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Fearful Symmetry:
India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons
This book by two professors of two different US universities is an attempt to analyse factors that have been at play in Indo-Pakistan relations since the early 80s, right up to the present times. Particularly, it covers all the major and minor flash points since the two neighbours became nuclear weapon states. It counts six such crises—big and small—that India and Pakistan have weathered while remaining engaged in an intense nuclear arms race. The list begins with the time in 1984 when the Indian Government contemplated making preventive air strikes on Pakistan’s evolving nuclear facilities. Alarmed, Pakistan made it clear that it would hit India’s nuclear facilities, which would spread deadly radiation in populated areas. Both restrained themselves and subsequently arrived at an agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear establishments. In 1986-87, India’s military exercise "Brasstacks" created a month-long crisis. In 1990, there was a crisis over Kashmir insurgency. Despite all the military build-up and frightening perceptions, these crises were resolved peacefully. Then came the 1998 nuclear tests by the two countries. The armies were put on high alert, but once again an armed conflict was avoided. In 1998-99, Pakistani infiltration into Kargil evoked a robust Indian reaction. Even this armed conflict was contained within the Indian side and Indian troops never went across the Line of Control (LoC). After the 2001 Pakistani-supported terrorist attack on Indian Parliament, India mobilised its military forces along the international border and the LoC in Kashmir. Pakistan responded with a similar build-up on its side. About one million highly armed Indian and Pakistani troops stared at one another till the situation was defused in the autumn of 1992. A shooting war was once again avoided. All these crises, except Kargil, were resolved without recourse to bloodshed. Even in Kargil, the conflict was kept limited to the territory of Kashmir. The book tries to answer one basic question: What accounts for the fact that India and Pakistan have avoided a major war over the past two decades despite all the mutual provocations and mistrust that suggest that South Asia is sitting on a nuclear tinder-box. The book offers three theories to explain this central puzzle: (1) Unipolarity theory, (2) Nuclear deterrence theory and (3) Conventional deterrence theory. The first theory lays down that the Indian and Pakistani governments, despite compelling incentives to attack each other during the crises, were dissuaded from doing so by timely and forceful US intervention. The nuclear deterrence theory maintains that the two countries were restrained by the fear that the war might escalate to the nuclear level. The conventional deterrence theory holds that the countries were stopped by their lack of sufficient conventional military superiority to pursue a successful blitzkrieg strategy. And the main conclusion is that nuclear deterrence provides the best explanation for the absence of war in the region. US intervention has played only a secondary, yet important role, particularly during the Kargil crisis when the US administration prevailed upon the Pakistanis to end the incursion. The third proposition is the weakest because India almost always had the capability to inflict a strong blitzkrieg, but always chose a different course of action. The book concludes with
the observation that though the US has limited influence over Indian and
Pakistani decision-making on nuclear weapons, it can do a much better
job of addressing the political conflicts between the two countries. The
final section contains a step-by-step roadmap for the use of US
influence to promote positive Indo-Pakistan relations. It acknowledges
that the chances of setting the Kashmir dispute are slim, but the fear
that another crisis might escalate to fearful proportions make the
authors plead for a more proactive stance on the part of US
policy-makers. |
South
Asia watchers have often wondered how India and Pakistan have managed to
avoid a major war in the past two decades despite all the mutual
distrust, political tensions and the conflict over Kashmir. They get all
the more baffled when they see two chronically belligerent states now
trying to chart a course of friendship and mutual confidence in South
Asia’s nuclear era.