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OFF THE SHELF Punjab Politics,
1936-1939:
Two important appendices are enclosed in the volume, the first on the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, October 1937; and the other, Outlines of a Scheme for India, February 1939. Lionel Carter, former Librarian, Centre of South Asian Studies, University of Cambridge (1980-1999) had assisted Nicholas Mansergh in editing his monumental work on the Transfer of Power India series (1942-47), which has become a standard reference work on the last phase of the Raj. The volume focuses on the working of the provincial autonomy in Punjab under the leadership of the Unionist Party. The Governors wrote their reports on the basis of information from various sources, especially from their colleagues in the Council, intelligence, government officials and important public men. The reports contain the Governors’ understanding and perception of the men and affairs in Punjab. Under the 1935 Constitution, the governors had special powers, which they could use in emergency. The first Unionist Ministry under the new Constitution took over in 1937. Besides the Premier Sikander Hyat Khan, the other members of the Council of Ministers were Sir Sunder Singh Majithia, Sir Chottu Ram, Sir Manohar Lal, Mian Abdul Haye and Khizar Hyat Khan. The question arises did the unionist government have a concrete policy? The Indian National Congress was fighting for the freedom of the country. The Muslim League was claiming for the protection of Muslim rights, which were "threatened" by the Hindu majoritarian domination. The main plank of the Unionist government’s policy was to relieve the peasantry from their impoverished condition. For the first time, within the British system, an elected government based on a limited franchise had come to power. There were several sensitive issues it had to handle: communal riots, Sunni-Ahamadiya fracas, Shahidganj, agitation, famine in South-East Punjab, teachers’ strike in Khalsa College, Amritsar, etc. The relationship between the governors and his Council of Ministers were free and easy, and they could discuss matters of public interest without reservation. Sir Herbert Emerson was cogent and reflective in his reports, while Sir Henry Craik was businesslike and matter of fact. Sir Sikander was tactful in his dealings with the governors. Courteous, affable, soft-spoken, moderate and well meaning in disposition, Sir Sikander would prefer a settlement to a drastic solution. From the outbreak of World War II, Sir Sikander had supported Britain in her hour of trial, and did as much as he could to stimulate India’s war effort. He realised that any effort to thwart Britain’s war effort would be inimical to India’s Constitutional advancement for self-government. By his unstinted support to war effort, Sir Sikander won the confidence of the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, and the Punjab governors. The Muslim league was hesitant then in lending any military support to the British. The documents show that Sir Sikander was opposed to the idea of Pakistan. His formula for breaking the deadlock suggested the grouping of all the provinces and states in seven regions. According to his proposal, the regions would be federal, the provinces and states retaining their autonomy. He met Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru in 1939 and tried to persuade them to support his federal scheme. He also advised them not to oppose the British war effort, but the Congress chose the warpath, much to its peril. Did Sir Sikander sign the death warrant of the Unionist Party by forging the Sikander- Jinnah Pact, Lucknow, in October 1937? Was he hustled into it due to his political naivety? How is it that he fell into Jinnah’s trap and mortgaged the future of his party? What led him to do so? Was it the impulse of the moment at the Lucknow session of the Muslim League in 1937 to ward off criticism against the inter-communal partnership of his ministry that he thought it prudent to appease his detractors? According to the pact, all Muslim members of the Unionist Party who were not members of the Muslim League would be advised to sign its creed, and would be subject to the rules and regulations of the Central and Provincial Boards of the All India Muslim League. It was agreed also that the Punjab coalition ministry would not be affected by it. Probably, Fazl-I-Husain, Sir Sikander’s mentor, would not have signed the pact. He had distrusted Jinnah and shown him the door. Jinnah felt humiliated and vowed never to return to Punjab. Since then, communal differences had aggravated and national politics was impinging on the provinces. Sikander’s calculation was to support Jinnah in all-India politics, while expecting his Muslim League not to create problems in the functioning of his ministry. He wanted to gain time to mobilise resources to work his Federal India scheme. His premature death at the end of 1942 blasted his hopes and opened the gates for Jinnah’s politics and propaganda. By all standards, Sir
Sikander Hyat Khan stands in the first rank of Indian statesmen. It is
men like Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, C. Rajagopalachari and Maulana Abul
Kalam Azad, who could by their vision and flexibility, have averted the
disaster of Partition in 1947. Lionel Carter’s work is precise and
insightful. How one wishes that he had carried the story up to Sir
Sikander’s death in 1942 or to March 1940 when the Pakistan resolution
was passed in Lahore. |
IN addition to the editor’s
short introduction, the volume contains in full the fortnightly reports
of the Governor of Punjab to the Viceroy (with copies to the Secretary
of State to India) from October 1936 to the end of 1939. Some enclosures
relating to the points raised in the reports are also included with few
additional documents. The reports are essentially the work of two
governors, Sir Herbert Emerson and Sir Henry Craik, but the single
person who dominates the volume is Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, first premier
of Punjab under the 1937 constitutional arrangements.