use’ doctrine on the grounds that it will render Pakistan more vulnerable to India’s conventional weapons superiority.

While this has been seen by many as an attempt to set a low nuclear threshold on the escalation ladder, the author, in the most useful sections of the book, looks at various crisis situations, including Kargil and Operation Parakram, to marshal some evidence that Pakistan has a ‘first use but last resort’ kind of doctrine. He writes: "Like other nuclear powers before, when faced with a choice, they have preferred politically painful compromises rather than using these weapons to overcome military disadvantages."

The effort is a good introduction to the subject, accessible and well written, but don’t expect any dramatic new insights.

HOME