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Shedding Shibboleths is a collection of his writings in newspapers from the mid-1980s to 1998 (the year of the Shakti atomic tests), rearranged into thematic chapters by Arthur Monteiro. The purpose of the book, says Subrahmanyam in his preface, is to address what he calls a deficit in strategic thinking in the country. Indeed, the most valuable section of the book is Part I, where Subrahmanyam discourses on Indian strategic perspectives and policy-making or rather the lack of it, and various issues relating to defence R & D and production, arms acquisition, the structure of the armed forces, and the intelligence services. He makes a strong case for clear policies, whether it is to do with our general defence or foreign policy, on specific issues like nuclear weapons, or towards countries like China. As he points out, the absence of such articulation, compounded by a short-sighted policy on release of information, "leads to wide variation in perceptions and understandings which others tend to exploit." India has yet to learn that information and views made available in the public domain are important tools in diplomacy. What is more, this lack of a coherent national strategy prevents "India’s enormous bargaining advantage in its large market" from being put to effective use in international politics. "There is no unipolar world, and exaggerating US power is counter productive. The US will need India in the future global management of a polycentric world." He stresses on the importance of military capability, noting that diplomacy cannot enhance security unless it is backed by "meaningful capability". He urges an increased role for think-tanks and academic institutions in providing inputs for policy-making, and sharply criticises the widespread "we know best" attitude of the defence and external affairs ministries. As he notes however, the dozens of departments that exist in international relations and defence studies in the country, "hardly produce any worthwhile literature." That still holds true, with the exception of one or two bright spots. One of the spin-offs of increased interaction between government on the one hand and think-tanks, academia and media persons on the other, may well be an improvement in the quality of the output coming from the latter group. All chapters brim with insights, warnings, and useful policy prescriptions. He can also be quite entertaining – the chapter on intelligence reads like a spy thriller, while his critique of the generalist bureaucracy and the Vikramaditya syndrome (the chair I sit on will give me the wisdom and knowledge needed to discharge my duties) will bring forth nods of recognition from long-suffering souls from both outside and within the bureaucracy. The kickback culture is still very much with us, and "preference for large scale defence imports has got entangled with raising funds for political purposes," he observes. Then comes a dire warning - "kickbacks on an arms deal are the surest opening to intelligence penetration of our national security apparatus," given that those who take money are vulnerable to blackmail. "Some scandals are deliberately leaked to apply pressure on certain other highly placed individuals." Many of the other pieces in the book are historical, anecdotal or reflective. Some of the pieces occasionally feel dated, but such instances are few. In any case, as the author himself acknowledges, a book on the post-1998 phase covering issues raised by the nuclear tests and the Kargil war will be needed. While we are waiting, we can ponder Subrahmanyam’s definition of security, something students and scholars of international relations and strategic studies are grappling with around the world: "Security has to be redefined as management of change in an orderly way and harmonisation of conflicting interests, views and perspectives between different groups within the nation and among the nations." Much of international
relations and strategic studies depend on western concepts and models;
quite understandable, at one level, considering that the international
system we live in is a western creation. On the other hand, there is an
urgent need to create our own framework and not come up with stale,
derivative arguments and analyses. Subrahmanyam’s definition of
security is an excellent starting point for government, the specialist
and the layman, who want to engage in strategic thinking. |
HAILED
as the Bhishma Pitamaha of Indian security studies, K. Subrahmanyam is
the most authoritative voice on matters relating to defence, foreign
policy and international affairs in the country. His is also a
trenchant, original and compassionate voice, worthy of being savoured
not just by specialists in strategic studies, but anyone interested in
the future of this nation.